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Operations in Fiscal Year 2007 
A.  Summary 
The National Labor Relations Board, an independent Federal agency, 
initiates no cases: it acts only on those cases brought before it.  All 
proceedings originate from filings by the major segment of the public 
covered by the National Labor Relations Act—employees, labor unions, 
and private employers who are engaged in interstate commerce.  During 
fiscal year 2007, 25,649 cases were received by the Board. 
The public filed 22,331 charges alleging that employers or labor 
organizations committed unfair labor practices prohibited by the statute, 
which adversely affected employees.  During this period the NLRB also 
received 3,318 representation petitions, including 3056 petitions to 
conduct secret-ballot elections in which workers in appropriate groups 
select or reject unions to represent them in collective bargaining with 
their employers as well as 94 petitions for elections in which workers 
voted on whether to rescind existing union-security agreements.  The 
NLRB also received 6 petitions to amend the certification of existing 
collective-bargaining representatives and 162 petitions to clarify existing 
collective-bargaining units.  
After the initial influx of charges and petitions, the flow narrows 
because the great majority of the newly filed cases are resolved in 
NLRB’s national network of field offices by dismissals, withdrawals, 
agreements, and settlements. 
During fiscal year 2007, the five-member Board was composed of 
Chairman Robert J. Battista and Members Wilma B. Liebman, Peter C. 
Schaumber, Peter N. Kirsanow, and Dennis P. Walsh.  Ronald Meisburg 
served as General Counsel. 
Statistical highlights of NLRB’s casehandling activities in fiscal 
20071 include: 
• The NLRB conducted 1,905 conclusive representation elections 
among some 101,551 employee voters, with workers choosing labor 
unions as their bargaining agents in 54.9 percent of the elections. 
• Although the Agency closed 26,727 cases, 12,324 cases were 
pending in all stages of processing at the end of the fiscal year.  The 
closings included 23,130 cases involving unfair labor practice charges, 
3332 cases affecting employee representation, and 103 related cases. 
                                                          
1 Note: The numbers in Chapter I vary slightly in some instances from equivalent numbers in the 
tables in the back of this report. 
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• Settlements, avoiding formal litigation while achieving the goal 
of equitable remedies in unfair labor practice situations, numbered 8149. 
• The amount of $124,365,988 in reimbursement to employees 
illegally discharged or otherwise discriminated against in violation of 
their organizational rights was obtained by the NLRB from employers 
and unions.  This total was for lost earnings, fees, dues, and fines.  The 
NLRB obtained 1771 offers of job reinstatements, with 1273 
acceptances. 
• Acting on the results of professional staff investigations, which 
produced a reasonable cause to believe unfair labor practices had been 
committed, Regional Offices of the NLRB issued 1099 complaints, 
setting the cases for hearing. 
• NLRB’s corps of administrative law judges issued 212 decisions, 
of which 22 were noncomplaint election objection cases. 
 
NLRB Administration 
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency 
created in 1935 by Congress to administer the basic law governing 
relations between labor unions and business enterprises engaged in 
interstate commerce.  This statute, the National Labor Relations Act, 
came into being at a time when labor disputes could and did threaten the 
Nation’s economy. 
Declared constitutional by the Supreme Court in 1937, the Act was 
substantially amended in 1947, 1959, and 1974, each amendment 
increasing the scope of the NLRB’s regulatory powers. 
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The purpose of the Nation’s primary labor relations law is to serve the 
public interest by reducing interruptions in commerce caused by 
industrial strife.  It seeks to do this by providing orderly processes for 
protecting and implementing the respective rights of employees, 
employers, and unions in their relations with one another.  The overall 
job of the NLRB is to achieve this goal through administration, 
interpretation, and enforcement of the Act. 
In its statutory assignment, the NLRB has two principal functions: (1) 
to determine and implement, through secret-ballot elections, the free 
democratic choice by employees as to whether they wish to be 
represented by a union in dealing with their employers and, if so, by 
which union; and (2) to prevent and remedy unlawful acts, called unfair 
labor practices, by either employers or unions or both. 
The NLRB does not act on its own motion in either function.  It 
processes only those charges of unfair labor practices and petitions for 
employee elections which are filed in the NLRB’s Regional, 
Subregional, and Resident Offices, which numbered 51 during fiscal year 
2007. 
The Act’s unfair labor practice provisions place certain restrictions on 
actions of employers and labor organizations in their relations with 
employees, as well as with each other.  Its election provisions provide 
mechanics for conducting and certifying results of representation 
elections to determine collective-bargaining wishes of employees, 
including balloting to determine whether a union shall continue to have 
the right to make a union-shop contract with an employer. 
In handling unfair labor practices and election petitions, the NLRB is 
concerned with the adjustment of labor disputes either by way of 
settlements or through its quasi-judicial proceedings, or by way of secret-
ballot employee elections. 
The NLRB has no independent statutory power of enforcement of its 
decisions and orders.  It may, however, seek enforcement in the U.S. 
courts of appeals, and parties to its cases also may seek judicial review. 
NLRB authority is divided by law and by delegation.  The five-
member Board primarily acts as a quasi-judicial body in deciding cases 
on formal records.  The General Counsel, who, like each Member of the 
Board, is appointed by the President, is responsible for the issuance and 
prosecution of formal complaints in cases leading to Board decision, and 
has general supervision of the NLRB’s nationwide network of offices. 
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For the conduct of its formal hearings in unfair labor practice cases, 
the NLRB employs administrative law judges who hear and decide cases. 
Administrative law judges’ decisions may be appealed to the Board by 
the filing of exceptions.  If no exceptions are taken, the administrative 
law judges’ orders become orders of the Board. 
All cases coming to the NLRB begin their processing in the Regional 
Offices.  Regional Directors, in addition to processing unfair labor 
practice cases in the initial stages, also have the authority to investigate 
representation petitions, to determine units of employees appropriate for 
collective-bargaining purposes, to conduct elections, and to pass on 
objections to conduct of elections.  There are provisions for appeal of 
representation and election questions to the Board. 
 
Operations in Fiscal Year 2007 5 
 
 
B.  Operational Highlights 
1.  Unfair Labor Practices 
Charges that business firms, labor organizations, or both have 
committed unfair labor practices are filed with the National Labor 
Relations Board at its field offices nationwide by employees, unions, and 
employers.  These cases provide a major segment of the NLRB 
workload. 
Following their filing, charges are investigated by the Regional 
professional staff to determine whether there is reasonable cause to 
believe that the Act has been violated.  If such cause is not found, the 
Regional Director dismisses the charge or it is withdrawn by the 
charging party.  If the charge has merit, the Regional Director seeks 
voluntary settlement or adjustment by the parties to the case to remedy 
the apparent violation; however, if settlement efforts fail, the case goes to 
hearing before an NLRB administrative law judge and, lacking 
settlement at later stages, on to decision by the five-member Board. 
In fiscal year 2007, 22,331 unfair labor practice charges were filed 
with the NLRB, a decrease of 3 percent from the 23,091 filed in fiscal 
year 2006.  In situations in which related charges are counted as a single 
unit, there was a decrease of 2 percent from the preceding fiscal year.  
(Chart 2.) 
Alleged violations of the Act by employers were filed in 16,291 cases, 
a decrease of 3.5 percent from the 16,887 of 2006.  Charges against 
unions decreased 2.9 percent to 5992 from 6172 in 2006. 
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There were 48 charges of violation of Section 8(e) of the Act, which 
bans hot-cargo agreements.  (Tables 1A and 2.) 
The majority of all charges against employers alleged illegal refusal 
to bargain.  There were 8178 such charges in 54.4 percent of the total 
charges that employers committed violations. 
Alleged illegal discharge or other discrimination against employees 
was the second largest category of allegations against employers, 
comprising 6853 charges, in about 45.6 percent of the total charges.  
(Table 2.) 
Of charges against unions, the majority (5,188) alleged illegal 
restraint and coercion of employees, about 84.4 percent.  There were 473 
charges against unions for illegal secondary boycotts and jurisdictional 
disputes, a decrease of 1 percent from the 479 of 2006. 
There were 476 charges (about 7.7 percent) of illegal union 
discrimination against employees, a decrease of 13 percent from the 549 
of 2006.  There were 63 charges that unions picketed illegally for 
recognition or for organizational purposes, compared with 74 charges in 
2004.  (Table 2.) 
In charges filed against employers, unions led with about 73.5 percent 
of the total. Unions filed 11,978 charges and individuals filed 4263. 
 
Concerning charges against unions, 4959 were filed by individuals, or 
82.8 percent of the total of 5,992.  Employers filed 943 and other unions 
filed the 90 remaining charges. 
In fiscal year 2007, 23,012 unfair labor practice cases were closed. 
Some 96 percent were closed by NLRB Regional Offices, roughly 
equivalent to the previous year’s 96 percent.  During the fiscal year, 41.4 
percent of the cases were settled or adjusted before issuance of 
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administrative law judges’ decisions, 31.5 percent were withdrawn 
before complaint, and 29.2 percent were administratively dismissed. 
In evaluation of the Regional workload, the number of unfair labor 
practice charges found to have merit is important—the higher the merit 
factor the more litigation required.  In fiscal year 2007, 38.7 percent of 
the unfair labor practice cases were found to have merit. 
When the Regional Offices determine that charges alleging unfair 
labor practices have merit, attempts at voluntary resolution are stressed—
to improve labor-management relations and to reduce NLRB litigation 
and related casehandling.  Settlement efforts have been successful to a 
substantial degree.  In fiscal year 2007, precomplaint settlements and 
adjustments were achieved in 6678 cases, or 29 percent of the charges.  
In 2006, the percentage was 35.2.  (Chart 5.) 
 
Cases of merit not settled by the Regional Offices produce formal 
complaints, issued on behalf of the General Counsel.  This action 
initiates hearings before administrative law judges.  During 2007, 1099 
complaints were issued, compared with 1272 in the preceding fiscal year.  
(Chart 6A.) 
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Of complaints issued, 88.4 percent were against employers and 10.6 
percent against unions. 
NLRB Regional Offices processed cases from filing of charges to 
issuance of complaints in a median of 96 days.  The 96 days included 15 
days in which parties had the opportunity to adjust charges and remedy 
violations without resorting to formal NLRB processes.  (Chart 6B.) 
 
Additional settlements occur before, during, and after hearings before 
administrative law judges.  The judges issued 190 decisions in 361 cases 
during 2007.  They conducted 162 initial hearings, and 20 additional 
hearings in supplemental matters.  (Chart 8 and Table 3A.) 
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By filing exceptions to judges’ findings and recommended rulings, 
parties may bring unfair labor practice cases to the Board for final NLRB 
decision. 
In fiscal year 2007, the Board issued 288 decisions in unfair labor 
practice cases contested as to the law and/or the facts—213 initial 
decisions, 13 backpay decisions, 6 determinations in jurisdictional work 
dispute cases, and 56 decisions on supplemental matters.  Of the 213 
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initial decision cases, 195 involved charges filed against employers and 
18 had union respondents. 
 
For the year, the NLRB awarded backpay of $117.3 million.  (Chart 
9)  Reimbursement for unlawfully exacted fees, dues, and fines added 
about another $7,023,249.  Backpay is lost wages caused by unlawful 
discharge and other discriminatory action detrimental to employees, 
offset by earnings elsewhere after the discrimination.  About 1771 
employees were offered reinstatement, and 72 percent accepted. 
At the end of fiscal 2007, there were 12,324 unfair labor practice 
cases being processed at all stages by the NLRB, compared to 13,123 
cases pending at the beginning of the year. 
2.  Representation Cases  
The NLRB received 3318 representation and related case petitions in 
fiscal 2007, compared to 3637 such petitions a year earlier. 
The 2007 total consisted of 2394 petitions pursuant to which the 
NLRB conducted secret-ballot elections where workers select or reject 
unions to represent them in collective bargaining; 662 petitions to 
decertify existing bargaining agents; 94 deauthorization petitions for 
referendums on rescinding a union’s authority to enter into union-shop 
contracts; and 162 petitions for unit clarification to determine whether 
certain classifications of employees should be included in or excluded 
from existing bargaining units.  Additionally, 6 amendment of 
certification petitions were filed. 
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During the year, 3597 representation and related cases were closed, 
compared to 3848 in fiscal 2006.  Cases closed included 2647 collective-
bargaining election petitions; 685 decertification election petitions; 103 
requests for deauthorization polls; and 162 petitions for unit clarification 
and amendment of certification.  (Tables 1 and 1B and Chart 14) 
The overwhelming majority of elections conducted by the NLRB 
resulted from some form of agreement by the parties on when, where, 
and among whom the voting should occur.  Such agreements are 
encouraged by the Agency.  In 4.4 percent of representation cases closed 
by elections, balloting was ordered by NLRB Regional Directors 
following a hearing on points in issue.  There were 98 cases where the 
Board directed an election after transfer of a case from the Regional 
Office. (Table 10.)  There were two cases that resulted in expedited 
elections pursuant to the Act’s 8(b)(7)(C) provisions pertaining to 
picketing. 
 
3.  Elections  
The NLRB conducted 1905 conclusive representation elections in 
cases closed in fiscal 2007, compared to the 2147 such elections a year 
earlier. Of 128,465 employees eligible to vote, 101,551 cast ballots, 
virtually 8 of every 10 eligible. 
Unions won 1195 representation elections, or 55.7 percent. In 
winning majority designation, labor organizations earned bargaining 
rights or continued as employee representatives for 83,764 workers. The 
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employee vote over the course of the year was 70,057 for union 
representation and 52,673 against. 
The representation elections were in two categories—the 1767 
collective-bargaining elections in which workers chose or voted down 
labor organizations as their bargaining agents, plus the 360 
decertification elections determining whether incumbent unions would 
continue to represent employees. 
There were 1752 select-or-reject-bargaining-rights (one union on 
ballot) elections, of which unions won 922, or 52.7 percent.  In these 
elections, 46,120 workers voted to have unions as their agents, while 
43,162 employees voted for no representation.  In appropriate bargaining 
units of employees, the election results provided union agents for 55,607 
workers.  In NLRB elections the majority decides the representational 
status for the entire unit. 
There were 153 multiunion elections, in which two or more labor 
organizations were on the ballot, as well as a choice for no 
representation.  Employees voted to continue or to commence 
representation by one of the unions in 122 elections, or 79.7 percent. 
 
As in previous years, labor organization results brought continued 
representation by unions in 126 elections, or 35 percent, covering 13,978 
employees.  Unions lost representation rights for 12,518 employees in 
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234 elections, or 65 percent.  Unions won in bargaining units averaging 
111 employees, and lost in units averaging 53 employees.  (Table 13.) 
Besides the conclusive elections, there were 96 inconclusive 
representation elections during fiscal year 2007 which resulted in 
withdrawal or dismissal of petitions before certification, or required a 
rerun or runoff election. 
In deauthorization polls, labor organizations lost the right to make 
union-shop agreements in 17 referendums, or 32.7 percent, while they 
maintained the right in the other 35 polls which covered 3918 employees.  
(Table 12.) 
For all types of elections in 2007, the average number of employees 
voting, per establishment, was 53, compared to 57 in 2006.  About 74 
percent of the collective bargaining and decertification elections involved 
59 or fewer employees.  (Tables 11 and 17.) 
 
4.  Decisions Issued  
a.  The Board 
Dealing effectively with the remaining cases reaching it from 
nationwide filings after dismissals, settlements, and adjustments in 
earlier processing stages, the Board handed down 592 decisions 
concerning allegations of unfair labor practices and questions relating to 
employee representation.  This total compared to the 705 decisions 
rendered during fiscal year 2006. 
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A breakdown of Board decisions follows: 
 
Total Board decisions....................................................................     592 
 
Contested decisions .......................................................................    393 
 
   Unfair labor practice decisions .......................................   288 
   Initial (includes those based on 
stipulated record)..……………….213 
Supplemental ..................................56 
Backpay..................................….....13 
Determinations in jurisdictional 
     disputes………………………….6 
   Representation decisions .........................................…..   97 
After transfer by Regional Directors 
     for initial decision                         2 
After review of Regional Director 
     decisions ....................................28 
On objections and/or challenges .....67 
   Other decisions .......................……….............................    8 
Clarification of bargaining unit.........4 
Amendment to certification ..............0 
Union-deauthorization ......................4 
   Noncontested decisions.....................................................….    199 
Unfair labor practice .......................93 
Representation ..............................102 
Other .................................................4 
 
The majority (71 percent) of Board decisions resulted from cases 
contested by the parties as to the facts and/or application of the law.  
(Tables 3A, 3B, and 3C.) 
In fiscal 2007, about 4.5 percent of all meritorious charges and 51.1 
percent of all cases in which a hearing was conducted reached the Board 
for decision. Generally, unfair labor practice cases take about twice the 
time to process than representation cases. 
b.  Regional Directors 
NLRB Regional Directors issued 454 decisions in fiscal 2007, 
compared to 541 in 2006.  (Chart 13 and Tables 3B and 3C.) 
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c.  Administrative Law Judges 
Administrative law judges issued 190 decisions and conducted 182 
hearings.  (Chart 8 and Table 3A.) 
5.  Court Litigation 
a.  Appellate Courts 
In fiscal year 2007, 68 cases involving the NLRB were decided by the 
United States courts of appeals compared to 79 in fiscal year 2006. Of 
these, 97.1  percent were won by NLRB in whole or in part compared to 
75.9 percent in fiscal year 2006; 2.9 percent were remanded entirely 
compared to 11.4 percent in fiscal year 2006; and no cases were entire 
losses compared to 8.9 percent in fiscal year 2006. 
b.  The Supreme Court 
In fiscal 2007, the Supreme Court did not decide any Board cases.  
The Board did not participate as amicus in any cases in fiscal 2007. 
c.  Contempt Actions 
In fiscal 2007, 333 cases were formally referred to the Contempt 
Litigation and Compliance Branch for consideration of contempt or other 
compliance actions.2  Fifteen civil contempt or equivalent proceedings 
and 18 ancillary proceedings were instituted in Federal District Courts or 
                                                          
2 In 207 other cases, advice and/or assistance was solicited and provided to the Regions or other 
agency personnel and the cases returned for further administrative processing. 
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Bankruptcy Courts.  Fourteen civil contempt or equivalent adjudications 
were awarded in favor of the Board as well as 24 other substantive orders 
in ancillary proceedings.  There were 5 cases in which the court directed 
compliance without adjudication; and there was one case in which the 
court discontinued the proceeding at the CLCB’s request. 
d.  Miscellaneous Litigation 
There were 13 additional cases involving miscellaneous litigation 
decided by appellate, district, and bankruptcy courts.  The NLRB’s 
position was upheld in 9 cases.  (Table 21.) 
e.  Injunction Activity 
The NLRB sought injunctions pursuant to Sections 10(j) and 10(l) in 
21 petitions filed with the U.S. district courts, compared to 25 in fiscal 
year 2006. (Table 20.) Injunctions were granted in 12, or 85.7 percent, of 
the 14 cases litigated to final order. 
NLRB injunction activity in district courts in 2007: 
 
Granted……………………………………………………………… 12 
Denied………………………………………………………………..   2 
Withdrawn……………………………………………………………   0 
Settled or placed on court’s inactive lists……………………………   7 
Awaiting action at end of fiscal year…..…………………………….   3 
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C.  Decisional Highlights 
In the course of the Board’s administration of the Act during the 
report period, it was required to consider and resolve complex problems 
arising from the great variety of factual patterns in the many cases 
reaching it.  In some cases, new developments in industrial relations, as 
presented by the factual situation, required the Board’s accommodation 
of established principles to those developments.  Chapter II on “Board 
Procedure,” Chapter III on “Representation Proceedings,” and Chapter 
IV on “Unfair Labor Practices” discuss some of the more significant 
decisions of the Board during the report period.  The following 
summarizes briefly some of the decisions establishing or reexamining 
basic principles in significant areas.   
1.  Decertification Petition or Rival Union Petition and Voluntary 
Recognition Agreement 
In Dana Corp.,3 the Board majority modified the recognition-bar 
doctrine, and held that an employer’s voluntary recognition of a union 
does not bar a decertification or rival union petition that is filed within 45 
days of the notice of recognition.   
                                                          
3 351 NLRB No. 28 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Kirsanow; Members Liebman 
and Walsh, dissenting in part, but concurring in the result). 
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Under the Board’s former policy, established in Keller Plastics 
Eastern, Inc.,4 an employer’s voluntary recognition of a union, based on 
a showing of the union’s majority status, barred a decertification petition 
filed by employees or a rival union’s petition for a reasonable period of 
time.  The Board reasoned that labor-relations stability was promoted by 
a rule under which a voluntarily recognized union was insulated from 
challenge to its status while negotiating for a first collective-bargaining 
agreement.   
In the instant case, the majority concluded that although the basic 
justifications for providing an insulated period were sound, they did not 
warrant immediate imposition of an election bar following voluntary 
recognition.  Rather, the uncertainty surrounding voluntary recognition 
based on an authorization card majority and/or a neutrality agreement, as 
opposed to union certification after a Board election, justified delaying 
the election bar for a brief period during which unit employees could 
decide whether they preferred a Board-conducted election.  Under the 
new policy, an employee or rival union may file a petition during a 45-
day period following notice that a union has been voluntarily recognized.  
The petition will be processed if, like other petitions, it is supported by 
30 percent of the bargaining unit.  The majority stated that it would apply 
this modified procedure prospectively only. 
Members Liebman and Walsh, dissenting in part, stated that nothing 
in the majority’s decision justified its radical departure from the 
longstanding and judicially approved procedure first announced in Keller 
Plastics.  In their view, prior Board law struck an appropriate balance 
between the Act’s twin interests in promoting stable collective-
bargaining relationships and employee free choice.  They asserted that 
voluntary recognition is a favored element of national labor policy, yet 
the majority has relegated it to disfavored status by allowing a minority 
of employees to disrupt the bargaining process just as it is beginning.  
They stated that the majority’s decision effectively discourages voluntary 
recognition altogether.    
2.  Filing and Maintenance of a Lawsuit 
In BE & K Construction Co.,5 the Board majority, on remand from 
the Supreme Court,6 held that the filing and maintenance of a reasonably 
based lawsuit does not violate the Act, regardless of whether the lawsuit 
is ongoing or is completed, and regardless of the motive for initiating the 
lawsuit.   
4 157 NLRB 583 (1966). 
5 351 NLRB No. 29 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Kirsanow; Members Liebman 
and Walsh, dissenting). 
6 BE & K Construction Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002). 
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In its prior decision in this proceeding,7 the Board found, pursuant to 
Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB,8 that the Employer’s 
unsuccessful lawsuit violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act because it was 
filed to retaliate against the Union for engaging in protected concerted 
activity.  Bill Johnson’s held that an ongoing, reasonably based lawsuit 
could not be enjoined as an unfair labor practice even if the lawsuit had a 
retaliatory motive, in order to safeguard the fundamental First 
Amendment right to petition.  The Board had applied a different standard 
to completed lawsuits, however, based on language in Bill Johnson’s 
suggesting that if the employer lost the lawsuit or the lawsuit was 
withdrawn, the Board could proceed with the unfair labor practice case 
and could find that the suit violated the Act if it was deemed retaliatory.  
The Supreme Court in BE & K, however, effectively disavowed this 
portion of Bill Johnson’s as dicta and refused to be bound by it, stating 
that the Board’s standard for evaluating the lawfulness of completed, 
unsuccessful lawsuits raised a difficult First Amendment issue.  
Accordingly, the majority concluded that, just as with an ongoing 
lawsuit, a completed lawsuit that is reasonably based cannot be found to 
be an unfair labor practice, stating that the “chilling effect on the right to 
petition exists whether the Board burdens a lawsuit in its initial phase or 
after its conclusion.”   
Members Liebman and Walsh, dissenting, stated that the Supreme 
Court in BE & K did not hold, as the majority did, that all reasonably 
based lawsuits are immune from liability under the Act.  In their view, 
such a holding goes too far in protecting potential First Amendment 
interests at the expense of the rights guaranteed by Federal labor law.  
They contend that if the BE & K Court intended the majority’s holding, 
then it would have announced that rule, and not left open, as it did, the 
possibility that the Board could find unlawful some subset of 
unsuccessful, but reasonably based, lawsuits targeting conduct protected 
by the Act.  Nor does it follow that the Board is precluded from imposing 
any burden on the First Amendment right to petition in order to protect 
Section 7 rights.   
3.  Salting: Refusal-to-Consider and Hire Union Applicants 
In Toering Electric Co.,9 the Board majority held that an applicant for 
employment must be genuinely interested in seeking to establish an 
employment relationship with an employer in order to qualify as a 
Section 2(3) employee and thus be protected against hiring 
7 329 NLRB 717 (1999). 
8 461 U.S. 731 (1983). 
9 351 NLRB No. 18 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Kirsanow; Members Liebman 
and Walsh, dissenting). 
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discrimination based on union affiliation or activity.  The majority 
further held that the General Counsel bears the ultimate burden of 
proving an individual’s genuine interest in seeking to establish an 
employment relationship with an employer. 
The majority stated that the presumption that any individual who 
submitted an application was entitled to protection was inconsistent with 
the text of the Act and its basic purposes.  Rather, only applicants who 
are statutory employees within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act are 
entitled to protection against hiring discrimination, and statutory 
employee status, in turn, requires the existence of at least a rudimentary 
economic relationship, actual or anticipated, between an employee and 
an employer.  According to the majority, no such economic relationship 
is anticipated in the case of applicants with no genuine aspiration to work 
for an employer.  Thus, job applicants without a genuine interest in an 
employment relationship are not employees within the meaning of 
Section 2(3).  Although some salts, paid or unpaid, may genuinely desire 
to work for a nonunion employer and to proselytize coworkers on behalf 
of a union, other salts clearly have no such interest.   
The majority also imposed on the General Counsel in all hiring 
discrimination cases the burden of proving that the alleged discriminatee 
was genuinely interested in seeking to establish an employment 
relationship and was thereby qualified for protection as a Section 2(3) 
employee.  Once the General Counsel shows that an application was 
made, the employer may contest the genuineness of the application 
through evidence that creates a reasonable question as to the applicant’s 
genuine interest in working for the employer.  Assuming that an 
employer produces such evidence, the General Counsel will be required, 
as part of a prima facie case, to rebut the employer’s evidence and to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the individual was 
genuinely interested in an employment relationship with the employer.  
Members Liebman and Walsh, dissenting, would have retained 
without modification the standard for litigating hiring discrimination 
cases set forth in FES.10  In their view, the majority’s new approach 
cannot be reconciled with the Act, its policies, or Supreme Court 
precedent.  They noted that Sections 2(3) and 8(a)(3) of the Act make 
clear that an employer’s motive, and not the applicant’s intentions, is the 
proper focus in cases like this one.  They further stated that the 
majority’s new standard, even considered on its own terms, is critically 
flawed because it fails to provide clear guidance with respect to 
determining an applicant’s genuine interest.  Moreover, the new standard 
10 331 NLRB 9 (2000), enfd. 301 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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places an unfair burden on the General Counsel by allowing an employer 
to first raise the genuineness issue during the unfair labor practice 
hearing.  They argued it will both spawn and prolong the course of 
litigation by creating a new fact-intensive defense. 
4.  Backpay Period for “Salts” 
In Oil Capitol Sheet Metal, Inc.,11 the Board majority announced new 
evidentiary standards for determining the duration of the backpay period 
when the discriminatee is a salt.   
Prior to this decision, the remedy for an unlawful discharge or refusal 
to hire included the employer’s payment of backpay to the discriminatee 
from the date of the unlawful act until the employer made a valid offer of 
reinstatement or instatement.  The Board applied a presumption that, if 
hired, the salt would have stayed on the job for an indefinite period.  If 
the job was a construction job, the Board further presumed that the 
employer would have transferred the employee to other jobsites when the 
job from which he was discharged (or for which he should have been 
hired) ended.   
In this decision, the majority held that the General Counsel can no 
longer rely on a presumption of indefinite employment, but instead will 
be required, “as part of his existing burden of proving a reasonable gross 
backpay amount due, to present affirmative evidence that the 
salt/discriminatee, if hired, would have worked for the employer for the 
backpay period claimed in the General Counsel’s compliance 
specification.”  The majority reasoned that permitting the General 
Counsel to rely on a presumption of indefinite employment effectively 
requires the employer to produce evidence that the discriminatee would 
not have worked for the entire backpay period claimed.  However, the 
majority found that experience dictates that many salts only intend to 
remain with the employer as long as the union finds it useful for them to 
do so, and that the organizer and the union, not the employer, have the 
ability to prove how long the organizer, if hired, would have remained 
with the employer.   
Members Liebman and Walsh, dissenting in part, criticized the 
majority for overturning Board precedent endorsed by two appellate 
courts and rejected by none, without any party having raised the issue, 
without the benefit of briefing, and without any sound legal or empirical 
basis.  They found that the majority’s approach violated the well-
established principle of resolving remedial uncertainties against the 
wrongdoer, and also treated salts as a uniquely disfavored class of 
11 349 NLRB 1348 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Kirsanow; Members Liebman 
and Walsh, dissenting in part). 
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discriminatees.  They asserted that the majority failed to cite any 
evidence or other empirical data to support its assertion that salts do not 
seek employment for an indefinite time.  They stated that salting 
campaigns vary dramatically in duration, that some campaigns can last 
for years, and that sometimes salts are simply assigned to work for an 
employer without any timeframe or campaign commitment.  In their 
view, it is the employer’s unlawful conduct that creates uncertainty about 
how long the salt would remain employed.  Thus, allocating the burden 
of proof to employers is “a matter of equity,” not a penalty. 
D.  Financial Statement 
The obligations and expenditures of the National Labor Relations 
Board for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2007, are as follows: 
 
Personnel compensation $161,965,500 
Personnel benefits     37,475,644 
Benefits for former personnel              3,521 
Travel and transportation of persons       1,634,036 
Transportation of things          160,197 
Rent, communications and utilities     32,833,021 
Printing and reproduction          243,874 
Other services     13,377,986 
Supplies and materials          813,152   
Equipment       2,763,116  
Insurance claims and indemnities            35,143  
  
Total obligations and expenditures12  $251,305,190 
 
The NLRB assets were approximately $32 million as of September 
30, 2007. The Fund Balance with Treasury, which was $23 million, 
represents the NLRB’s largest asset. The Fund Balance consists of 
unspent appropriated and unappropriated funds from the past six fiscal 
years and includes backpay settlement funds.  The NLRB has one 
unusual account, Backpay Settlements Due to Others.  These are backpay 
funds that are owed to discriminatees by employers due to the filing of 
ULP charges with the NLRB. The source of these funds is either the 
12 Includes $9499 reimbursables from OPM (ALJ) 
    Includes $10652 for reimbursables from MSPB (ALJ) 
    Includes $26,209 for reimursables from IRS (ALJ) 
Includes $929 for reimbursables from EEOC (ALJ) 
Includes $7645 for reimbursables from GSA Metro Service Division (Fitness Center) 
Includes $2975 for reimbursables from EPA (Fitness Center) 
Includes $856 for reimbursables from Federal Maritime Commission (Fitness Center) 
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original employer or a bankruptcy court disposition. During the time it 
takes the Agency to locate discriminatees, these funds are sometimes 
invested in U.S. Treasury market-based securities. 
The NLRB’s appropriation is used to resolve Representation Cases or 
ULP Charges filed by employees, employers, unions, and union 
members. Of the $266 million net cost of operations in FY 2007, 16 
percent was used to resolve Representation Cases and 84 percent was 
used to resolve ULP Charges.  
For FY 2007, the NLRB had available budgetary resources of $257 
million, the majority of which were derived from new budget authority. 
This represents a .83-percent increase over FY 2006 of available 
budgetary resources of $255 million. For FY 2007, the status of 
budgetary resources showed obligations of $252 million, or 98 percent of 
funds available.  This is comparable to FY 2006’s obligations which 
totaled $250 million or 98 percent of funds available. Total outlays for 
FY 2007 were $253 million which is a $4 million increase from FY 
2006’s outlays of $249 million.  
Of the budget appropriation received by the NLRB, approximately 88 
percent of the payments are for employees’ salaries and benefits, space 
rent, and building security. The remaining 12 percent is utilized for 
expenses integral to the Agency’s casehandling mission, such as 
casehandling travel, transcripts in cases requiring a hearing; interpreter 
services, reflective of a growing community of non-English speaking 
workers; travel; witness fees; and information technology. 
 25 
II 
Board Procedure 
The filing of a charge activates the Board’s processes. The charge 
enables the General Counsel, after due investigation, to issue a 
complaint. Section 10(b) of the Act provides, however, “[t]hat no 
complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring 
more than six months prior to the filing of the charge[.]” 
Limitation of Section 10(b) 
In Carney Hospital,1 the Board set forth new guidelines in applying 
the test set forth in Redd-I, Inc.,2 for determining whether unfair labor 
practice allegations that are otherwise time-barred by the 6-month 
limitations period in Section 10(b) may be litigated.  The Board in Redd-
I held that otherwise untimely allegations may be litigated if they are 
“closely related” to allegations in a prior timely filed charge, and set 
forth the following test for making that determination: (1) the otherwise 
untimely allegations must involve the same legal theory as the 
allegations in the timely charge; (2) the otherwise untimely allegations 
must arise from the same factual situation or sequence of events as the 
allegations in timely charge; and (3) the defenses raised to both the 
untimely and timely charged allegations may, but need not be, the same 
or similar. (The third part of this test is not a mandatory aspect of the 
Redd-I test.)  
The Board’s focus in Carney Hospital centered on whether the second 
prong of the Redd-I test was met. The judge, relying on the Board’s 
decision in Ross Stores, Inc.,3 found that this prong was met because the 
conduct alleged in the timely and otherwise untimely charges all arose 
out of an antiunion campaign carried on by the respondent. The Board 
agreed, but the D.C. Circuit disagreed, stating that the “Board’s 
contention that the factual relationship prong can be satisfied solely on 
the basis that the separate acts arise out of the same anti-union campaign 
here is a deviation from the very precedent it cites.” Ross Stores, Inc. v. 
NLRB.4 
In response to this judicial criticism, the Board in Carney Hospital 
overruled its decision in Ross Stores and stated that it would no longer 
“find that the second prong [of the Redd-I test] is satisfied merely 
                                                 
1 350 NLRB 627 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Walsh). 
2 290 NLRB 1115 (1988). 
3 329 NLRB 573 (1999). 
4 235 F.3d 669, 673 (2001). 
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because timely and untimely allegations pertain to events that occurred 
during or in response to the same union campaign.”5 The following new 
test was set forth: “where the two sets of allegations ‘demonstrate similar 
conduct, usually during the same time period with a similar object,’ or 
there is a causal nexus between the allegations and they are part of a 
chain or progression of events, or they are part of an overall plan to 
undermine union activity, we will find that the second prong of the Redd-
I test has been satisfied.”6 
 
5 350 NLRB 627, 630. 
6 Id. (citations omitted). 
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III 
Representation Proceedings 
The Act requires that an employer bargain with the representative 
designated by a majority of its employees in a unit appropriate for 
collective bargaining.  But it does not require that the representative be 
designated by any particular procedure as long as the representative is 
clearly the choice of a majority of the employees.  As one method for 
employees to select a majority representative, the Act authorizes the 
Board to conduct representation elections.  The Board may conduct such 
an election after a petition has been filed by or on behalf of a group of 
employees or by an employer confronted with a claim for recognition 
from an individual or a labor organization. 
Incident to its authority to conduct elections, the Board has the power 
to determine the unit of employees appropriate for collective bargaining 
and to formally certify a collective-bargaining representative on the basis 
of the results of the election.  Once certified by the Board, the bargaining 
agent is the exclusive representative of all employees in the appropriate 
unit for collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, 
and other conditions of employment. 
The Act also empowers the Board to conduct elections to decertify 
incumbent bargaining agents that have been previously certified or that 
are being currently recognized by the employer.  Decertification petitions 
may be filed by employees, by individuals other than management 
representatives, or by labor organizations acting on behalf of employees. 
This chapter concerns some of the Board’s decisions during the past 
fiscal year in which the general rules governing the determination of 
bargaining representative were adapted to novel situations or reexamined 
in the light of changed circumstances. 
A.  Bars to an Election 
1.  Decertification Petition or Rival Union Petition and 
Voluntary Recognition Agreement 
In Dana Corp.,1 the Board, in a 3–2 decision, modified its 
recognition-bar doctrine, and held that an employer’s voluntary 
recognition of a labor organization does not bar a decertification or rival 
union petition that is filed within 45 days of the notice of recognition.  
                                                 
1 351 NLRB No. 28 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Kirsanow; Members Liebman 
and Walsh dissenting in part, but concurring in the result). 
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In deciding this case the Board considered the positions of the parties 
as well as amicus submissions from various companies, organizations, 
and individuals, as well as members of the U.S. Senate and U.S. House 
of Representatives.   
Under the Board’s former policy, established in Keller Plastics 
Eastern, Inc.,2 an employer’s voluntary recognition of a union, based on 
a showing of the union’s majority status, barred a decertification petition 
filed by employees or a rival union’s petition for a reasonable period of 
time.  The Board had reasoned that labor-relations stability was 
promoted by a rule under which a voluntarily recognized union was 
insulated from a challenge to its majority status while it negotiated for a 
first collective-bargaining agreement with the employer.   
In Dana, the Board majority of Chairman Battista and Members 
Schaumber and Kirsanow concluded that although the basic justifications 
for providing an insulated period are sound, these reasons do not warrant 
immediate imposition of an election bar following voluntary recognition.  
The Board held that the uncertainty surrounding voluntary recognition 
based on an authorization card majority, as opposed to union certification 
after a Board election, justifies delaying the election bar for a brief 
period during which unit employees can decide whether they prefer a 
Board-conducted election.  Under the Board’s modified policy, an 
employee or rival union may file a petition during a 45-day period 
following notice that a union has been voluntarily recognized.  The 
petition will be processed if, like other petitions, it is supported by 30 
percent of the bargaining unit.  The Board will apply this modified 
procedure prospectively only.   
In their partial dissent, Members Liebman and Walsh stated that 
nothing in the majority’s decision justifies its radical departure from the 
longstanding and judicially approved procedure first announced in Keller 
Plastics.  The dissent maintains that voluntary recognition is a favored 
element of national labor policy, yet the majority relegates it to 
disfavored status by allowing a minority of employees to file a 
decertification petition to disrupt the bargaining process just as it is 
getting started.  This, the dissent contends, may discourage voluntary 
recognition altogether. 
 
2 157 NLRB 583 (1966). 
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2.  Decertification Petition Filed After Alleged Unfair Labor 
Practices and Prior to Settlement of Charges 
In Truserv Corp.,3 the Board found, in a 3–2 decision, that a 
decertification petition filed after the occurrence of alleged unfair labor 
practices by the employer, and prior to settlement of charges pertaining 
to those unfair labor practices, should not be dismissed where there has 
been no finding or admission that the employer actually engaged in the 
allegedly wrongful conduct.  
In reaching this conclusion, Chairman Battista and Members 
Schaumber and Kirsanow overturned prior decisions in Douglas-
Randall, Inc.,4 Liberty Fabrics, Inc.,5 and Supershuttle of Orange 
County.6  Members Liebman and Walsh dissented. 
In Douglas-Randall, the Board held that where the parties have 
entered into a settlement of outstanding unfair labor practice charges, and 
the settlement requires recognition and bargaining with the union, any 
petition challenging the union’s majority status that is filed after the 
allegedly unlawful conduct, and before the settlement, must be 
dismissed. 
Douglas-Randall involved a Board-approved settlement of pending 
unfair labor practice charges.  In Liberty Fabrics, the Board applied the 
Douglas-Randall rationale to private, non-Board settlements.  In 
Supershuttle, the Board extended the reasoning of Douglas-Randall and 
Liberty Fabrics to a situation where the parties’ negotiation of a 
collective-bargaining agreement was intended to resolve unfair labor 
practice charges.  The Board in Supershuttle held that the collective-
bargaining agreement precluded a rival union’s petition that was filed 
after the occurrence of the alleged illegal conduct, and before the parties 
entered into the collective-bargaining agreement.  In overruling these 
cases, the Board majority returned to the doctrine previously enunciated 
in Passavant Health Care.7  
In reconsidering the Douglas-Randall decision and its progeny, the 
Board majority agreed with the reasoning of former Member Cohen in 
his dissent in Douglas-Randall, and the dissents of former Member 
Hurtgen in Liberty Fabrics and Supershuttle.  Like them, the Board 
concluded that, absent a finding of a violation of the Act, or an admission 
by the employer of such a violation, there is no basis for dismissing a 
                                                 
3 349 NLRB 227 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Kirsanow; Members Liebman 
and Walsh dissenting). 
4 320 NLRB 431 (1995). 
5 327 NLRB 38, 39 (1998). 
6 330 NLRB 1016, 1018–1019 (2000). 
7 278 NLRB 483 (1986). 
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petition based on a settlement of alleged but unproven unfair labor 
practices.  To do so would unfairly give determinative weight to 
allegations of unlawful conduct and would be in derogation of employee 
rights under Section 7 of the Act. 
In dissent, Members Liebman and Walsh disagreed with the 
majority’s overruling of Douglas-Randall, Liberty Fabrics, and 
Supershuttle, and stated they would adhere to the Board’s decisions in 
those cases.  They emphasized that the Board’s task is to strike a balance 
between the establishment and maintenance of stable collective-
bargaining relationships and the employees’ freedom of choice in 
deciding whether they want to engage in collective bargaining and, if so, 
whom they wish to represent them.  The dissent contended that the Board 
in Douglas-Randall and its progeny struck an appropriate balance 
between these interests, recognizing that the settlement of unfair labor 
practice allegations is a meaningful act, which bears consequences, and 
must be given due consideration when weighed against the right to 
choose whether to decertify a union. 
B.  Unit Issues 
1.  Employee Status of Research Assistants 
In Research Foundation of the State University of New York Office of 
Sponsored Programs,8 the Board majority of Members Kirsanow and 
Walsh found, contrary to the Acting Regional Director, that Brown 
University9 was inapplicable to this employer, and that the petitioned-for 
Research Project Assistants (RPAs) are statutory employees.  The 
majority reinstated the petitions and remanded them to the Regional 
Director for further appropriate action consistent with its Decision on 
Review.  Chairman Battista dissented. 
The petitioner filed three petitions seeking to represent RPAs at the 
employer’s Albany, Buffalo, and Syracuse locations.  The employer is a 
private, not-for-profit “educational corporation” established under the 
laws of the State of New York.  The parties stipulated that the employer 
“is not an academic institution and therefore does not issue academic 
degrees.”  The parties also stipulated that the Board has statutory 
jurisdiction over the employer, and that the employer is the sole 
employer of the RPAs.  The RPAs are enrolled as students at the State 
University of New York (SUNY), which is exempt from the Board’s 
jurisdiction.  In 1977, the employer entered into an agreement with 
 
8 350 NLRB 197 (Members Kirsanow and Walsh; Chairman Battista dissenting). 
9 342 NLRB 483 (2004). 
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SUNY assigning management and administrative authority over SUNY 
sponsored research programs to the employer.   
The Acting Regional Director found in the supplemental decision 
that, like the graduate student assistants enrolled at Brown, the RPAs 
have an educational relationship with the employer because the RPAs 
must be enrolled at SUNY to work for the employer, their work 
assignments bear a substantial relationship to their dissertations, the 
Principal Investigator on their research project often simultaneously 
serves as their dissertation advisor, and they end their careers as RPAs 
once they receive their degrees.   
Contrary to the Acting Regional Director and the dissent, the majority 
found that unlike Brown, the employer is not a university or college and 
does not confer degrees or admit students.  Although the employer is a 
not-for-profit “educational corporation,” the parties stipulated that the 
employer is “not an academic institution.”  In addition, the RPAs are 
solely employed by the employer. 
Moreover, the majority found that the undisputed evidence 
demonstrates the existence of an economic relationship between the 
RPAs and the employer, rather than an educational relationship as in 
Brown.  The majority stated:  
 
[P]ursuant to an agreement with SUNY, the Employer receives, 
administers, and manages government and private donor awards 
for SUNY’s sponsored research programs.  Under that 
agreement, the Employer employs research and other personnel, 
including the RPAs, “who shall be deemed to be employees of 
the [Employer] and not the University.”  The RPAs are 
employed and receive compensation, including benefits, under 
awards administered by the Employer; their compensation is 
subject to the Employer’s compensation benchmarks; and they 
are placed on the Employer’s payroll by the Employer’s Human 
Resources office.  In addition, the parties stipulated that the 
Employer’s labor and employment policies apply to the RPAs.   
 
The majority rejected the premise of the Acting Regional Director and 
the dissent that RPAs, like the graduate student assistants in Brown, have 
a primarily educational relationship with the employer.  The majority 
found that the evidence cited by the Acting Regional Director in support 
of her finding that the RPAs have an educational relationship with the 
employer demonstrates the RPAs’ primarily educational relationship 
with SUNY, not with the employer.   
In dissent, Chairman Battista found that the majority overlooked the 
employer’s integral role in the RPAs’ education.  Although the 
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relationship between the RPAs and SUNY is an educational one, that 
does not mean that the relationship between RPAs and the employer is an 
economic one.  The dissent emphasized the undisputed fact that the 
employer is an educational corporation with a chartered mission “in 
keeping with the educational purposes [of SUNY].”  Moreover, the 
dissent cited the evidence relied on by the Acting Regional Director to 
explain that the employer participates in the educational mission of 
SUNY and serves much the same function for the conduct of research at 
SUNY as Brown did for research by its graduate students.  Based on the 
substantial similarities between the relationships presented in this case 
and Brown, the Chairman would have found that the RPAs are not 
employees within the scope of Section 2(3) of the Act.  
In Research Foundation of the City University of New York,10 the 
Board affirmed the Regional Director’s finding that research assistants 
(RAs) are employees within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act.    
The Board reached the same result in this case as it did in Research 
Foundation of SUNY supra, for the same reason: the employer is not an 
educational institution, and the RAs have an economic and not an 
educational relationship with the employer.   
Chairman Battista, concurring, agreed that the RAs are statutory 
employees because their relationship with the employer is primarily 
economic rather than educational.  Noting that the instant case has some 
similarities to Research Foundation of the State University of New York 
because the employer is an “educational corporation,” and must be “in 
keeping with the educational purposes and objects of [CUNY],” the 
Chairman nevertheless emphasized several differences between the two 
cases:  
 
[U]nlike the employer in Research Foundation of SUNY, some 
of the RAs here are enrolled at universities other than the City 
University of New York (CUNY).  That is, status as a CUNY 
student is not a requisite for working for the Employer.  In 
addition, the RAs perform administrative and editorial work that 
is typically unrelated to their studies. Although their work is 
overseen by a grant recipient on the CUNY faculty, that faculty 
member does not also act as the dissertation adviser. Moreover, 
the RAs here work with nonstudents who are assigned the same 
work, and they are paid on an hourly basis at a rate similar to the 
nonstudents.  Rather than financial support for their graduate 
studies, their compensation thus represents payment in 
 
10 350 NLRB 201 (Chairman Battista and Members Kirsanow and Walsh).  
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consideration for hours worked. In fact, for financial aid 
purposes, work as an RA is treated as outside employment.  
 
The Board also ruled on the employer’s request for review with 
regard to issues that were held in abeyance pending the resolution of the 
employee status of the RAs. The Board found that substantial issues were 
raised concerning the supervisory and managerial status of certain 
employees, but determined that those issues could be best resolved 
through the challenge procedure. The Regional Director’s supplemental 
decision was amended to permit the challenged employees to vote by 
challenged ballot, denying the employer’s request for review in this and 
all other respects. 
2.  On-call and Part-time Employees 
In Wadsworth Theatre Management,12 the Board held, contrary to the 
administrative law judge, that William Merrick is an eligible voter whose 
ballot should be opened and counted.  The Board directed that the 
Regional Director open and count Merrick’s ballot, along with those of 
three other voters, and issue a revised tally of ballots and the appropriate 
certification. 
The tally of ballots for the election held on June 7, 2006, showed no 
votes for the petitioner (Treasurers and Ticket Sellers Local 857, 
IATSE), 2 votes against representation, and 6 challenged ballots.  In the 
absence of exceptions, the Board adopted, pro forma, the judge’s 
recommendation to sustain the challenges to two ballots and to overrule 
the challenges to three ballots. 
The employer operates two professional theaters.  It hired Merrick in 
mid-March 2006 to work in the box office for a 4-week production that 
ended shortly before the election.  Merrick worked until late April.  The 
judge recommended that the challenge to Merrick’s ballot be sustained 
because he did not meet the eligibility requirements set forth in Julliard 
School.13  Under Julliard School, voting eligibility is accorded to 
employees who have been employed by the employer (1) during two 
productions for a total of 5 working days over a 1-year period, or (2) for 
at least 15 days over a 2-year period.  Julliard School.14  The judge found 
Merrick was an ineligible voter under the first prong because he had not 
worked for the employer for two or more productions; and that he was 
ineligible under the second prong because he had not worked for the 
employer for 2 years. 
                                                 
12 349 NLRB 122 (Members Liebman, Kirsanow, and Walsh).  
13 208 NLRB 153, 155 (1974). 
14 Supra, 208 NLRB at 155. 
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The Board found that the appropriate formula for determining the 
eligibility of part-time and on-call employees is set forth in Davison-
Paxon Co.15  Applying Davison-Paxon, the Board determined that 
Merrick was eligible to vote and overruled the challenge to his ballot 
because Merrick averaged more than 4 hours of work per week in the 
quarter prior to the eligibility date for the election (he worked 172 hours 
during that quarter).  Member Liebman would have found Merrick 
eligible under the second prong of the formula articulated in Julliard 
School:  he worked 15 days or more during the 2-year period preceding 
the eligibility date. 
In Columbus Symphony Orchestra, Inc.,16 the Board found, contrary 
to the Regional Director, that there were no special circumstances that 
would warrant deviating from applying the traditional voting eligibility 
formula set out in Davison-Paxon Co.,17 to determine the voting 
eligibility of employees in the petitioned-for unit of full-time, part-time, 
per diem and casual stagehands.  The Board remanded the proceeding to 
the Regional Director for further appropriate action. 
The employer is a professional symphony orchestra that performs on 
a 46-week, year-round schedule that includes a 7-week schedule of 
summer performances held in a tent on the lawn of a corporate sponsor.  
The employer hires casual employees during the entire year, with the 
majority of casual employees hired in the summer to set up and take 
down the tent.  The employer also hires one casual employee to directly 
assist its full-time stagehand with summer concert production work.  The 
employer regularly hires for this position from a “pool” of four 
stagehands with previous experience working for the employer.  In 2005, 
the person who filled this position worked approximately 200 hours, 
while the three other casual employees hired from the “pool” worked 
between 15 and 19 hours each.  In 2006, one casual employee worked 
140 hours, while three others worked between 37 and 63 hours each.   
The Regional Director found that the use of an outdoor venue for 
summer performances and the employer’s reliance on casual employees 
to perform a significant percentage of summer production work were 
“special circumstances” that warranted the application of a modified 
Davison-Paxon formula.  The Regional Director further found that the 
employer’s repeated hiring of the same four casual employees from the 
“pool” and the fact that they performed the same work as the full-time 
stagehand, showed that they had a reasonable expectation of future 
employment with the employer and possessed a continuing interest in the 
 
15 185 NLRB 21, 24 (1970). 
16 350 NLRB 523 (Chairman Battista and Members Liebman and Schaumber). 
17 185 NLRB 21 (1970). 
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employer’s terms and conditions of employment.  Instead of the standard 
election eligibility period, which would have been the payroll period 
preceding the May 2007 election, the Regional Director fashioned a 
formula based on the number of hours that unit employees worked 
during the 13-week summer component of the employer’s 2006 season. 
The Board reversed the Regional Director’s use of a modified 
Davison-Paxon voting eligibility formula.  The Board reiterated that the 
traditional Davison-Paxon formula, under which a part-time or on-call 
employee is considered to have a sufficient regularity of employment to 
demonstrate a community of interest with unit employees if that 
employee regularly averages 4 or more hours of work per week for the 
last quarter prior to the election eligibility date, is to be applied unless 
“special circumstances” exist.  The Board has found “special 
circumstances” in the entertainment industry where irregular patterns of 
employment have required the Board to tailor eligibility formulas to meet 
those circumstances.  However, the Board has consistently applied the 
standard Davison-Paxon formula to entertainment industry employers 
that operate on a regular, year-round basis.  Wadsworth Theatre Mgmt.18 
and Steppenwolf Theatre Co.19 
The Board emphasized that the employer has a regular, year-round, 
46-week schedule of performances, and found, contrary to the Regional 
Director, that summer performances at an outdoor venue are not “special 
circumstances” requiring the traditional Davison-Paxon formula to be 
modified.  The Board further found, unlike the Regional Director, that 
the irregular employment pattern experienced by casual employees 
during the summers of 2005 and 2006 did not show that they could 
reasonably expect to be employed in the summer of 2007.  The Board 
directed that the traditional Davison-Paxon formula be used. 
3.  Construction Industry 
In Cajun Co., Inc.,20 the Board affirmed the Regional Director’s 
finding that the construction industry eligibility formula as set forth in 
Daniel Construction Co.,21 reaffirmed and further modified in Steiny & 
Co.,22 is applicable.  In his decision, the Regional Director found that the 
employer is engaged in the building and construction industry, and that 
use of the Daniel/Steiny formula is necessary to enfranchise employees 
who are hired intermittently for “outages” that occur during the months 
of January through May. He found that the “outage” employees are hired 
                                                 
18 349 NLRB 122. 
19 342 NLRB 69 (2004).  
20 349 NLRB 1031 (Chairman Battista and Members Liebman and Walsh). 
21 133 NLRB 264 (1961), modified at 167 NLRB 1078 (1967). 
22 308 NLRB 1323 (1992). 
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for a specific outage and not an entire outage season, rejecting the 
employer’s contention that Daniel/Steiny should not apply in this case 
because the employer is a seasonal employer. The employer filed a 
timely request for review of the Regional Director’s decision, contending 
that it is not an employer in the building and construction industry, and 
that the majority of construction tasks are performed during the outage 
season, and not year-round. The employer further contended that it is a 
seasonal employer, and thus that the Daniel/Steiny formula does not 
apply. 
The Board found it unnecessary to pass on the issue of whether the 
employer is actually engaged in the building and construction industry as 
defined under the Act.  It remanded the case to the Regional Director for 
further appropriate action.  The Board wrote: 
 
In sum, the Employer performs a substantial amount of 
construction work during the January through May outage 
months (when the work force may more than double), and 
a smaller amount during the remainder of the year.  
Moreover, the total amount of construction work 
performed year-round is more than de minimis or 
incidental, and such functions are integral to the 
Employer’s work at these plants.  In addition, the 
Employer’s employment pattern of hiring intermittent 
employees on an outage-by-outage basis and laying off 
employees at various times is similar to the hiring pattern 
in the construction industry.   Further, the evidence does 
not establish that the Employer is a seasonal employer.  
Under these circumstances, in agreement with the 
Regional Director, we find that the application of the 
Daniel/Steiny formula is reasonable, regardless of whether 
the Employer meets the definition of construction 
employer under the Act. 
 
C.  Election Objections 
An election will be set aside and a new election directed if the 
election campaign was accompanied by conduct which the Board finds 
created an atmosphere of confusion or fear of reprisals, or which 
interfered with the employees’ exercise of their freedom of choice of a 
representative as guaranteed by the Act. In evaluating the interference 
resulting from specific conduct, the Board does not attempt to assess its 
actual effect on the employees, but rather concerns itself with whether it 
is reasonable to conclude that the conduct tended to prevent the free 
expression of the employees’ choice. In making this evaluation, the 
Representation Proceedings 37 
Board treats each case on its facts, taking an ad hoc rather than a per se 
approach to resolution of the issues. 
Electioneering is permissible under the Act. However, the Board may 
invalidate the result of a representation election if the campaign tactics 
adopted by a party tend to exert a coercive impact. In other words, the 
employer or the union may attempt to influence the votes of the 
employees; they may not, however, attempt to coerce the voters so as to 
deprive them of freedom of choice. 
During an election campaign, the employer or the union might 
employ many forms of conduct in an attempt to influence the votes of the 
employees. In some election campaigns, the parties threaten the 
employees with reprisals; cajole them with the promise of benefits; or 
solicit their support through misrepresentations of law or fact. In several 
significant cases decided during the report year, the Board considered 
allegations involving each of these types of preelection conduct. 
The Board evaluates the permissibility of electioneering tactics, 
including threats, in terms of whether the conduct tended to prevent free 
employee expression. 
1.  Official Election Ballot Disclaimer Language 
In Ryder Memorial Hospital,23 the Board announced the revision of 
its official election ballot to explicitly include language that asserts the 
Board’s neutrality in the election process and disclaims the Board’s 
participation in the alteration of any sample ballots.  Accordingly, the 
official election ballot will include the following language, taken from 
the disclaimer language on the Notice of Election: 
 
The National Labor Relations Board does not endorse any choice in 
this election.  Any markings that you may see on any sample ballot 
have not been put there by the National Labor Relations Board. 
 
The disclaimer language will appear on both the actual ballots cast by 
employees in the election and the sample ballot contained on the Notice 
of Election, and is in addition to the existing disclaimer language on the 
bottom of the Notice of Election.   
The Board indicated its position that the inclusion of this explicit 
disclaimer language will preclude any reasonable impression by 
employees that the Board endorses a particular choice in any election 
and, accordingly, it eliminates the need for the Board to engage in a case-
by-case evaluation of allegedly objectionable altered sample ballots.  
Thus, in future cases, the Board will decline to set aside an election 
based on a party’s distribution of an altered sample ballot, provided that 
                                                 
23 351 NLRB No. 26 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Walsh). 
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the altered sample ballot is an actual reproduction of the Board’s sample 
ballot, i.e., it includes the new disclaimer language; if a party distributes 
an altered sample ballot from which the disclaimer language has been 
deleted, however, the Board will consider the deletion intentional, and 
will deem the altered ballots per se objectionable.   
As the altered sample ballot alleged to be objectionable in this case 
did not include the Board’s new disclaimer language, the Board applied 
extant precedent requiring a case-specific evaluation of the nature and 
contents, and circumstances of the distribution of, the altered sample 
ballot.  See 3-Day Blinds;24 SDC Investment.25  Pursuant to that analysis, 
a panel majority of Members Schaumber and Walsh concluded that the 
altered sample ballot was not objectionable.  In so concluding, the 
majority relied on the facts that, among others, the ballot was distributed 
by the petitioner by the same method it used to distribute other campaign 
propaganda, various markings on the ballot indicated that the document 
was a photocopy of the Board’s sample ballot, the ballot contained a 
portion of the disclaimer language appearing on the Board’s Notice of 
Election, and the employer had posted copies of the Board’s Notice of 
Election (containing disclaimer language) at various locations throughout 
its facility. 
Chairman Battista indicated that, consistent with his dissenting 
opinion in Oak Hill Funeral Home and Memorial Park,26 he would have 
found the altered sample ballot to be objectionable.     
2.  E-Mail Addresses of Eligible Voters 
In Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York,27 the 
majority of Members Schaumber and Kirsanow reversed the Regional 
Director and overruled the petitioner’s objection, which alleged that the 
employer’s refusal to provide the petitioner with the electronic mail (e-
mail) addresses of eligible voters thwarted the manifest purpose of the 
requirements of Excelsior Underwear.28  The Board majority found that 
the employer fully complied with its Excelsior requirements as 
heretofore defined by the Board. 
The employer operates an institute of higher learning, including a 
research vessel named the R/V Maurice Ewing.  The parties stipulated 
that a unit of all unlicensed crew members of the R/V Maurice Ewing 
constitute an appropriate unit.  The parties also stipulated to the date, 
time, and location of the mixed manual and mail ballot election.  The 
 
24 299 NLRB 110 (1990). 
25 274 NLRB 556 (1985). 
26 345 NLRB 532 (2005). 
27 350 NLRB 574 (Members Schaumber, Kirsanow, and Walsh). 
28 156 NLRB 1236 (1966) 
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vessel and crew are typically at sea for several days or weeks at a time.  
The vessel was at sea for most of the preelection period, and the manual 
election was held aboard the vessel.  Although there is no evidence 
whether the vessel receives U.S. Mail, the crew did have access to the 
employer’s e-mail system aboard the vessel for personal business.  The 
petitioner is a longstanding maritime labor organization, and its 
organizing campaign began while the vessel was being repaired in 
Tampa, Florida. 
At the preelection hearing, the petitioner requested that, in addition to 
providing it with the names and home addresses of eligible voters as 
required by Excelsior, the employer be required to provide petitioner 
with the e-mail addresses of eligible voters because of the unique 
circumstances of this case.  The hearing officer rejected the request, and 
in the decision and direction of election, the Regional Director affirmed 
the hearing officer.  The petitioner filed a request for review.  The Board 
denied the request for review, but “without prejudice to the Petitioner’s 
right to file an objection concerning the issue raised on review.”  
Following the election, the petitioner filed an objection, alleging that the 
employer’s failure to provide the e-mail addresses thwarted the manifest 
purpose of the Excelsior rule.   
The Regional Director found merit in the petitioner’s objection.  In 
the supplemental decision and direction of second election, the Regional 
Director found that based on the unusual circumstances of this case, it 
would be inconsistent with the “animating principles” of Excelsior and 
its progeny to find that the employer’s submission of names and home 
addresses to the petitioner, without the e-mail addresses, satisfied the 
requirements of Excelsior.  The employer sought review, contending that 
it was not compelled to furnish the petitioner with the e-mail addresses at 
issue in this case, under Excelsior or otherwise, and that requiring e-mail 
production here would be a retroactive modification of Excelsior 
requirements, which would deprive it of due process.  The petitioner 
urged affirmance of the Regional Director’s supplemental decision.   
Contrary to the Regional Director and the dissent, the majority found 
that the employer timely provided the Regional Director with a complete 
and accurate list of unit employees and their home address, and thus fully 
complied with existing Board precedent interpreting Excelsior.  The 
majority emphasized that no Board case ever has held that the failure to 
provide the e-mail addresses of eligible voters constitutes objectionable 
conduct.  The majority therefore could not agree with the dissent’s 
contentions that the employer did not “substantially comply” with 
Excelsior, emphasizing that the list was both complete and accurate.  In 
addition, the majority pointed out that the petitioner is a maritime union 
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with vast experience and a long history of organizing and representing 
employees at sea.  Although its communication with many of the eligible 
voters may have been limited while they were at sea, the petitioner 
agreed to the election date and details of the election with full knowledge 
that the vessel would be at sea during most of the election period, and 
with full knowledge that no Board decision ever had required production 
of e-mail address in the context of a Board-conducted election. 
The majority also emphasized that a “multitude of unanswered and 
difficult questions exist regarding the potential ramifications, for both 
employers and employees, of requiring employers to furnish employee e-
mail addresses.”  The majority concluded that the Board is not in a 
position to extend Excelsior, as the Union asks it to do, without the 
benefit of amicus briefing and a fully developed record.  Given the 
employer’s undisputed compliance with its Excelsior obligations as they 
stood as of the date of the union’s request, the majority is unwilling on 
the facts of this case to characterize that compliance as objectionable 
conduct.  
 
In dissent, Member Walsh stated:  
 
In the particular circumstances of this case. . . a list of 
employees’ home addresses failed to effectuate the purposes of 
the Excelsior rule: to facilitate an informed electorate by “giving 
unions the right of access to employees that employers already 
have.” Special Citizens Futures Unlimited, 331 NLRB 160, 161 
(2000).  As the Regional Director found, mailings or visits to the 
employees’ home addresses would have been futile.  Because the 
Petitioner could not contact the employees using the information 
contained in the Excelsior list, the employees were prevented 
from receiving information with respect to one of their choices, 
and thereby prevented from exercising their Section 7 rights.  
Accordingly, the Employer has not substantially complied with 
the Excelsior requirement under the facts of this case.  
 
Member Walsh also rejected the majority’s argument that petitioner 
agreed to the timing of the election knowing it would be limited in its 
ability to communicate with the unit employees:  
 
This argument essentially amounts to a contention that by 
agreeing to the election date, the Petitioner waived its right to 
communicate with the voters during the preelection period.  
Although it is true that the Petitioner agreed to the timing of the 
election, the Petitioner did not know that the Employer would 
refuse to provide it with the employees’ e-mail addresses. 
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3.  Attorney Paralegal as Employer Election Observer 
In Detroit East, Inc.,29 Members Liebman and Walsh remanded the 
case to the hearing officer for further consideration and issuance of a 
supplemental report, declining to adopt the hearing officer’s 
recommendation to overrule the union’s objection alleging that the 
employer improperly used its attorney’s paralegal as its election observer.  
The hearing officer found that the union waived this objection by failing to 
raise it during the preelection conference.  Members Liebman and Walsh 
noted the testimony of the union’s designated election observer, who 
testified that during the conference, she informed the Board agent that the 
paralegal was the employer’s attorney and asked her why she was present.  
The union’s election observer further testified that, in response, the Board 
agent called her supervisor at the Regional Office and thereafter pulled the 
paralegal aside.  The majority decided that testimony of the union’s 
election observer, if credited, would sufficiently establish that the union 
raised the status of the employer’s observer during the preelection 
conference. 
Chairman Battista, dissenting, concluded that the testimony of the 
union’s election observer, even if credited, was insufficient to establish 
that the union raised this objection during the preelection conference and 
agreed with the hearing officer that the union waived this objection. 
4.  Union Interruption of Employer Off-Site Employee Meeting 
In Reliable Trucking, Inc.,30 a mail-ballot election case, the Board 
majority (Members Kirsanow and Walsh; Chairman Battista dissenting 
in part), applying the factors set forth in Phillips Chrysler Plymouth,31 
agreed with the administrative law judge, who served as hearing officer, 
that the employer did not meet its burden of showing that the election 
should be set aside on the basis of a single incident in which the union 
interrupted the employer’s off-site meeting with employees.  In so 
concluding, however, the majority disagreed with the judge’s finding that 
the union’s actions were likely to cause fear among the employees, 
particularly given that the union did not direct any threats towards 
employees, and one employee stood up and directly challenged the 
union. 
The incident at issue took place on August 9, 2005, at a private hotel 
room rented by the employer to hold a meeting for 15–20 employees 
regarding the election that was to commence the next day.  During the 
meeting, in a darkened room while a slide show was underway, seven or 
                                                 
29 349 NLRB 935 (Members Liebman and Walsh; Chairman Battista dissenting). 
30 349 NLRB 812 (Members Kirsanow and Walsh; Chairman Battista dissenting in part). 
31 304 NLRB 16 (1991) 
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eight union agents barged in, disrupted the meeting, yelled at, and 
exchanged profanities with, employees and the employer’s 
representatives.  In his dissenting opinion, Chairman Battista, explaining 
why he would find the union’s conduct objectionable, noted: “The union 
agents’ belligerent conduct conveyed to the employees at the meeting 
that the Employer was powerless to enforce its own right to conduct the 
meeting and to control the premises.  Even the hotel’s agents were 
unable to enforce the hotel’s property rights.  The union agents left only 
after the police arrived and led them out.” 
5.  Statements of Labor Consultant Hired by Employer 
In Medieval Knights, LLC,32 a Board majority found, contrary to the 
hearing officer, that statements made by labor consultant Peter List to 
unit employees 1 week before the election were not objectionable.  
Consequently, Members Schaumber and Kirsanow certified the election 
results, in which the joint petitioners did not receive a majority of the 
valid ballots cast. 
The employer’s business involves staging medieval events.  The joint 
petitioners filed a petition to represent a unit of show employees at the 
employer’s Lyndhurst, New Jersey facility.  In August 2006, about 1 
month before the election, the employer hired labor consultants Peter 
List and James Hulsizer to educate employees and management about the 
election and bargaining processes.  At meetings held with employees 1 
week before the election, the consultants conducted a collective-
bargaining exercise involving hypothetical employers and employees.  
During the presentation, List stated, among other things, that an 
employer did not have to agree on any specific proposals, that all 
negotiations were different, and that the bargaining process could take 
weeks, months, or more than a year.  According to credited testimony, 
List said that an employer could “stall out” the negotiations by “giving in 
to lesser items or addendums . . . but not really getting anything done.”  
Witnesses could not remember List’s exact words, but it was undisputed 
that List’s presentation was about a hypothetical employer, and at no 
time did he say that Medieval Knights would engage in any particular 
bargaining conduct. 
Members Schaumber and Kirsanow found that List’s statements about 
a hypothetical employer merely described “the possible pitfalls for 
employees of the collective-bargaining process.”  Standard Products 
Co.33  Employees could understand that the presentation described a 
hypothetical employer’s bargaining strategy, and List did not state or 
 
32 350 NLRB 194 (Members Schaumber and Kirsanow; Member Walsh dissenting). 
33 281 NLRB 141, 163 (1986) (citations omitted). 
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imply that the employer in this case would engage in the same conduct.  
In similar situations, the Board has found such statements 
unobjectionable.34   
In dissent, Member Walsh found that, under the circumstances, the 
employees would consider List’s statements within the context of their 
own employment and infer that, if the unions won the election, the 
employer would rely on the strategy List described to avoid coming to 
terms.  Member Walsh stated that List’s hypothetical exercise described 
sham bargaining whereas the cases relied on by the majority described 
good faith bargaining or factually accurate events. Thus, Member Walsh 
would set aside the election. 
6.  Prounion Conduct of Supervisor 
In Madison Square Garden Ct, LLC,35 the Board majority of 
Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber reversed the Regional 
Director’s finding that supervisors’ prounion conduct, including their 
solicitation of union authorization cards, did not constitute objectionable 
conduct under Harborside Health Care, Inc.36  Applying Harborside to 
the facts of this case, the majority found that the supervisors held 
meaningful authority over event staff employees; that the supervisors’ 
conduct, including their soliciting union authorization cards from their 
direct subordinates, was inherently coercive absent mitigating 
circumstances; that there were no mitigating circumstances; and that the 
supervisors’ prounion conduct materially impacted the election’s 
outcome.  Accordingly, the majority reversed the Regional Director’s 
decision to overrule the employer’s objections, and directed a second 
election. 
In her dissent, Member Liebman noted that Harborside Healthcare 
was “wrongly decided,” and that it should not be applied retroactively to 
conduct that was lawful at the time it occurred.  Moreover, Member 
Liebman found that even applying the Harborside standard to the present 
case, the card solicitations herein were not objectionable because 
mitigating circumstances tempered any possible impact of the 
solicitations.    
D.  Deauthorization Petition 
Supporting Signatures 
In Covenant Aviation Security, LLC,37 considering an issue of first 
impression, Chairman Battista and Member Kirsanow decided that the 
                                                 
34 See, e.g., Manhattan Crowne Plaza, 341 NLRB 619 (2004).  
35 350 NLRB 117 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Liebman dissented.) 
36 343 NLRB 906 (2004). 
37 349 NLRB 699 (Chairman Battista and Member Kirsanow; Member Walsh dissenting). 
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individual petitioner’s deauthorization petition must be processed even 
though the supporting signatures predate the execution of a contract 
containing a union-security provision.   The majority reinstated the 
petition and remanded the proceeding to the Regional Director for further 
appropriate action.  Member Walsh, dissenting, explained that 
Section 9(e)(1) of the Act “for sound policy reasons, clearly 
contemplates that the signatures gathered in support of a deauthorization 
petition may be collected only after the effective date of a collective-
bargaining agreement containing a union-security clause.”  
The Regional Director dismissed the petitioner’s deauthorization 
petition as premature because the supporting signatures predated an 
effective union-security clause.  The Board in May 2006 granted the 
petitioner’s request for review.  In this decision on review, the majority 
held that based on the language of Section 9(e)(1), its legislative history, 
and Board precedent on deauthorization elections, “requiring the 
signatures underlying the showing of interest to postdate the effective 
union-security provision here would unjustly impede the right of 
employees to deauthorize a union shop.”   
 
Section 9(e)(1)  provides: 
 
Upon the filing with the Board, by 30 per centum or more of 
the employees in a bargaining unit covered by an agreement 
between their employer and a labor organization made 
pursuant to Section 8(a)(3), of a petition alleging the desire that 
such authority be rescinded, the Board shall take a secret ballot 
of the employees in such unit and certify the results thereof to 
such labor organization and to the employer. 
 
Chairman Battista and Member Kirsanow observed that, contrary to 
the dissent’s contention, the “plain meaning” of Section 9(e)(1) does not 
resolve the question at issue and it is unclear as to whether the showing 
of interest in support of a deauthorization petition may be gathered in 
advance of an agreement containing a union-security clause.  They 
wrote: 
 
Although it is clear from the statutory language that, when 
filed, a deauthorization petition must be supported by at least 
30 percent of employees “covered by” a contract containing a 
union-security provision, Section 9(e)(1) is devoid of language 
as to when the showing of interest must be gathered.  The 
employees in the instant case are “covered by an agreement” 
containing a union-security clause, and 30 percent of the 
employees so covered have supported a petition to get rid of 
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that clause.  The fact that the 30 percent expressed their desire 
prior to the coverage does not clearly invalidate their desire. 
 
The majority reasoned that either Congress did not contemplate the 
question of whether the signatures supporting a showing of interest in a 
deauthorization petition may predate an effective contract containing a 
union-security clause, or that Congress did consider the question but left 
it to the Board, saying:  “Either way, the fact of the matter is that the 
statutory language is inconclusive, thus it falls to the Board as the agency 
charged with administering the Act to fill in the statutory gap.” The 
majority pointed out that although the Act does not conclusively resolve 
the issue, it is consistent with processing a Section 9(e)(1) petition 
supported by preagreement signatures.  It wrote:  
 
Section 9(e)(1) reflects Congress’s intent to subject union-
security arrangements to employee veto.  Our holding here 
clears away a perceived procedural obstacle to a timely election 
in which employees may decide whether to cast that veto.   
    Like the statutory language, the legislative history behind the 
1951 amendments to the Act does not speak directly to the 
issue before us but it is certainly consistent with our holding 
that the “covered by” language of Section 9(e)(1) applies only 
to the filing of a deauthorization petition and not to the dates of 
the signatures gathered for a showing of interest to support 
such a petition. 
 
Accordingly, the majority found Congress’s purpose of protecting 
employee free choice best effectuated by processing the instant petition, 
saying:  “If we were to dismiss the petition on the basis of an assertedly 
premature showing of interest, we would effectively require these 
employees to engage in the essentially ministerial task of reiterating their 
already expressed desire to secure a deauthorization vote.” 
 
Dissenting Member Walsh stated:  
  
Sound policy considerations underlie the statute’s 
requirement that the showing of interest supporting a 
deauthorization election must be collected after the 
employees are subject to a union-security clause.  An 
employee’s decision regarding whether or not to financially 
support a union is certainly related to the benefits the 
employee believes are achieved though union 
representation.  A showing of interest obtained before 
employees know what contractual benefits a union has 
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negotiated on their behalf is therefore a very poor indicator 
of the employees’ interest in deauthorization. 
 
Member Walsh believes that “[u]sing Board resources to conduct an 
election when the majority of the signatures supporting the petition were 
collected before the parties even began negotiating a contract exemplifies 
the kind of inefficiency that Congress sought to eliminate in doing away 
with authorization elections.”  He added that “a deauthorization election 
here will undoubtedly involve a substantial expenditure of Board 
resources given the varied hours and locations of bargaining unit 
members.  Such an expenditure is unwise where employees signed the 
petition before they even had a reasonable chance to evaluate the benefits 
of the collective-bargaining agreement and the union-security clause 
contained in it.” 
 47 
IV 
Unfair Labor Practices 
The Board is empowered under Section 10(c) of the Act to prevent 
any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in Sec. 8) 
affecting commerce.  In general, Section 8 prohibits an employer or a 
union or their agents from engaging in certain specified types of activity 
that Congress has designated as unfair labor practices.  The Board, 
however, may not act to prevent or remedy such activities until an unfair 
labor practice charge has been filed with it.  Such charges may be filed 
by an employer, an employee, a labor organization, or any other person 
irrespective of any interest he or she might have in the matter.  They are 
filed with the Regional Office of the Board in the area where the alleged 
unfair labor practice occurred. 
This chapter deals with decisions of the Board during fiscal year 2007 
that involved novel questions or set precedents that may be of substantial 
importance in the future administration of the Act.  
A.  Employer Interference with Employee Rights 
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act forbids an employer “to interfere with, 
restrain, or coerce” employees in the exercise of their rights as 
guaranteed by Section 7 to engage in or refrain from engaging in 
collective-bargaining and self-organizational activities.  Violations of 
this general prohibition may be a derivation or byproduct of any of the 
types of conduct specifically identified in paragraphs (2) through (5) of 
Section 8(a), or may consist of any other employer conduct that 
independently tends to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in 
exercising their statutory rights.  This section treats only decisions 
involving activities that constitute such independent violations of Section 
8(a)(1). 
1.  Filing and Maintenance of a Lawsuit 
In BE & K Construction Co.,1 the Board, in a 3–2 decision, held that 
the filing and maintenance of a reasonably based lawsuit does not violate 
the Act regardless of the motive for bringing the suit.   
BE & K filed a lawsuit against several unions in federal district court 
in California. The suit alleged that the unions were engaged in activities 
violating both the Act and antitrust laws. The district court granted the 
unions’ motions for summary judgment and dismissed the employer’s 
                                                 
1 351 NLRB No. 29 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Kirsanow; Members Liebman 
and Walsh dissenting). 
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suit. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s decision. 
The unions filed unfair labor practice charges alleging that the lawsuit 
was unlawful because it was retaliatory, and the General Counsel issued 
a complaint.  In an earlier decision in this proceeding, the Board found, 
pursuant to Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB,2 that the 
employer’s unsuccessful suit violated Section 8(a)(1) because it was filed 
to retaliate against the exercise of activities protected by the Act.  BE & 
K Construction Co.3  The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit enforced the Board’s decision. BE & K Construction Co. v. 
NLRB.4 
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the Board’s analysis on First 
Amendment grounds.  BE & K Construction Co. v. NLRB.5  The Court 
first evaluated its relevant precedent concerning the First Amendment 
right to petition the government through the courts, most of which had 
been developed in antitrust cases.  The Court found that the threat of an 
NLRB adjudication amounted to a burden on such petitioning.  It also 
found that the Board’s standard for evaluating the lawfulness of 
completed, unsuccessful lawsuits raised a difficult First Amendment 
issue.  The Court adopted a limiting construction of Section 8(a)(1) to 
avoid this constitutional issue, and it invalidated the Board’s legal 
standard because it did not comport with that limited construction.  The 
Court remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings consistent 
with its opinion. 
On remand, the question presented was whether the Board may 
impose liability on an employer for filing a losing retaliatory lawsuit, 
even if the employer could show that the suit was not objectively 
baseless under Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia 
Picture Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993). The Board majority of 
Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Kirsanow noted, first, 
that in Bill Johnson’s, the Court had held that, in order to protect the First 
Amendment right to petition, an ongoing, reasonably based lawsuit could 
not be enjoined as an unfair labor practice even if its motive was to 
retaliate against the exercise of rights protected by the Act.  After setting 
out the considerations that led to the Court’s holding, the Board found: 
 
 These principles, in our view, are equally applicable to 
both completed and ongoing lawsuits. . . . 
 
 
2 461 U.S. 731 (1983). 
3 329 NLRB 717 (1999). 
4 246 F.3d 619 (2001). 
5 536 U.S. 516 (2002).   
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 [The] chilling effect on the right to petition exists 
whether the Board burdens a lawsuit in its initial phase 
or after its conclusion.  Indeed, the very prospect of 
liability may deter prospective plaintiffs from filing 
legitimate claims. Thus, the same weighty First 
Amendment considerations catalogued by the Court in 
Bill Johnson’s with respect to ongoing lawsuits apply 
with equal force to completed lawsuits.  In sum, we see 
no logical basis for finding that an ongoing, reasonably-
based lawsuit is protected by the First Amendment right 
to petition, but that the same lawsuit, once completed, 
loses that protection solely because the plaintiff failed to 
ultimately prevail.  Nothing in the Constitution restricts 
the right to petition to winning litigants. 
 
. . . Accordingly, we find that, just as with an ongoing 
lawsuit, a completed lawsuit that is reasonably based 
cannot be found to be an unfair labor practice.  In 
determining whether a lawsuit is reasonably based, we 
will apply the same test as that articulated by the Court 
in the antitrust context: a lawsuit lacks a reasonable 
basis, or is “objectively baseless,” if “no reasonable 
litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.”  
Professional Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 60. 
 
In applying its new standard to the facts of the case, the Board found 
that it was bound by the Court’s view that the employer’s lawsuit was 
reasonably based, but it reached the same conclusion based on its own 
analysis of the suit.  Although the suit ultimately was unsuccessful, it 
was not shown to lack a reasonable basis.  Accordingly, the Board 
dismissed the complaint without evaluating the employer’s motive for 
filing the suit. 
In dissent, while Members Liebman and Walsh concurred with the 
majority that the suit at issue must be treated as reasonably based, they 
disagreed with the breadth of the majority’s decision.  In their view, the 
Supreme Court did not hold that all reasonably based suits are 
constitutionally immune from liability under the Act, and the majority 
went too far in protecting First Amendment interests at the expense of 
rights protected by the Act.   The dissent stated: 
 
 What the BE & K decision leaves open is convincingly 
described by the concurring opinion of Justice Breyer in 
BE & K, which was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, 
and Ginsburg:  The Board may not “rest its finding of 
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‘retaliatory motive’ almost exclusively upon the simple 
fact that the employer filed a reasonably based but 
unsuccessful lawsuit and the employer did not like the 
union.”  536 U.S. at 539.  Left open, in contrast, is the 
possibility of imposing unfair labor practice liability in 
“other circumstances in which the evidence of 
‘retaliation’ or antiunion motive might be stronger or 
different.”  Id. 
   
 One example, as Justice Breyer’s concurrence 
observes, is the situation expressly referred to by the 
Court’s opinion: a case involving “an employer, 
indifferent to outcome, who intends the reasonably based 
but unsuccessful lawsuit simply to impose litigation 
costs on the union.”  Id.  A second example is the 
lawsuit brought by an employer “as part of a broader 
course of conduct aimed at harming the unions and 
interfering with employees’ exercise of their rights 
under” the Act.  Id. 
 
In the dissent’s view, Bill Johnson’s requires the Board to balance the 
need to protect Section 7 rights from incursion by lawsuits against the 
need to safeguard the constitutional right of access to the courts.  
Although the BE & K Court distanced itself from Bill Johnson’s, the 
dissent asserts that it did not reject this balancing principle, or preclude 
the Board from imposing a measured burden on the right to petition in 
order to protect rights under the Act. 
The dissent would have remanded the case for further litigation to 
evaluate whether the employer’s suit was retaliatory because, for 
example, it was brought to impose litigation costs on the unions or as 
part of a broader pattern of conduct unlawful under the Act. 
In Ray Angelini, Inc.,6 the Board, in a supplemental decision and 
order, found that the respondent’s lawsuit was reasonably based, and that 
therefore, under the test set forth in the Board’s supplemental decision in 
BE & K,7 the filing and maintenance of the lawsuit did not violate the 
Act.  The Board dismissed the complaint. 
The lawsuit arose out of the City of Philadelphia’s (City) bid process 
for electrical work at the Philadelphia International Airport (Airport).  
The City notified the respondent that it was the lowest bidder.  However, 
the charging party union (union) notified the City that the respondent had 
violated prevailing-wage regulations on jobs it performed for the State of 
 
6 351 NLRB No. 24 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Kirsanow). 
7 351 NLRB No. 29. 
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New Jersey.  The City made inquiries and then notified the respondent 
that it was disqualified from receiving the Airport contract.  The 
respondent requested a disqualification hearing. The hearing panel 
included the City director of procurement. The respondent’s 
disqualification was upheld and the City awarded the Airport contract to 
another company.  The respondent filed suit in state court against the 
City and the other company.  The respondent also made inquiries and, as 
a result, informed the City that it had awarded contracts to other bidders 
with much more serious prevailing-wage violations than those alleged to 
have been committed by the respondent. Also, the respondent’s attorney 
happened to encounter the City’s director of procurement who stated, 
according to the attorney, that the City’s political obligations to the 
union’s business agent were involved in the Airport contract.  (The union 
had a convention coming to the City and it would not look good if a 
nonunion contractor, such as the respondent, was working on the Airport 
contract.)  Thereafter, the respondent dropped its state court action and 
filed suit in federal district court—the lawsuit at issue in this case—
against the City, the company awarded the Airport contract, and the 
union. The respondent alleged that the defendants had acted in concert, 
under color of state law, to deprive the respondent of its 14th 
Amendment right to substantive due process.  The respondent alleged 
that the defendants conspired to have the respondent, a nonunion 
contractor, disqualified from the Airport contract and divested of its bid 
in favor of a union contractor.  The respondent relied heavily on its 
attorney’s conversation with the City’s director of procurement and the 
respondent’s information about the City’s awarding contracts to other 
bidders with much more serious prevailing-wage violations than those 
alleged to have been committed by the respondent. 
The union filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a 
claim on which relief may be granted.  The court denied this motion, 
without opinion, and also denied a similar motion filed by other 
defendants.  The union next filed a motion for summary judgment which 
the court denied, again without opinion.  The court then conducted a 5-
day bench trial after which the court dismissed the respondent’s 
complaint in its entirety, with prejudice.  The respondent failed to prove 
the existence of a conspiracy between the union and the City.  The court 
required the respondent to pay the cost of the proceeding, but it denied 
the union’s request for attorneys’ fees.  The respondent did not appeal 
the court’s decision. 
Meanwhile, the union filed a charge alleging that the respondent’s 
lawsuit was filed in retaliation  against the union’s exercise of Section 7 
rights and thus violated Section 8(a)(1).  The Board’s administrative law 
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judge found the violation.  She applied Bill Johnson’s Restaurants v. 
NLRB,8 and reasoned that because the respondent’s lawsuit was 
“unsuccessful,” it was unlawful if filed in retaliation against the exercise 
of Section 7 rights.  The administrative law judge so found, citing the 
respondent’s opposition to the union’s having reported its prevailing-
wage violations to City officials, to the union’s lobbying those officials 
in an effort to obtain City contracts for union contractors, and to the 
union’s business agent’s efforts to ingratiate himself with potential 
voters.  The Board adopted the administrative law judge’s decision. 
The General Counsel and the respondent urged the Board to dismiss 
the complaint in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in BE & K 
Construction Co. v. NLRB.9  They argued that the lawsuit had a 
reasonable basis and did not violate the Act.  The union urged the Board 
to find the violation because it was not objectively reasonable given the 
union’s evidence. 
In this supplemental decision, the Board cited its recent BE & K 
decision for the principles that: “the filing and maintenance of a 
reasonably based lawsuit does not violate the Act, regardless of whether 
the lawsuit is ongoing or completed, and regardless of the motive for 
initiating the lawsuit,” and that “a lawsuit lacks a reasonable basis, or is 
‘objectively baseless,’ if ‘no reasonable litigant could reasonably expect 
success on the merits.’” The Board also cited the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bill Johnson’s Restaurant,10 for the principles that: “if there is 
a genuine issue of material fact that turns on the credibility of witnesses 
or on the proper inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, it cannot, 
in our view, be concluded that the suit should be enjoined,” and that the 
Board should “stay its hand” unless “the plaintiff’s position is plainly 
foreclosed as a matter of law or is otherwise frivolous.” 
The Board applied these principles here and found that the 
respondent’s lawsuit was reasonably based. The Board inferred from the 
district court’s denial of the union’s motions to dismiss and for summary 
judgment first, that the respondent’s complaint stated a claim upon which 
relief could be granted, and second, that disputed issues of material fact 
existed precluding judgment as a matter of law in the union’s favor.  
Thus, the Board could not say that the respondent could not have 
reasonably expected to succeed on the merits.  Indeed, the Board noted 
that the union wanted the Board to readjudicate its motion for summary 
judgment, i.e., to have the Board find no factual dispute as to the 
existence of a conspiracy.  However, the court found to the contrary. The 
 
8 461 U.S. 731 (1983). 
9 536 U.S. 516 (2002). 
10 Supra. 
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Board declined the union’s invitation to second-guess the court in this 
regard. The Board found the Respondent’s lawsuit was reasonably based 
and dismissed the complaint. 
In Postal Service,11 the Board affirmed the finding of the 
administrative law judge that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of 
the Act by threatening an employee with a lawsuit and unspecified 
reprisals because he had filed an unfair labor practice charge with the 
Board.   
In determining that the threat to sue violated the Act, the Board 
“assume[d] arguendo, without deciding, that the principles of BE & K 
[BE & K Construction v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002)] are to be applied 
to a situation where a threat to file a lawsuit is ‘incidental’ to a lawsuit.”  
The Board found, however, “that where, as here, no actual lawsuit was 
filed, the threat was not ‘incidental’” and, thus, the threat to sue the 
employee for filing an unfair labor practice charge violated Section 
8(a)(1) of the Act.  Because no lawsuit had been filed against the 
employee, the Board found that the threat to sue in this case “was not 
preliminary to, or intertwined with, protected litigation or petitioning 
activity” and was therefore “not entitled to immunity.”  The Board 
affirmed the judge’s finding that the threat to sue the employee for filing 
an unfair labor practice charge had the reasonable tendency to restrain 
employees in the exercise of their right to file charges under the Act and 
accordingly violated Section 8(a)(1). 
2.  Employer Assistance in Decertification Petition 
In Mickey’s Linen & Towel Supply, Inc.,12 the Board reversed the 
administrative law judge and found that the Respondent violated 
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by assisting employees in their attempts to 
decertify the union when it performed translations for an employee who 
was soliciting signatures for a decertification petition. 
In early February 2006, unit employee Judy Wickhorst began 
soliciting signatures from coworkers to decertify the union.  Because two 
of her coworkers spoke only Spanish, Wickhorst asked David Cerda, a 
bilingual supervisor, to translate for her.  Cerda initially responded that 
he could not assist her in the decertification process because he was a 
member of management.  Moments later, however, Cerda changed his 
mind and agreed to translate.  Through Cerda, Wickhorst asked the two 
employees whether they wanted to pay union dues, and told them that 
they could do better than the union. After Cerda translated for Wickhorst, 
 
11 350 NLRB 125 (Chairman Battista and Members Liebman and Walsh) reconsideration denied 351 
NLRB No. 23 (Chairman Battista and Members Liebman and Walsh). 
12 349 NLRB 790 (Chairman Battista and Members Liebman and Walsh). 
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the two employees signed the decertification petition in the presence of 
Cerda and Wickhorst.   
The Board found, contrary to the judge, that the respondent’s conduct 
constituted more than mere ministerial aid, and that the respondent, 
through Cerda, provided unlawful assistance to the decertification effort.  
It wrote:  “Cerda translated for Wickhorst, who was soliciting signatures 
for a decertification petition, moments after he served as a translator for 
the Respondent at a mandatory employee meeting that concerned union 
matters, in particular, the ongoing collective-bargaining negotiations.  In 
addition to simply translating, Cerda stood with Wickhorst while the 
employees made their decisions and signed the decertification petition.  
In these circumstances, the employees could reasonably feel coerced into 
signing the decertification petition.”  Contrary to the judge, the Board 
found immaterial the fact that Wickhorst alone initiated the 
decertification effort.  Further, although Cerda initially declined 
Wickhorst’s request to translate for her, it did not shield his later actions. 
3.  Unprotected Employee Activities 
In Fineberg Packing Co.,13 the complaint alleged that the respondent 
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by discharging 32 unit employees 
because of their participation in a work stoppage.  Chairman Battista and 
Member Schaumber reversed the administrative law judge’s findings that 
(1) the work stoppage at issue constituted protected concerted activity, 
notwithstanding a no-strike clause in the parties’ collective-bargaining 
agreement, and (2) even assuming the work stoppage was unprotected, 
the respondent condoned the employees’ conduct and therefore could not 
discipline them for that conduct.  Member Liebman dissented. 
In the early morning of February 14, 2001, a group of employees, 
who were concerned about rumors of a reduction in their hours, left their 
work stations and walked out of the plant to wait for plant manager 
Richard Freudenberg.  When Freudenberg arrived, employees Kathy 
Furlong and Billy Exum informed Freudenberg that the employees 
wanted to speak to him about the rumored work hour reduction.  
Freudenberg responded that it would be unlawful for him to meet with 
the employees as a group, but that he could meet with them individually.  
Freudenberg then ordered the employees to return to work or, 
alternatively, to leave the premises.  In response to employee questions if 
they were fired, Freudenberg assured them that he was not firing anyone, 
and told them to come back the next day.  Some employees returned to 
work and others left the plant.  The next morning several employees 
attempted to return to work, but were denied access to the respondent’s 
 
13 349 NLRB 294 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Liebman dissenting in part). 
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premises.  The following day, when the employees returned to the plant 
to pick up their paychecks, Freudenberg gave them separation notices, 
which stated that the employees had “voluntarily quit.” 
Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber noted that the General 
Counsel expressly conceded that the work stoppage was unprotected and 
litigated the case consistent with that position.  Thus, the respondent was 
neither put on notice that the nature of the work stoppage would be 
considered by the judge nor provided the opportunity to litigate the issue.  
Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber said it was not appropriate 
for the judge to make a finding that the work stoppage constituted 
protected concerted activity, and declined to adopt her finding in that 
regard.  They also found that the evidence was insufficient to establish 
that the respondent intended to condone the employees’ continuation of 
the work stoppage after giving the employees the choice of returning to 
work or leaving. 
Member Liebman agreed with the majority that the judge’s finding 
concerning the nature of the work stoppage should be reversed and that 
the General Counsel apparently conceded that the work stoppage was 
unprotected.  She would affirm, however, the judge’s finding that the 
respondent acted unlawfully in discharging the employees when they 
returned to work.  Contrary to the majority’s finding, Member Liebman 
found that there was nothing ambiguous about Freudenberg’s statements, 
which clearly demonstrated an intent to overlook the employees’ 
misconduct and to allow them to return to work. 
B.  Employer Assistance to Labor Organization 
The central issue in Syracuse University14 was whether the 
respondent’s employee complaint procedure, the staff complaint process 
(SCP), is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the 
Act.  Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber reversed the 
administrative law judge and found that the SCP is not a labor 
organization.  Accordingly, Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber 
found that the respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the 
Act by establishing and maintaining the SCP nor Section 8(a)(1) by 
interfering with employee rights to refrain from supporting a labor 
organization.  The complaint was dismissed. 
Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber concluded that the SCP is 
not a labor organization because it does not “deal with” the employer on 
terms and conditions of employment.  Rather, they found that the SCP is 
limited to an adjudicative function, similar to the entities found not to be 
 
14 350 NLRB 755 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Liebman dissenting). 
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labor organizations in Mercy-Memorial Hospital15 and John Ascuaga’s 
Nugget.16 Member Liebman, dissenting, found that the SCP is a dispute 
resolution mechanism that fulfills the characteristics of a Section 2(5) 
labor organization. 
C.  Employer Discrimination Against Employees 
Section 8(a)(3) prohibits an employer from discriminating against 
employees “in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or 
condition of employment” for the purpose of encouraging or 
discouraging membership in any labor organization.  Many cases arising 
under this section present difficult factual, but legally uncomplicated, 
issues concerning employer motivation.  Other cases, however, present 
substantial questions of policy and statutory construction, such as the 
ones that follow. 
1.  Permanent Replacement Status of At-Will Employees 
In Jones Plastic & Engineering Co.,17 the Board announced that at-
will employment status does not detract from an employer’s otherwise 
valid showing that it has permanently replaced striking employees.  The 
Board overruled Target Rock18 to the extent it is inconsistent with that 
principle. 
An economic striker who unconditionally offers to return to work is 
entitled to immediate reinstatement unless the employer has hired a 
permanent replacement for the striker in order to continue its business 
operations during the strike.  Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. NLRB.19  
Thus, at the conclusion of a strike, an employer is not bound to discharge 
those hired permanently to fill the places of economic strikers, but 
permanent replacement status is an affirmative defense, with the burden 
on the employer to show a mutual understanding with the replacements 
that they are permanent. 
Many employers hire employees on an “at-will” basis, meaning that 
they can be discharged at any time, with or without cause.  In Target 
Rock, the Board opined that statements advising replacement employees 
of their at-will status “obviously do not support the [r]espondent’s 
position that the striker replacements were permanent.”  In Jones Plastic, 
the General Counsel asserted that because Target Rock could be read to 
deprive at-will replacement employees of permanent status, the law 
 
15 231 NLRB 1108 (1977). 
16 230 NLRB 275 (1977), enfd. in pertinent part 623 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1980), cert denied 451 U.S. 
906 (1981).   
17 351 NLRB No. 11 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Kirsanow; Members 
Liebman and Walsh dissenting). 
18 324 NLRB 373, 374 (1997), enfd. 172 F.3d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
19 304 U.S. 333, 345–346 (1938).  
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should be changed to make clear that at-will employment does not 
foreclose a finding of permanent replacement status.     
A Board majority (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and 
Kirsanow) concluded that at-will employment status does not detract 
from permanent replacement status, stating that    
 
we view as untenable any implication in Target Rock 
that conditions on hiring other than those enumerated in 
Belknap [v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983),] detract from a 
finding of permanent replacement status.  Instead, we 
find that the status of the replacements hired by the 
Respondent in this case is indistinguishable from the 
status of probationary employees found to be permanent 
replacements in Kansas Milling, [97 NLRB 219, 225–
226 (1951)], and its progeny.  In those cases, the 
probationary employees were subject to discharge 
without cause, and their postprobation employment was 
subject to their satisfaction of the employer’s standards.  
As a matter of law, then, equivalent conditions imposed 
by the Respondent through its at-will disclaimers do not 
detract from other evidence proving the replacements’ 
status as “permanent employees” for the purpose of 
Federal labor law.    
 
Applying those principles, the Board found that the respondent’s 
issuance of at-will disclaimers informing employees that their 
employment was for “no definite period” and could be terminated for 
“any reason” and “at any time, with or without cause” did not detract 
from its showing of permanent replacement status.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Board noted that the respondent was following its normal 
employment practices because the strikers as well as the replacements 
were employed on an at-will basis. 
The Board found that the other evidence in the case supported a 
finding of permanent replacement status. The respondent issued to the 
replacement employees forms stating that they were permanent 
replacements, in many cases naming the striker whom the individual was 
hired to permanently replace.  The respondent also told striking 
employees that it had begun to hire permanent replacements and that 
they risked permanent replacement if they did not return to work.  The 
respondent’s human resource manager also told one replacement that he 
was a permanent employee.  On these facts, the Board concluded that the 
respondent established a mutual understanding with its replacement 
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employees that they would not be displaced by returning strikers at the 
end of the strike, which is the meaning of “permanence” in this context.   
Members Liebman and Walsh dissented.  In their view, Board 
precedent established that at-will employment was not incompatible with 
permanent replacement status, and nothing in Target Rock required the 
overruling of that case.  What is required to show permanent status, in 
their view, is “the promise to the replacements of some right vis-à-vis the 
strikers”—“‘strikers . . . are entitled to reinstatement’ unless the 
employer has made a commitment to the replacements that would be 
breached if the employer ‘discharg[ed] them to make way for selected 
strikers . . . .’ [Belknap, supra, 463 U.S. at 503-504].”   
The dissent noted that the respondent had advised the replacements 
that their employment “may be terminated as a result of a strike 
settlement agreement . . . or by order the National Labor Relations 
Board” and stated that  
 
[h]ad the Respondent made only the latter statement, a 
finding that the replacements were permanent would 
follow.  But the Respondent did not so limit itself.  
Rather, it told the employees not only that they could be 
displaced as a result of a strike settlement or Board 
order, but, additionally, that they could be discharged at 
any time for any reason.  Taken together—and absent 
any other evidence of mutual understanding of 
permanence—the Respondent’s statements did not 
reflect any commitment by the Respondent to the 
replacements.  Certainly, the statements did not reflect a 
commitment that the Respondent would refuse, in the 
absence of a strike settlement, to reinstate strikers if it 
meant terminating replacements. Although the 
Respondent used the term “permanent replacement,” it 
then undercut that statement by failing to give the 
replacements any assurance that they had rights vis-à-vis 
the strikers.   
 
Because the dissent concluded that a mutual understanding of 
permanent employment was not established, in their view the respondent 
violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by refusing to reinstate the 
strikers upon their unconditional offer to return to work. 
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2.  Salting: Refusal-to-Consider and Hire Union Applicants 
In Toering Electric Co.,20 the Board, in a 3–2 decision, ruled that an 
applicant for employment must be genuinely interested in seeking to 
establish an employment relationship with the employer in order to 
qualify as a Section 2(3) employee and thus be protected against hiring 
discrimination based on union affiliation or activity.  The Board 
explained that “one cannot be denied what one does not genuinely seek.”  
The Board further held that the General Counsel bears the ultimate 
burden of proving an individual’s genuine interest in seeking to go to 
work for the employer. 
The Board majority of Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber 
and Kirsanow held in Toering that the presumption that any individual 
who submitted an application was entitled to protection was inconsistent 
with the text of the Act and its basic purposes.  Only applicants who are 
statutory employees within the meaning of Section 2(3) are entitled to 
protection against hiring discrimination, and statutory employee status, in 
turn, requires the existence of “at least a rudimentary economic 
relationship, actual or anticipated, between employee and employer.”  
WBAI Pacifica Foundation.21  No such economic relationship is 
anticipated in the case of applicants with no genuine aspiration to work 
for an employer.  Thus, job applicants without a genuine interest in an 
employment relationship are not employees within the meaning of 
Section 2(3).  
Although some salts, paid or unpaid, may genuinely desire to work 
for a nonunion employer and to proselytize coworkers on behalf of a 
union, other salts clearly have no such interest.  According to the Board, 
“submitting applications with no intention of seeking work but rather to 
generate meritless unfair labor practice charges is not protected activity.  
Indeed, such conduct manifests a fundamental conflict of interests ab 
initio between the employer’s interest in doing business and the 
applicant’s interest in disrupting or eliminating this business.”  Such 
conduct, the Board observed, also collides with the employer’s right, 
recognized by the Supreme Court, to insist on employee loyalty and on a 
cooperative employee-employer relationship. NLRB v. Electrical 
Workers IBEW Local 1229 (Jefferson Standard).22 
For these reasons, the Board imposed on the General Counsel in all 
hiring discrimination cases the burden of proving that the alleged 
discriminatee was genuinely interested in seeking to establish an 
 
20 351 NLRB No. 18 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Kirsanow; Members 
Liebman and Walsh dissenting). 
21 328 NLRB 1273, 1274 (1999). 
22 346 U.S. 464, 472 (1953). 
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employment relationship and was thereby qualified for protection as a 
Section 2(3) employee.  The Board explained that this requirement 
embraces two components: 
 
(1)  there was an application for employment, and (2) the 
application reflected a genuine interest in becoming 
employed by the employer.  As to the first component, 
the General Counsel must introduce evidence that the 
individual applied for employment with the employer or 
that someone authorized by that individual did so on his 
or her behalf. . . . .  
    As to the second component (genuine interest in 
becoming employed), the employer must put at issue the 
genuineness of the applicant’s interest through evidence 
that creates a reasonable question as to the applicant’s 
actual interest in going to work for the employer.  In 
other words, while we will no longer conclusively 
presume that an applicant is entitled to protection as a 
statutory employee, neither will we presume, in the 
absence of contrary evidence, that an application for 
employment is anything other than what it purports to 
be.  
 
The Board concluded that although some evidence in Toering 
suggested the alleged discriminatees’ genuine interest in seeking 
employment, other evidence suggested the opposite.  In these 
circumstances, the Board remanded the case to the judge in order to 
apply the new analytical framework.  
Members Liebman and Walsh, dissenting, would have retained 
without modifications the standard for litigating hiring discrimination 
cases set forth in FES.23  They commented that the Board’s decision in 
Toering, reached without the benefit of briefs, oral argument, or even a 
request to reconsider precedent, “continues the Board’s roll-back of 
statutory protections for union salts who seek to uncover hiring 
discrimination by nonunion employers and to organize their workers” by 
legalizing hiring discrimination in some, perhaps many, cases involving 
salts.  
In the dissent’s view, the majority’s new approach cannot be 
reconciled with the Act, its policies, or Supreme Court precedent.  They 
pointed out that in Phelps Dodge, the Supreme Court stated that:  
 
 
23 331 NLRB 9 (2000), supplemented 333 NLRB 66 (2001), enfd. 301 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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Discrimination against union labor in the hiring of men 
is a dam to self organization at the source of supply.  The 
effect of such discrimination is not confined to the actual 
denial of employment; it inevitably operates against the 
whole idea of the legitimacy of organization.  In a word, 
it undermines the principle which . . . is recognized as 
basic to the attainment of industrial peace. 
 
According to the dissent, the Act’s aims are, therefore, furthered by 
finding unlawful an employer’s refusal to hire or consider an applicant 
because of his union affiliation, even where it cannot be established that 
an applicant would have accepted a job if offered. 
The dissent noted that Sections 2(3) and 8(a)(3) make clear that the 
employer’s motive, and not the applicant’s intentions, is the proper focus 
in cases like this one.  If Congress had intended to exclude “non-
genuine” job applicants, they argued, it presumably would have done so.  
Instead, Congress has repeatedly declined to enact numerous anti-salting 
bills in the 12 years since the Supreme Court decided NLRB v. Town & 
Country Electric, Inc.24 (unanimously approving Board’s holding that 
paid union organizers who seek employment are statutory employees). 
The dissent further stated that the majority’s new standard, even 
considered on its own terms, is critically flawed because it fails to 
provide clear guidance with respect to determining an applicant’s 
genuine status.  Moreover, they observe that the new standard places an 
unfair burden on the General Counsel by allowing an employer to first 
raise the genuineness issue during the unfair labor practice hearing.  And, 
they argued, it will both spawn and prolong the course of litigation by 
creating a new fact-intensive defense. 
The dissenters summarized their disagreement with the majority in the 
following terms: 
 
By any measure, today’s decision represents a failure in 
the administration of the National Labor Relations Act.  
The majority unnecessarily overturns carefully 
considered precedent and implements an untenable 
approach that will not even accomplish the majority’s 
professed goals.  Worse, the Board now creates a 
legalized form of hiring discrimination, a step that would 
have been considered unthinkable by the Phelps Dodge 
Court when it held that the prevention of hiring 
discrimination against union members was “the driving 
 
24 516 U.S. 85 (1995). 
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force behind the enactment of the National Labor 
Relations Act.”  313 U.S. at 186.  Because we still 
believe that it is crucial to the Act’s basic mandate to 
uncover and redress discrimination against union 
members, we dissent. 
 
In Innes Construction Co.,25 the Board majority of Members 
Schaumber and Kirsanow reversed the administrative law judge’s finding 
that the respondent unlawfully refused to hire or consider for hire 12 
union applicants.  Contrary to the judge, the majority found that the 
respondent would have refused to consider or hire the applicants even in 
the absence of their union affiliation.  The majority analyzed the case 
under FES,26 finding that, even assuming that the General Counsel 
established his prima facie case, the respondent established that it would 
have refused to hire or consider the applicants even in the absence of 
their union affiliation.   
The majority found that the respondent’s vice president, Jeff Johnson, 
had a reasonable belief that the applicants were not willing to work for 
the wages offered by the respondent.  The majority found that union 
organizer Chad Miller spoke on behalf of the applicants during the 
application process, and attempted to persuade Johnson to sign a union 
contract.  When Johnson refused, neither Miller nor the other applicants 
indicated that they were willing to work for the respondent without a 
union contract.  Consequently, the respondent was privileged to refuse to 
hire or consider the applicants with these conditions attached.   
Member Liebman dissented, arguing that the respondent’s purported 
reason for refusing to hire or consider the applicants was an after-the-fact 
justification.  Member Liebman argued that Miller told Johnson that the 
applicants’ intent was to organize the respondent, a task that could only 
be accomplished by obtaining jobs with the respondent.  Member 
Liebman also argued that Johnson could have dispelled any doubts as to 
the motivations of the applicants by making employment offers or asking 
the applicants what wages they were willing to work for. 
D.  Employer Bargaining Obligation 
An employer and the representative of its employees, as designated or 
selected by a majority of employees in an appropriate unit pursuant to 
Section 9(a), have a mutual obligation to bargain in good faith about 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.  An 
 
25 351 NLRB No. 34 (Members Schaumber and Kirsanow; Member Liebman dissenting). 
26 331 NLRB 9 (2000), enfd. 301 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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employer or labor organization, respectively, violates Section 8(a)(5) or 
Section 8(b)(3) of the Act if it does not fulfill its bargaining obligation. 
1.  Withdrawal of Recognition 
In Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc.,27 the Board addressed an issue of first 
impression, whether an employer may rely on evidence of actual loss of 
majority support to withdraw recognition from a union after the third 
year of a contract of longer duration. The majority found that the 
respondent lawfully withdrew recognition from United Food and 
Commercial Workers Local 1445 after the third year of a 5-year 
contract.   
The case was before the Board on competing motions for partial 
summary judgment on the issue of whether the withdrawal of recognition 
was unlawful.  The General Counsel contended that an employer should 
not be allowed to withdraw recognition during the term of a contract.  
The General Counsel noted that in General Cable Corp.,28 the Board 
held that a union’s majority status cannot be questioned during the term 
of a 3-year contract.  Citing Montgomery Ward & Co.,29 and Northern 
Pacific Sealcoating,30 the General Counsel observed that when a contract 
is for a term longer than 3 years, it bars for its full term an election 
petition filed by the employer or by an incumbent union (though not one 
filed by an employee or another union).  The General Counsel contended 
that a contract of more than 3 years’ duration should continue to act as a 
bar for its entire term with respect to a withdrawal of recognition.  The 
General Counsel submitted that it would be unreasonable to allow an 
employer to withdraw recognition at a time when it would not be allowed 
to file an RM petition and that, as to the effectuation of the employees’ 
right to free choice, the appropriate method would be to hold an election 
after employees filed a timely decertification petition, as the employees 
did here. 
The respondent argued that it met the criterion of Levitz Furniture Co. 
of the Pacific,31 in that it had been presented with actual proof of loss of 
majority support when it withdrew recognition.  
Relying on the Board’s distinction in Levitz between the showing 
required for a withdrawal of recognition and that required to obtain an 
RM election, Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber found that “an 
employer, as here, in possession of facts showing an actual loss of 
majority support for an incumbent union should have wider freedom of 
 
27 350 NLRB 585 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Liebman dissenting). 
28 139 NLRB 1123 (1962). 
29 137 NLRB 346 (1962). 
30 309 NLRB 759 (1992). 
31 333 NLRB 717 (2001). 
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action than an employer lacking such knowledge.” Stating that it should 
fix the parameters of this wider freedom of action “at a point where the 
policy goals of stability in labor relations and employee freedom of 
choice . . . can best be satisfied and reconciled,” the majority found that 
in the present case both these policy goals could be effectively 
accommodated by permitting the respondent, who was in possession of 
untainted evidence of the union’s actual loss of majority support, to 
withdraw recognition from the union after the third year of a contract of 
longer duration (in this case, a 5-year contract).  Dissenting, Member 
Liebman argued that it was anomalous to permit the respondent to 
withdraw recognition at a time when it would not have been permitted to 
file an election petition, and that Hexton Furniture Co.,32 stood for the 
principle that when an employer may not file an election petition, it is 
also prohibited from unilaterally withdrawing recognition. 
In Badlands Golf Course,33 the Board, in a 3–2 decision, found that 
the respondent lawfully withdrew recognition from Laborers Local 872 a 
little more than 6 months after resuming bargaining pursuant to an Order 
of the Board, which had found that the respondent’s previous withdrawal 
of recognition was unlawful. 
The majority reversed a 2004 decision of an administrative law judge 
that found that the second withdrawal violated Section 8(a)(5) of the 
Act.  Applying the factors identified in Lee Lumber & Building Material 
Corp.,34 the majority found that a reasonable period of time for 
bargaining had elapsed after the resumption of negotiations pursuant to 
the Board’s November 2002 Order.  The majority found it relevant that 
the parties had bargained for 8 months before the first withdrawal of 
recognition.  Dissenting, Members Liebman and Walsh stated that the 
majority had misapplied Lee Lumber, in part by improperly relying on 
the earlier period of bargaining. 
In Young Women’s Christian Association of Western Massachusetts,35 
Members Liebman and Walsh affirmed the administrative law judge’s 
findings that the respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act 
by failing to reduce to writing and sign a contract reached with Auto 
Workers Local 2322 and ratified by employees on April 20, 2005, and by 
withdrawing recognition from the union when it received evidence that 
the union had lost majority support after the parties had reached a final 
agreement. 
 
32 111 NLRB 342 (1955). 
33 350 NLRB 264 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Kirsanow; Members Liebman 
and Walsh dissenting). 
34 334 NLRB 399 (2001). 
35 349 NLRB 762 (Members Liebman and Walsh; Chairman Battista dissenting). 
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Chairman Battista, dissenting, found that the April 20 agreement did 
not render unlawful the withdrawal of recognition.  Citing Appalachian 
Shale Products Co.,36 he noted that the Board has held that a document 
containing substantial terms and conditions of employment can serve as a 
contract bar only if it is signed by the parties.  The Chairman decided 
that the contract-bar principles are applicable to this case, saying if there 
is no signed contract as a bar, an employer can withdraw recognition 
based upon the union’s loss of majority status.  He acknowledged that an 
oral agreement followed by an uncertainty or doubt as to the union’s 
majority status, will not privilege a refusal to sign a contract.  Chairman 
Battista pointed out however that in this case, the oral agreement was 
followed by the fact of loss of the union’s majority status and that under 
Levitz Furniture,37 an employer can withdraw recognition based on the 
fact of loss of majority status.  The only exception is that majority status 
cannot be challenged during the term of a signed contract, which is not 
applicable here. 
Members Liebman and Walsh rejected their colleague’s contention, 
also advanced by the respondent, that because, under Appalachian Shale, 
an unwritten, unsigned agreement does not bar the Board from 
processing an employee decertification petition, such an agreement 
should not preclude an employer’s unilateral withdrawal of recognition, 
based on evidence of the union’s actual minority status.  They explained: 
 
The Respondent and the dissent fail to recognize the crucial 
distinction between employees challenging a union’s 
representational status by asking the Board to hold an 
election and an employer withdrawing recognition from a 
union unilaterally.  The Board, with court approval, has 
repeatedly stated that the decertification election process, 
with the safeguards for Section 7 rights, is the preferred 
method of resolving questions regarding employees’ support 
for an incumbent union.  See Levitz, supra at 723, 727.  
Employer self-help, by contrast, has always been judged by 
different standards.  As the judge pointed out, the distinction 
that the Board makes between the effect of an unwritten, 
unsigned agreement concerning, on the one hand, the 
processing of a decertification election petition, and, on the 
other, an employer’s withdrawal of recognition, is fully 
consistent with the Board’s duty to balance stability in 
 
36 121 NLRB 1160, 1161 (1958). 
37 333 NLRB 717 (2001). 
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collective-bargaining relationships against the effectuation 
of employees’ representational desires. 
2.  Waiver of Right to Bargain 
In Provena St. Joseph Medical Center,38 a Board panel majority of 
Members Liebman and Walsh affirmed the administrative law judge’s 
application of the “clear and unmistakable standard waiver” standard for 
determining whether an employer has fulfilled its statutory bargaining 
obligation and found that the respondent, Provena St. Joseph Medical 
Center, violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by unilaterally and without 
notice to the union (Illinois Nurses Association) implementing a staff 
incentive policy, but reversed the judge and dismissed another Section 
8(a)(5) allegation with respect to the respondent’s unilaterally 
implementing a new attendance and tardiness policy.   
Admitting that it acted unilaterally with respect to both matters, the 
respondent asserted that it was privileged to do so because the union had 
waived its right to bargain about these matters and, alternatively, that the 
“contract coverage” standard should be followed rather than the “clear 
and unmistakable waiver” standard applied by the judge.   
In explaining its reasons for adhering to the waiver standard, the 
majority acknowledged that “contract coverage” has been endorsed by 
the Seventh and D.C. Circuits, and specifically addressed those courts’ 
concerns.  The majority pointed to the approval by many courts, 
including the Supreme Court, of the Board’s long-established waiver 
analysis, the Board’s unique responsibility of ensuring that the mandates 
of the Act are carried out, and the likelihood of complicating the 
collective-bargaining process by switching to a different analytical 
approach. 
Applying the Board’s traditional “clear and unmistakable waiver” 
test, the majority determined that because (1) the parties’ collective-
bargaining agreement did not contain an express provision regarding 
incentive pay, and (2) there was no evidence that during the course of 
negotiations the subject of incentive pay was consciously explored or 
that the union intentionally relinquished its right to bargain over the 
topic, the respondent was not privileged to act unilaterally on the matter.  
With respect to the attendance and tardiness policy, however, the 
majority determined that several parts of the contract’s management 
rights clause, read together, explicitly authorized the respondent to take 
unilateral action.   
In dissent, Chairman Battista embraced contract coverage, stating that 
it would eliminate the conflict between the Board and certain courts as 
 
38 350 NLRB 808 (Members Liebman and Walsh; Chairman Battista dissenting). 
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well as harmonize the Board’s views with the grievance-arbitration 
process.  He stated that under contract coverage, where there is a clause 
relevant to the dispute within the collective-bargaining agreement, it can 
reasonably be said that the parties have bargained about the subject, not 
that there has been a refusal to bargain.  Applied to the instant case, he 
determined that the respondent acted lawfully in both matters because (1) 
the management rights clause contained several provisions relevant to 
time and attendance and (2) a provision relating to “extraordinary pay” 
as well as language in the management rights section arguably permitted 
the respondent to act unilaterally with respect to incentive pay. 
In Baptist Hospital of East Tennessee,39 a Board majority of 
Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber, affirming the administrative 
law judge, found that the respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) and 
(1) of the Act by unilaterally implementing a change on January 1, 2002, 
concerning the scheduling of holiday shift work for unit employees 
assigned to the respondent’s in-patient radiology unit, of the hospital’s 
imaging department. 
The majority determined initially that the General Counsel’s theory of 
the case involved solely a unilateral-change violation, noting that the 
General Counsel never clearly asserted an alternative Section 8(d) 
contract-modification theory. 
The respondent had argued that, through the management-rights 
clause of the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement, the union waived 
its right to bargain over the scheduling change. The majority agreed with 
the respondent and the judge that the evidence showed a clear and 
unmistakable waiver. They found, in particular, that the language in the 
management-rights clause giving the respondent the right “to determine 
and change starting times, quitting times and shifts,” to “assign” 
employees, and to “change methods and means by which its operations 
are to be carried on” provided the respondent with the fundamental right 
to schedule employees. The respondent’s unilateral change in scheduling 
employees for holiday-shift work was consistent with this right. 
Accordingly, the majority affirmed the judge’s recommended dismissal 
of the complaint. 
In a footnote, Chairman Battista, citing his dissent in Provena St. 
Joseph Medical Center,40 wrote that his conclusion that dismissal of the 
complaint was appropriate would be the same under a “contract 
coverage” test accepted by several circuit courts of appeal.  Member 
 
39 351 NLRB No. 12 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Liebman dissenting). 
40 350 NLRB 808. 
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Schaumber agreed, citing his dissenting position in California Offset 
Printers41 that application of that test reaches the same outcome. 
Member Liebman, dissenting, would have reversed the judge’s 
dismissal of the complaint. Citing her dissent in Bath Iron Works 
Corp.,42 she observed that her “clear and unmistakable waiver” analysis 
would be the same whether the General Counsel’s refusal-to-bargain 
theory was “unilateral change” under Section 8(a)(5) or “contract 
modification” under Section 8(d).  In her view, the management-rights 
clause language relied on by her colleagues did not establish a clear and 
unmistakable waiver, because language in the collective-bargaining 
agreement separate from the management-rights clause appeared to 
prohibit the respondent from making the scheduling change—just the 
opposite of what is required to find a waiver. 
3.  Continuing Obligation to Bargain after Union Merger 
In Raymond F. Kravis Center for the Performing Arts,43 the Board 
modified its standard for determining under what circumstances a union 
merger or affiliation may relieve an employer of its obligation to 
recognize and bargain with an incumbent union.  Reversing precedent, 
the Board determined that an employer could not withdraw recognition 
after a merger or affiliation merely because the merger or affiliation was 
not conducted with adequate “due process.”  Rather, the Board held that 
the employer’s obligation to recognize the union continues unless the 
merger or affiliation resulted in changes so significant as to alter the 
identity of the bargaining representative.   
The Board affirmed the administrative law judge’s finding that the 
respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by unilaterally 
withdrawing recognition from the International Alliance of Theatrical 
Stage Employees and Moving Picture Technicians and Allied Crafts of 
the United States, its Territories and Canada, Local 623 (Local 623) on 
September 11, 2000.  On February 1, 2002, shortly before the hearing in 
this case began, Local 623 merged with five other locals to form Local 
500.  Applying existing Board law, the judge rejected the General 
Counsel’s contention that Local 500 was the successor to Local 623, 
finding that the merger had occurred without due process because union 
members had not been provided the opportunity to vote on the merger.  
Accordingly, the judge found that the respondent had no obligation to 
recognize and bargain with Local 500, and that any bargaining obligation 
 
41 349 NLRB 732. 
42 345 NLRB 499 (2005), affd. sub nom. Bath Marine Draftsmen’s Assn. v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 14 (1st. 
Cir.). 
43 351 NLRB No. 19 (Chairman Battista and Members Liebman and Kirsanow). 
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the respondent had with Local 623 terminated as of the date of the 
merger. 
Having determined that the due process requirement was no longer 
viable in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Financial 
Institution Employees of America Local 1182 (Seattle-First),44 the Board 
examined whether the merger resulted in such a dramatic change to the 
union as to alter its identity as the bargaining representative of the 
respondent’s employees.  Because the Board found no such change had 
occurred, it reversed the judge and found that the respondent’s obligation 
to recognize and bargain with the union continued after the merger. 
The Board affirmed the judge’s finding that the respondent violated 
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by unilaterally changing terms and conditions of 
employment, including eliminating department head positions and 
refusing to use the union’s hiring hall, without complying with the 
requirements of Section 8(d)(3) and without having first lawfully 
bargained to impasse with respect to those terms and conditions.  The 
Board also affirmed the judge’s finding that the respondent violated 
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by declaring impasse over a change in the scope 
of the bargaining unit. 
In Allied Mechanical Services,45 the Board unanimously reversed the 
administrative law judge and found that the respondent violated Section 
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by withdrawing recognition from the union, 
refusing to furnish information, and unilaterally revising its job 
application procedure to require applicants to apply in person at its 
Kalamazoo office. 
The Board granted the General Counsel’s and union’s motions for 
reconsideration of the Board’s prior decision,46 in which the Board had 
adopted the judge’s dismissal of the Section 8(a)(5) allegations.  
Contrary to its prior decision, the Board found that the lack of a 
membership vote on a union merger did not relieve the respondent of its 
obligation to recognize and bargain with the union.  In so finding, the 
Board applied its decision in Kravis Center for the Performing Arts,47 
which overruled the Board’s “due process” requirement for union 
mergers or affiliations, i.e., the rule that, following a union merger or 
affiliation, an employer’s obligation to recognize and bargain with the 
union ended if the union’s members had not been afforded an 
opportunity to vote, with adequate due process safeguards, regarding the 
merger or affiliation.  The Board thus found that lack of a membership 
 
44 475 U.S. 192 (1986). 
45 351 NLRB No. 5 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Walsh). 
46 341 NLRB 1084 (2004). 
47 351 NLRB No. 19. 
Seventy-Second Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board 70 
 
                                                
vote on the union merger was not a defense to the Section 8(a)(5) 
allegations against the respondent. 
The Board then addressed the judge’s two other rationales for his 
dismissal of the Section 8(a)(5) allegations. Contrary to the judge, the 
Board found that the General Counsel established that the respondent and 
the union had a Section 9(a) bargaining relationship, not a Section 8(f) 
relationship. The parties’ bargaining relationship originated in a 1991 
settlement of an unfair labor practice complaint.  The Board found that 
the settlement, under which the respondent agreed to recognize and 
bargain with the union, coupled with the Board’s finding in a 2001 case 
that the respondent had violated Section 8(a)(5) at a time when it did not 
have a collective-bargaining agreement with the union, together showed 
that the respondent and the union had a Section 9(a) bargaining 
relationship. 
The Board also rejected the judge’s rationale that the respondent was 
relieved of its bargaining obligation because the parties had bargained for 
a reasonable period of time. Rather, under the applicable law at the time 
that the respondent withdrew recognition, the respondent could lawfully 
withdraw recognition only by showing either that the union had actually 
lost the support of a majority of the bargaining unit employees or that the 
employer had good-faith doubt or uncertainty, based on objective 
considerations, of the union’s continued majority status.  
The Board rejected the respondent’s contention that it had reasonable, 
good-faith doubt or uncertainty of the union’s majority status. The Board 
found that the fact that the only employees who engaged in union 
activities were “salts” did not support good-faith doubt or uncertainty 
regarding the union’s continued majority status. The Board found 
inapposite the respondent’s argument that the union had never 
demonstrated majority support, because a presumption of majority 
support was created by the respondent’s recognition of the union under 
the 1991 settlement agreement. Having rejected all of the respondent’s 
defenses, the Board found that the General Counsel established that the 
respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by withdrawing recognition 
from the union, refusing to furnish information, and unilaterally revising 
its job application procedure. 
4.  Unilateral Change During Economic Strike 
In Finch, Pruyn & Co.,48 the Board found that the respondent did not 
violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by unilaterally subcontracting 
during an economic strike for the pulp needed for its papermaking 
operation, agreeing with the administrative law judge that the 
 
48 349 NLRB 270 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Walsh dissenting in part). 
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respondent’s subcontracting was a lawful temporary measure to maintain 
its operations during the strike.  Accordingly, it affirmed the judge’s 
findings that the subcontracting did not convert the economic strike to an 
unfair labor practice strike, and that the strikers remained economic 
strikers.  The Board also found that the respondent did not violate the Act 
by continuing its unilateral subcontracting after the strike had ended 
because the union never made a request to bargain about the poststrike 
subcontracting.  
Member Walsh, dissenting in part, agreed that the respondent was not 
obliged to bargain with the union over its temporary means to maintain 
its papermaking operation during the strike.  He concluded, however, 
that the respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing to bargain 
over its mid-strike decision to subcontract for pulp “for an indefinite 
period not to terminate at the expiration of the strike,” that the violation 
converted the economic strike to an unfair labor practice strike, and that 
the respondent thus violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) when it failed to 
immediately reinstate the Local 18 strikers at the conclusion of the strike. 
On other alleged violations, the Board reversed the judge’s findings 
(1) that the respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing 
to provide Local 18 with copies of the respondent’s subcontracts for 
pulp; and (2) that the respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by 
refusing to provide information, requested by both Local 18 and Local 
155, regarding the preemployment drug testing of permanent 
replacement workers without offering to bargain over its asserted 
confidentiality concerns.  The Board found that Local 18 satisfied its 
burden of establishing that copies of the pulp contracts were relevant and 
necessary to Local 18’s ability to assess and enforce the unit employees’ 
recall rights.  The Board determined, however, that the union failed to 
demonstrate the probable relevancy of the information regarding the 
prehire drug testing of applicants.  In doing so, the Board rejected the 
union’s contention that it had safety concerns and believed that the 
respondent failed to uniformly require screening. 
Contrary to the judge, the Board found that the respondent violated 
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by unilaterally eliminating employee Bernard 
Palmer’s prestrike “pcc oiler” position.  It agreed, however, with the 
judge that the respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by 
eliminating the “pcc oiler” position or by failing to recall Palmer to 
another available position. 
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5.  Direct Dealing 
In Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc.,49 the Board, in a 2–1 
decision, found that the respondent lawfully locked out employees and 
presented them with individual no-strike forms that they would have to 
sign before being permitted to return to work.  The Board reversed a 
2005 decision of an administrative law judge that found that, although 
the lockout was initially lawful, the respondent’s presentation of no-
strike forms to individual employees constituted direct dealing and, from 
that time forward, the lockout violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the 
Act.  The Board majority found that the respondent timely informed the 
union of its intentions, giving it the option of ending the lockout by 
providing assurances that there would not be a strike, either by providing 
such assurance on behalf of bargaining unit employees or by providing 
no-strike assurances from individual employees. 
Dissenting, Member Walsh found that the respondent violated the Act 
by dealing directly with locked-out bargaining unit employees.  He found 
that the respondent bypassed the union by failing to inform it specifically 
of the respondent’s intent to present the no-strike forms to individual 
employees.  
6.  Construction Industry Agreement 
In Madison Industries, Inc.,50 Chairman Battista and Member 
Schaumber found, contrary to the administrative law judge, that the 
parties’ relationship was governed by Section 8(f) of the Act, rather than 
by Section 9(a), and that the respondent lawfully repudiated its 
relationship with, and lawfully refused to provide requested information 
to, the union following the expiration of their bargaining agreement. The 
majority dismissed the complaint in its entirety. 
In dissent, Member Liebman found that the respondent violated 
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) , as alleged, by refusing to bargain and to provide 
information relevant to bargaining.  She found that the language of the 
recognition clause in the parties’ contract met the requirements of 
Staunton Fuel & Material,51 for establishing a relationship under 
Section 9(a) (as opposed to Sec. 8(f)), and the respondent’s repudiation 
of that relationship thus was unlawful. 
The majority, applying the Staunton Fuel standard, examined the 
parties’ entire agreement to determine whether a Section 9(a) 
relationship was intended.   They concluded that the General Counsel did 
not establish that the Agreement reflects a 9(a) relationship:  
 
49 350 NLRB 678 (Members Schaumber and Kirsanow; Member Walsh dissenting).  
50 349 NLRB 1306 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Liebman dissenting). 
51 335 NLRB 717 (2001). 
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“Specifically, the Agreement contains a provision waiving the 
Respondent’s right to file a petition for an election with the Board during 
the term of the Agreement.  If the agreement were a 9(a) agreement, 
there would be no need for such a provision. That is, an agreement 
governed by Section 9(a) bars an employer from filing a petition for an 
election during its term.  By contrast, a petition can be processed during 
the life of an 8(f) contract. Thus, it would appear that the parties 
contemplated an 8(f) contract, and yet wished to waive the Respondent’s 
right to file a petition during the term of the Agreement.”  Absent 
extrinsic evidence to clarify the ambiguity of the contractual language, 
the General Counsel has not rebutted the 8(f) presumption, the majority 
held. 
Member Liebman said her colleagues’ approach “stretches the entire-
agreement rule too far.”   She explained:  “This is not a dispute over a 
single term that could arguably be interpreted in two different ways.  
Where, as here, a contract provision clearly addresses an issue with an 
unambiguous meaning, there can be no ambiguity unless another 
provision squarely contradicts it.  The recognition clause in this contract 
states categorically that the Union is the ‘majority representative’ and 
that the Employer recognizes it as such.  A separate clause that only 
waives the Respondent’s right to file a Board petition—which would 
merely be consistent with the Union’s having Section 8(f) status—simply 
does not negate or contradict the recognition clause in a manner that 
creates a genuine ambiguity.” 
E.  Union Interference with Employee Rights 
Even as Section 8(a) of the Act imposes certain restrictions on 
employers, Section 8(b) limits the activities of labor organizations and 
their agents. Section 8(b)(1)(A), which is generally analogous to Section 
8(a)(1), makes it an unfair labor practice for a union or its agents to 
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights, 
which generally guarantee them freedom of choice with respect to 
collective activities. However, an important proviso to Section 
8(b)(1)(A) recognizes the basic rights of a labor organization to prescribe 
its own rules for acquisition and retention of membership. 
Chargeability of Organizing Expenses 
In Teamsters Local 75 (Schreiber Foods),52 the Board affirmed the 
administrative law judge’s supplemental decision to the extent that it 
held that the respondent union did not unlawfully charge the charging 
party objectors, bargaining unit employees who are nonmembers of the 
 
52 349 NLRB 77 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Liebman dissenting). 
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respondent, for expenses incurred in organizing employees working in 
the public sector. 
Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber, with Member Liebman 
dissenting, reversed the judge and held that the respondent violated 
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act and its duty of fair representation by 
charging the charging parties for expenses incurred organizing the 
employees of other employers within the dairy and cheese processing 
industry, which is the competitive market of Schreiber Foods, the 
charging parties’ employer.  The majority held, contrary to the judge, 
that the respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to support a 
finding under Food & Commercial Workers Locals 951, 7, & 1036 
(Meijer, Inc.)53 that its organizing expenses are chargeable to objectors 
because they are germane to its role as collective-bargaining 
representative and ultimately inure to the benefit of the objectors’ 
bargaining unit. 
In Meijer, the Board held that the evidence presented by the unions 
established that the expenses they incurred in organizing employees 
employed in the retail grocery business in the same metropolitan area 
(“the same competitive market”) as the bargaining unit employees were 
lawfully charged to the objectors.  In so holding, the Board found that the 
testimony of experts in the field of economics and the direct observations 
and experience of the union representatives established a clear linkage 
between organizing in the retail grocery business in the same 
metropolitan area and wages for employees in the bargaining units at 
issue in Meijer.   
Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber wrote in this supplemental 
decision: 
 
In our view, then, Meijer permits a union to demonstrate, as the 
unions did in Meijer for the highly competitive retail grocery 
business located in the same metropolitan area, that “there is a 
direct, positive relationship between the wage levels of union-
represented employees and the level of organization of employees 
of employers in the same competitive market.”  Id.  If this same 
showing is made under analogous factual settings, then under 
Meijer the union may lawfully charge objectors for organizing 
expenditures.   
In the instant case, the evidence advanced by the Respondent 
failed to meet the standard set in Meijer. 
 
 
53 329 NLRB 730 (1999), enf. denied in relevant part sub nom. Food & Commercial Workers v. 
NLRB, 284 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2002), modified and superseded 307 F.3d 760 (2002), cert. denied 
537 U.S. 1024 (2002). 
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Member Schaumber, dissenting in part, believes that Meijer was 
wrongly decided.  In the absence of a Board majority to overrule Meijer, 
he recognized it as controlling Board law and joined Chairman Battista 
in its application to this case.  Member Schaumber said the Board failed 
to address the broader and recurring question, one specifically raised and 
briefed by the parties, namely, whether such expenses are ever properly 
chargeable to Beck54 objectors.  He noted that the issue was previously 
considered and erroneously decided by a divided Board in Meijer, a 
decision “repeatedly criticized by other Board members as utterly 
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.”  Member Schaumber 
believes his colleagues compounded the error by finding it unnecessary 
to pass on the judge’s unprecedented and unwarranted extension of 
Meijer in this case.  He would reach and address both issues. 
Member Liebman, in her partial dissent, found that the union acted 
lawfully in charging the objectors their fair share of the union’s 
expenses in organizing employees of Schreiber’s competitors.  She said 
that her colleagues, in finding to the contrary, hold “in effect, that no 
matter how much theoretical and empirical evidence has been introduced 
showing that increased union organizing helps to increase and protect 
union wage rates, no union may charge Beck objectors for such expenses 
unless it hires a labor economist to prove that such a relationship exists 
in the particular industry in which the union is the objectors’ bargaining 
agent.”  Member Liebman believes her colleagues reached their result 
“despite controlling Board and court precedent to the contrary, and on a 
theory that is at odds with accepted economic theory, empirical evidence, 
practical experience, and common sense.”  
F.  Remedial Order Provisions 
1.  Interim Employment Evidentiary Burdens 
In St. George Warehouse,55 the Board, by a 3–2 vote, modified its 
procedures in backpay cases.  Under the new rule, the General Counsel 
will have the burden of producing evidence concerning employees’ 
efforts to find interim employment after an unlawful discharge.   
In a prior proceeding, the Board found that St. George Warehouse, 
which operates a warehousing facility in Kearney, New Jersey, violated 
the Act by discharging two employees because of their union activities.  
The Board ordered St. George Warehouse to remedy those unfair labor 
practices by reinstating the two employees and paying them back wages 
 
54 Communication Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988). 
55 351 NLRB No. 42 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Kirsanow; Members 
Liebman and Walsh dissenting). 
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and benefits.  An administrative law judge then conducted a compliance, 
or backpay, proceeding to determine the amount of backpay owing. 
In a backpay proceeding, the burden to prove a reasonable amount of 
gross backpay is on the Board’s General Counsel, who prosecutes cases 
before the Board.  That amount is then reduced by the employees’ 
interim earnings from the time of their discharge to the date the employer 
offered them reinstatement, a figure usually derived from social security 
data.  The employer may seek to reduce that net backpay amount further 
by showing, among other things, that the employees had not sought to 
mitigate damages by making reasonable efforts to find interim 
employment.  Under prior Board law, the employer bore the burden of 
production and persuasion with respect to that affirmative defense.   
In its decision in this case, the Board reaffirmed the principle that the 
employer bears the ultimate burden of persuasion concerning whether an 
unlawfully discharged employee made an adequate search for interim 
employment.  But the Board determined that, once the employer shows 
that there were comparable jobs available in the relevant geographic 
area, the burden of production “is properly on the discriminatee and the 
General Counsel . . . to show that the discriminatee took reasonable steps 
to seek those jobs.”  To meet this burden of production, the General 
Counsel must produce the employee to testify or offer other competent 
evidence of the employee’s interim job search.  
The Board majority (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and 
Kirsanow) based their decision on the “mixed” reception the Board’s 
prior rule received in the courts of appeals and on the General Counsel’s 
superior access to discharged employees and information regarding their 
job searches.  The majority observed that its new rule is not burdensome 
to the General Counsel, who under existing internal guidelines routinely 
gathers evidence of job searches in employment discrimination cases 
likely to result in backpay.   
The dissenters (Members Liebman and Walsh) asserted that the 
majority offered no persuasive reason for modifying the current 
procedure, which placed all aspects of the burden of proof to reduce 
backpay upon the wrongdoer.  The dissenters observed that the existing 
rule had been followed for more than 40 years and that it was supported 
by the weight of judicial authority.  In a separate dissent, Member 
Liebman called the majority’s action an “unfortunate” continuation of 
“the Board’s recent trend of weakening the backpay remedy under the 
National Labor Relations Act.”  
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2.  Backpay Period for “Salts” 
In Oil Capitol Sheet Metal, Inc.,56 the Board announced new 
evidentiary standards for determining the duration of the backpay period 
when the discriminatee is a “salt.”    
In cases of this kind, a union has sent members to seek employment 
from a nonunion employer with the intent of obtaining employment and 
then organizing the employer’s employees.  Those members are 
commonly referred to as “salts.”  Under the law, if the employer 
discharges or refuses to hire the salt because of his union affiliation or 
activity, the employer’s conduct is unlawful. 
In this decision, the Board found unanimously that the respondent 
violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by refusing to hire a salt.  The 
Board split, however, over the remedy for this violation.   
The remedy for an unlawful discharge or refusal to hire includes the 
employer’s payment of backpay to the employee for the period from the 
unlawful act until the employer makes a valid offer of reinstatement (or 
instatement, in the case of an unlawful refusal to hire). In determining the 
duration of the backpay period, the Board applies a presumption that, if 
hired, the discriminatee would stay on the job for an indefinite period.  If 
the job is a construction job, the Board applies a further presumption that 
the employer would transfer the discriminatee to other jobsites when the 
job from which he was discharged (or for which he should have been 
hired) came to an end. 
Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Kirsanow declined 
to continue to apply those presumptions in cases where the discriminate 
is a salt.  The majority reasoned that they are inconsistent with the reality 
of salting because salts, when hired, stay on the job only until they 
succeed in their organizational effort or reach the point where such 
efforts are unsuccessful.  In either situation the union typically then sends 
the salt to seek to organize the employees of another nonunion employer. 
The majority recognized that this will not always be the case and that 
there may be instances where the union will permit a member to work for 
the targeted employer for an indefinite period.  However, the majority’s 
view was that the union and the salt/discriminatee were in the better 
position to explain their intentions, and thus the burden to establish the 
duration of the backpay period should be on them, rather than the 
respondent employer, “to prove the reasonableness of the claimed 
backpay period by presenting, through the General Counsel, evidence 
 
56 349 NLRB 1348 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Kirsanow; Members Liebman 
and Walsh dissenting in part). 
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readily available to them.” The burden should not be on the employer to 
prove the contrary. 
In its opinion, the majority stated:   
 
[T]he traditional presumption that the backpay period 
should run from the date of discrimination until the 
respondent extends a valid offer of reinstatement loses 
force both as a matter of fact and as a matter of policy in 
the context of a salting campaign.  Indeed, as discussed 
below, rote application of the presumption has resulted 
in backpay awards that bear no rational relationship to 
the period of time a salt would have remained employed 
with a targeted nonunion employer.  In this context, the 
presumption has no validity and creates undue tension 
with well-established precepts that a backpay remedy 
must be sufficiently tailored to expunge only actual, not 
speculative, consequences of an unfair labor practice, 
and that the Board’s authority to command affirmative 
action is remedial, not punitive.  
 
The majority also held that instatement to the job would not be 
ordered where the “salt” would have left the job prior to the Board’s 
decision. 
In reaching its conclusions, the majority relied in part on the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision in Aneco v. NLRB,57 where the court deemed 
“indefensible” the Board’s assumption that the hired salt would have 
worked for the respondent employer for 5 years. 
The majority acknowledged that the parties to the case before it had 
not sought a reversal of Board law.  However, the Board said that it was 
its responsibility to ensure that its remedies are compensatory and not 
punitive. 
In dissent, Members Liebman and Walsh criticized the majority for 
overturning Board precedent endorsed by two appellate courts and 
rejected by none, without any party having raised the issue, without the 
benefit of briefing, and without any sound legal or empirical basis. The 
dissent would have continued to treat salts as the Board treats all other 
employees who are subjected to employment discrimination.  The dissent 
stated that, in backpay cases, it is fundamental that the Board resolves 
factual uncertainties against the wrongdoer, the employer.  This approach 
is not unique to the Board.  Rather, as the Supreme Court stated in 
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures,58 the “most elementary conceptions of 
 
57 285 F.3d 326 (2002). 
58 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946). 
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justice and public policy require that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of 
the uncertainty which his own wrong has created.”  In the view of the 
dissenting members, the majority’s new approach not only violates that 
well-established principle of resolving remedial uncertainties against the 
wrongdoer, but it treats salts “as a uniquely disfavored class of 
discriminatees, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s ruling that salts are 
protected employees under the National Labor Relations Act.  NLRB v. 
Town & Country Electric, Inc., 516 U.S. 85 (1995).” 
The dissent also stated that the majority’s reasons for adopting its new 
evidentiary approach were “dubious at best,” and that it was 
unreasonable to presume that salts would leave employment at some 
fixed point in time, known by a union in advance.  For those same 
reasons, the dissenters found that there was no justification for the 
majority’s departure from the presumption that a salt, like any other 
employee at a construction site, would have been transferred to one of 
the employer’s other projects upon completion of the project at the site 
where the discrimination occurred.  
3.  Employee Misconduct Discovered by Employer  
Unlawful Conduct 
In Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,59 the Board, by a 3–2 vote, reaffirmed its 
2004 holding that the Act prohibits the Board from granting a make-
whole remedy to employees disciplined or discharged for misconduct 
discovered as a result of unlawful conduct by their employer.   
Without bargaining with the union that represents the employees at its 
St. Louis facility, Anheuser-Busch installed hidden surveillance 
videocameras.  Through use of the cameras, Anheuser-Busch learned 
that certain employees were engaged in misconduct, and it disciplined or 
discharged 16 of them.  
In its initial decision, the Board found the installation and use of the 
cameras to be an unlawful unilateral change, and it issued a cease-and-
desist order against Anheuser-Busch.  But by a 2–1 decision, the Board 
declined to order reinstatement or backpay for the employees.  The 
Board held that it lacked authority to order reinstatement or backpay 
because the employees were disciplined for cause, regardless of the fact 
that their employer learned of their misconduct only as a result of its own 
unfair labor practice.  On petition for review to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the court affirmed the 
Board’s unfair labor practice finding, but found that the Board had not 
 
59 351 NLRB No. 40 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Kirsanow; Members 
Liebman and Walsh dissenting). 
Seventy-Second Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board 80 
 
                                                
adequately reconciled with existing caselaw its decision to withhold a 
reinstatement and backpay remedy from the employees. 
On remand, the Board majority (Chairman Battista and Members 
Schaumber and Kirsanow) reviewed the NLRA and its legislative history 
and determined that the statute and compelling policy considerations bar 
the Board from granting a remedy to employees who have been 
disciplined or discharged for cause.  In particular, the majority was 
guided by the principle that employees should not benefit from their 
misconduct through a windfall award of reinstatement and backpay.  The 
Board overruled cases previously identified by the court as inconsistent 
with that holding. 
In dissent, Members Liebman and Walsh stated that the court’s 
decision precluded the Board from deciding this case on purely statutory 
grounds.  In their view, neither the statutory language relied on by the 
majority nor the legislative history addresses the issue presented.  The 
dissent emphasized that a make-whole remedy for the employees is 
necessary to repair the damage that Anheuser-Busch’s unlawful 
unilateral changes caused to the union’s status as the employees’ 
bargaining representative and to deter future unlawful unilateral changes. 
4.  Broad Order 
In Five Star Mfg., Inc.,60 the Board adopted the administrative law 
judge’s finding that the respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the 
Act by discharging employee and union supporter David Tanksley on 
Feb. 11, 2004, and by discharging him for a second time on April 26, 
2005; violated Section 8(a)(3), (5), and (1) by confiscating employees’ 
keys to its facility and changing employees’ work schedules on 
February 12, 2004; violated Section 8(a)(3), (4), and (1) by reassigning 
Tanksley to different and more difficult work on April 19, 2004; and 
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by continuing to award or deny 
discretionary bonuses and vacation pay after the union’s certification. 
The Board amended the judge’s recommended narrow cease-and-
desist order, finding that a broad order was appropriate despite the fact 
that the Respondent did not have a prior history of violations of the Act.  
It focused on the egregious and widespread nature of the respondent’s 
misconduct, saying:  “The mere fact that the Respondent has no prior 
history of violations does not, in and of itself, undermine the necessity 
for a broad order.”    
The Board noted that when the respondent was initially informed of 
its employees’ efforts in the union’s organizing campaign, Jim 
Woodward, the Respondent’s president, predicted that the employees 
 
60 348 NLRB 1301 (2006). 
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were “finding themselves a way out of there.”  In response to the union’s 
successful organizing campaign, the respondent engaged in a wide 
variety of egregious unfair labor practices, most of which were 
committed by Woodward, who followed through on his earlier prediction 
by discriminatorily discharging Tanksley on the day of the election, 
within minutes of the close of balloting.  The morning after the election, 
the respondent changed the locks on its facility, denying employees the 
early morning access that they had enjoyed for many years prior to the 
election, and Woodward demanded that employees return their keys to 
the building and unilaterally changed employees’ work schedules and 
breaktimes, all without bargaining with the union and in retaliation for 
the employees’ selection of the union as their bargaining representative.  
Woodward also made statements to employees implying that the union’s 
election victory had caused the respondent to confiscate their keys and 
that rejection of the union would improve working conditions.  
Following the union’s certification, Woodward continued awarding and 
denying employees discretionary bonuses and vacation pay without 
bargaining with the union. 
Although the respondent later reinstated Tanksley to his former 
position, it did so only after Tanksley filed a charge of discrimination 
with the Board. Upon Tanksley’s reinstatement, Woodward 
discriminatorily reassigned him to more onerous work and to a different 
work location, both in retaliation for his prior union activity and because 
he filed a charge with the Board.  The respondent also began recording 
any infraction by Tanksley in order to find some reason to discharge him.  
The respondent then began discriminatorily playing games with 
Tanksley’s paychecks, which precipitated his telling another employee to 
“shut up,” which led to Tanksley’s second discriminatory discharge. 
 83 
V 
Supreme Court Litigation 
During fiscal year 2007, the Supreme Court decided, on the merits, no 
cases involving the Board as a party.  The Board did not participate as 
amicus in any cases before the Court.  The Court denied seven private 
party petitions for certiorari in Board cases, and granted none. 
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VI 
Enforcement Litigation 
A. Duty to Bargain 
Section 8(a)(5) and (d) of the Act obligate an employer to bargain 
with its employees’ representative regarding wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment unless the representative has clearly 
and unmistakably relinquished its statutory rights to bargain over the 
mandatory subject at issue.1  Section 8(d) also provides that during the 
term of a collective-bargaining agreement neither party shall unilaterally 
modify its terms and conditions if such modification is to become 
effective before such terms and conditions can be reopened under the 
provisions of the contract.2 
In Bath Marine Draftsmen’s Association v. NLRB,3 the First Circuit 
affirmed the Board’s conclusion that the employer did not violate Section 
8(a)(5) of the Act by unilaterally merging an employee pension plan with 
its parent company’s pension plan.4  The Board found that the issue was 
whether the merger in fact unlawfully modified the governing collective-
bargaining agreements, not whether the unions clearly and unmistakably 
waived their right to bargain over the merger.  Without passing on 
whether the unions’ or the employer’s reasonable but conflicting 
interpretations of the collective-bargaining agreements and pension plan 
documents was the better view, the Board dismissed the General 
Counsel’s complaint because the employer had a “sound arguable basis 
for ascribing a particular meaning to his contract,” “his action [wa]s in 
accordance with the terms of the contract as he construe[d] it,” and he 
acted in good faith without any antiunion animus.5  
The court approved the Board’s “sound arguable basis” standard, as 
modified, noting that the choice of analytical framework is often very 
clear depending “upon whether the union alleges a unilateral change 
without bargaining to impasse or a modification in violation of an 
existing contract without union consent,” but “is not as straightforward 
when the union alleges a . . . unilateral change and the employer defends 
with a claim of contractual privilege to act unilaterally.”6  In the latter 
                                           
1 See Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 198 (1991); Trojan Yacht, 319 NLRB 741, 
742 (1995). 
2 See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 186 (1971). 
3 475 F.3d 14 (1st Cir.). 
4 345 NLRB 499 (2005). 
5 Id. 
6 475 F.3d at 22. 
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instance, the court explained, the threshold inquiry is whether the parties 
bargained over the mandatory subject at issue and memorialized their 
bargain in the collective-bargaining agreement, such that the subject is 
“covered by” the contract.7  “If so, the waiver standard is meaningless 
[because the union has exercised its statutory bargaining rights].  The 
unfair labor practice determination depends solely on the interpretation 
of the contract in place, and the appropriate standard for the Board to 
apply is the sound arguable basis standard.”8  Applying its standard, the 
court found that the pension plan documents were “specifically identified 
in each of the” contracts, such that the employer could rely on them as a 
basis for authority to merge the pension plans, and that “[i]t is a sound 
and arguable interpretation of those [contracts] that the [employer] had 
the authority to unilaterally change the Plan sponsor, whether or not the 
argument is correct.”9  
B.  Secondary Picketing 
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act makes it unlawful for a labor 
organization “to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person . . . where . . . an 
object thereof is . . . forcing or requiring any person . . . to cease doing 
business with any other person . . . .”  In Sheet Metal Workers, Local 15, 
AFL–CIO (Brandon Regional Medical Center),10 the union held a “mock 
funeral procession” in furtherance of a primary dispute with a nonunion 
contractor performing construction work at the Medical Center and an 
agency that provided employees to the contractor.  The union patrolled 
on the public sidewalk in front of the Medical Center, a neutral site, 
while carrying a faux casket and accompanied by a union member 
dressed as the Grim Reaper.  The Board found the union’s conduct 
unlawful coercion because it constituted picketing.11 
In Sheet Metal Workers, Local 15, v. NLRB,12 the District of 
Columbia Circuit rejected the Board’s finding that the union’s conduct 
violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).13  The court explained that “the mock 
funeral was not the functional equivalent of picketing as a means of 
persuasion because it had none of the coercive character of picketing 
. . . .: Union members did not physically or verbally interfere with or 
confront [Medical Center] patrons coming and going; nor . . . did the 
mock funeral participants ‘patrol’ the area in the sense of creating a 
 
7 475 F.3d at 23–25. 
8 475 F.3d at 25.   
9 475 F.3d at 28. 
10 346 NLRB 199 (2006). 
11 Id. 
12 491 F.3d 429 (D.C. Cir.). 
13 491 F.3d at 439. 
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symbolic barrier to those who would enter the [Medical Center].”  
Having determined that the mock funeral “lies somewhere between . . . 
lawful handbilling . . . and unlawful picketing or patrolling,” the court 
concluded that “the ultimate question[—]whether the means by which 
the [u]nion delivered its message was coercive[—] . . . must be answered 
consistent with developments in the Supreme Court’s [F]irst 
[A]mendment jurisprudence.”14  Applying the Supreme Court’s 
“abortion protest cases,” the “sources of constitutional guidance with 
which the [u]nion quite obviously complied,” the court held, contrary to 
the Board, that “the mock funeral was not ‘threaten[ing], coerc[ive], or 
restrain[ing],’ in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).”15   
C.  Remedial Authority 
1.  Broad Orders 
Where it is “essential to accomplish the purposes of the [A]ct,” the 
Board may issue a broad cease-and-desist order, in which it proscribes 
the offending party from violating the Act in any manner.16  In Hickmott 
Foods, Inc.,17 the Board held that a broad order is warranted where “a[n 
offending party] is shown to have a proclivity to violate the Act or has 
engaged in such egregious or widespread misconduct as to demonstrate a 
general disregard for employees’ fundamental statutory rights.”18  In two 
cases involving the United States Postal Service, the Fifth and Tenth 
Circuits reached different conclusions about whether a broad order was 
warranted. 
In the first case, NLRB v. USPS,19 the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the 
Board20 that the Postal Service’s repeated violations of its statutory duty 
to provide relevant information requested by a union at its Waco, Texas 
facility demonstrated a proclivity to violate the Act.  The Board had 
relied on several grounds to justify the broad order: (1) supervisors 
committed the same unfair labor practices twice in 2 years; (2) the unfair 
labor practices violated a narrow cease-and-desist order issued in 2002; 
(3) the refusals to provide information could mask other unlawful 
conduct; (4) the Postal Service’s defenses had been rejected previously 
by the Board; (5) the Postal Service was engaged in a nationwide pattern 
 
14 491 F.3d at 438. 
15 491 F.3d at 438–439. 
16 May Department Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376, 391–392 (1945).  See also NLRB v. Cheney 
California Lumber Co., 327 U.S. 385, 387 (1946); NLRB v. Express Pub. Co., 312 U.S. 426, 437 
(1941). 
17 242 NLRB 1357 (1979). 
18 Id. at 1357. 
19 477 F.3d 263, 271 (5th Cir.).  
20 Postal Service, 345 NLRB 409 (2005). 
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of refusing to provide such information; (6) the Board had 
simultaneously issued a broad order against the Postal Service for a 
series of unfair labor practices in Albuquerque, New Mexico, in 
retaliation for information requests; and (7) the Fifth Circuit had recently 
enforced three other broad orders against the Postal Service.21  The court, 
stating that those factors “pale in comparison” to prior cases in which it 
had refused to enforce broad orders, specifically rejected the Board’s 
view that the Postal Service’s conduct could mask other unfair labor 
practices, because there was “no evidence . . . that there have ever been 
any unfair labor practices at [the Waco] facility beyond information 
request violations.”22  The court entered a narrow “in any like or related 
manner” cease-and-desist order, stating that “[g]iven the sheer size of the 
Postal Service, the evidence relied upon by the Board shows that 
violations are relatively isolated incidents and rarely flagrant.”23 
Conversely, in NLRB v. USPS,24 the Tenth Circuit upheld the Board’s 
broad cease-and-desist order,25 agreeing with the Board that the Postal 
Service demonstrated a proclivity to violate the Act through its actions at 
three Albuquerque facilities.  The court “easily” distinguished the Fifth 
Circuit’s Waco case, on the ground that while the only violations in 
Waco were refusals to provide information, the Postal Service’s 
violations in Albuquerque began with information requests but “did not 
end there.”26  Thus, less than a year after voluntarily agreeing to remedy 
information-request violations at three other Albuquerque postal 
facilities with an identically-worded broad cease-and-desist order, the 
Postal Service not only refused to provide information to the union, but 
also discharged the union official who had requested the information and 
then threatened employees with discipline or discharge if they engaged in 
the same “self-destructive behavior” as the union official.27  The court 
found the Board’s decision to issue a broad remedial order justified 
because the Postal Service’s unfair labor practices demonstrated “an 
attitude of opposition to the purposes of the Act.”28 
2.  Gissel Bargaining Orders  
In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,29 the Supreme Court upheld the 
Board’s authority to order an employer to bargain with a union as a 
 
21 477 F.3d at 270. 
22 Id. at 270–271. 
23 Id. at 271. 
24 486 F.3d 683, 684–685 (10th Cir.). 
25 Postal Service, 345 NLRB 409 (2005). 
26 486 F.3d at 689. 
27 Id. at 685, 688. 
28 Id. at 688 (quoting May Dep’t Stores, 326 U.S. at 392). 
29 395 U.S. 575 (1969). 
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remedy where the union at one time had authorization cards from a 
majority of the employees in the bargaining unit, but the employer’s 
unfair labor practices had a reasonable tendency to undermine that 
majority support and to preclude a fair election.30  In two of the three 
Gissel bargaining order cases before the courts in 2007, the courts 
affirmed the Board’s decision to enter a bargaining order, and in the third 
case the court upheld the Board’s decision to order an election rather 
than bargaining. 
In Center Construction Co. v. NLRB,31 where the employer’s top 
officials committed various unfair labor practices, including discharging 
half of the bargaining unit, the Sixth Circuit observed that the “number, 
gravity, and type of the unfair labor practices,” including the “hallmark” 
discharge violation, “together with the small size of the bargaining unit 
and the involvement of the highest management,” supported the Board’s 
findings that the employer had dissipated the union’s majority status and 
that a fair election would be unlikely.32  Accordingly, the court held, the 
Board did not abuse its remedial discretion by ordering the employer to 
bargain with the union.33   
In NLRB v. National Steel Supply, Inc.,34 the Second Circuit agreed 
with the Board that a Gissel bargaining order was warranted where the 
employer’s highest-ranking official unlawfully interrogated and 
threatened the leader of the union organizing effort, the employer 
thereafter unlawfully terminated that union supporter, and the employer 
ultimately unlawfully refused to reinstate 27 of the 31 bargaining unit 
employees who had engaged in an unfair labor practice strike.35  The 
court focused on the “swift and severe” nature of the employer’s 
unlawful conduct, the fact that 85 percent of the unit employees were 
affected, the likelihood that the unfair labor practices would have a 
lasting impact on the employees, and the promptness with which the 
Board issued the bargaining order.36 
By contrast, in Steelworkers v. NLRB,37 the Ninth Circuit upheld the 
Board’s refusal to impose a Gissel bargaining order.  Notwithstanding 
the employer’s commission of several unfair labor practices and the 
union’s loss of the Board-conducted election, the Board concluded that 
its “traditional remedies” and the holding of a rerun election “will 
 
30 Id. at 614–615. 
31 482 F.3d 425 (6th Cir.). 
32 Id. at 434–438. 
33 Id. at 438. 
34 207 Fed.Appx. 9 (2d Cir. 2006). 
35 National Steel Supply, Inc., 344 NLRB 973 (2005). 
36 207 Fed.Appx. at 12. 
37 482 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir.). 
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satisfactorily protect and restore employees’ Section 7 rights.”38  Before 
the court, the union argued that the Board should have provided the same 
“clearly articulated reasoning” for rejecting the bargaining-order remedy 
as it must provide when imposing the same remedy.  Acknowledging that 
the courts require the Board to clearly articulate why the “extreme” 
remedy of a bargaining order is warranted, the court held that the need 
for a detailed, clear articulation is absent when the Board chooses to 
enter the “preferred,” standard remedy of a rerun election.39  In other 
words, the court explained, “the Board’s decision to order an 
unextraordinary remedy does not merit an extraordinary explanation.”40 
3.  Equitable Arguments Against Enforcement of  
Board Orders 
A court may decline to enforce a Board order if it would be 
inequitable to grant enforcement.41  In two cases, courts rejected 
employers’ equitable arguments against enforcement.  In NLRB v. King 
Soopers, Inc.,42 the Tenth Circuit enforced two Board orders entered in 
2005 remedying the employer’s refusals to provide requested 
information in 2000.43  The employer provided the information pursuant 
to the Board orders, but in 2006 the Board sought a court judgment 
enforcing the orders.  The court rejected the employer’s arguments that 
its compliance with the orders rendered enforcement unnecessary and 
that it was too late for the Board to seek enforcement, because a Board 
order “imposes a continuing obligation; and the Board is entitled to have 
the resumption of the unfair labor practice barred by an enforcement 
decree.”44  The court focused on “the factual circumstances surrounding 
the original dispute between King Soopers and the unions” not having 
changed “in any material fashion such that enforcement is obsolete.”45 
In NLRB v. Harding Glass Co.,46 the First Circuit enforced a backpay 
order the Board entered in 2006 to remedy the employer’s 1993 unfair 
labor practices.47  The court had enforced the Board’s underlying make-
whole order in 1996.48  Despite its dismay at the ensuing delay, 
occasioned in part by the employer’s own conduct, the court enforced the 
 
38 Allied Mechanical, Inc., 343 NLRB 631, 631–632 (2004). 
39 482 F.3d at 1116–1118. 
40 Id. at 1117–1118. 
41 Continental Web Press, Inc. v. NLRB, 742 F.2d 1087, 1095 (7th Cir. 1984). 
42 476 F.3d 843 (10th Cir.). 
43 King Soopers, Inc., 344 NLRB 838 (2005), and King Soopers, Inc., 344 NLRB 842 (2005). 
44 476 F.3d at 846 (quoting NLRB v. Mexia Textiles, 339 U.S. 563, 567 (1950)). 
45 Id. 
46 500 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.). 
47 347 NLRB 1112 (2006). 
48 NLRB v. Harding Glass Co., 80 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 1996). 
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backpay order essentially because those primarily hurt by the delay were 
the employees who were entitled to a monetary remedy for the 
employer’s unlawful conduct, and because the employer itself was 
responsible for some of the delay and, in any event, had use of its money 
for the entire time.49  
D.  Jurisdiction Over Tribal Casino 
In San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB,50 the District of 
Columbia Circuit upheld the Board’s assertion of jurisdiction over a 
casino owned by an Indian tribe and located on the tribal reservation.  
The Board, overruling prior decisions which had held that it lacked 
jurisdiction over on-reservation tribal enterprises,51 held that such 
commercial enterprises are “employers” within the meaning of Section 
2(2) of the Act and are not exempt as political subdivisions of states, and 
that nothing in federal Indian law or policy precludes the Board’s 
assertion of jurisdiction.52 
The court noted that the Supreme Court has held that general statutes 
applying in terms to all persons include Indians.53  However, the 
Supreme Court has also held that ambiguities in a federal statute are to 
be resolved in favor of Indians54 and that a statute will not be read as 
impairing tribal sovereignty absent a clear expression of Congressional 
intent to do so.55  The court also noted that the cases calling for 
construction of ambiguous statutes in favor of Indians all involved 
statutes designed specifically to benefit or regulate Indians, rather than 
statutes of general application.56 
The court noted that not every statute that constrains the actions of a 
tribal government impairs tribal sovereignty.  Tribal sovereignty is not 
absolute; it is at its strongest when explicitly established by treaty or 
when a tribal government acts within its reservation on matters of 
concern only to members of the tribe.  In other cases, the inquiry is not 
dependent on a mechanical conception of tribal sovereignty, but requires 
consideration of the specific nature of the state, federal, and tribal 
interests at stake.  The critical factor is the extent to which application of 
 
49 500 F.3d at 10. 
50 475 F.3d 1306 (D.C. Cir.). 
51 Southern Indian Health Council, 290 NLRB 436 (1988); Fort Apache Timber Co., 226 NLRB 503 
(1976). 
52 San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 NLRB 1055 (2005), 69th Annual Report (2004), p. 32. 
53 FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960). 
54 See, e.g., Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759 (1985). 
55 See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980). 
56 475 F.3d at 1312. 
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the general law would constrain the tribe with respect to its governmental 
functions—that is, acts traditionally performed by government.57 
Here, the court concluded, application of the Act to the tribal casino 
would not interfere with the tribe’s sovereignty to a sufficient extent to 
require explicit Congressional sanction.  The operation of the casino was 
not a traditional attribute of self-government; the casino was virtually 
identical to casinos operated by private entities for purely commercial 
purposes.  Moreover, its operation was not a purely internal affair, since 
most of the casino’s employees and customers were not members of the 
tribe and lived off its reservation. Finally, the governmental actions 
which the Act would displace—enactment of a tribal labor relations 
ordinance and execution of a compact with the state governing operation 
of the casino—were incidental to the commercial activity of operating 
the casino.58 
Finally, the court held that the Board reasonably concluded that the 
tribe, in operating the casino, was an “employer” within the meaning of 
Section 2(2) of the Act.  The tribe was clearly an “employer” in the 
ordinary sense of the term, and it did not fall within the statutory 
exemption for “any state or political subdivision thereof.”59  In addition, 
while the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d), requires 
tribes engaging in high-stakes gaming to enter into a compact with the 
State where the gaming will occur, and permits such compacts to address 
labor relations, it does not indicate that Congress thereby intended to 
preclude federal agencies from regulating employment issues arising in 
the context of tribal gaming.60 
 
57 Id. at 1312–1313. 
58 Id. at 1314–1315. 
59 Id. at 1316–1317. 
60 Id. at 1317–1318. 
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VII 
Injunction Litigation 
A.  Injunction Litigation Under Section 10(j) 
Section 10(j) of the Act empowers the Board, in its discretion, to 
petition a U.S. district court for appropriate, temporary injunctive relief 
or restraining order in aid of an unfair labor practice proceeding.  Section 
10(j) proceedings can be initiated after issuance of an unfair labor 
practice complaint under Section 10(b) of the Act against any employer 
or labor organization.1  Any injunction issued under Section 10(j) lasts 
until final disposition of the unfair labor practice case by the Board. 
In fiscal 2007, the Board filed in district courts a total of 20 petitions 
for temporary injunctive relief under Section 10(j).  Of these petitions, all 
were filed against employers.  Five cases authorized in a prior fiscal year 
were also pending in district court at the beginning of the fiscal year.  Of 
these 25 cases, six were settled or adjusted prior to court action, and one 
case was withdrawn prior to a court decision as moot due to the issuance 
of a Board order.  District courts granted injunctions in eight cases, 
granted partial injunctions in two cases, and denied injunctions in three 
cases.  Five cases remained pending in district court at the end of the 
fiscal year. 
Of the 13 cases litigated to decision in fiscal 2007, four cases 
involved employer withdrawals of recognition from incumbent unions.  
Two cases involved successor employers’ refusal to recognize and 
bargain with the incumbent union that had represented the employees of 
the predecessor employer.  Three cases this fiscal year involved 
employer conduct designed to undermine the status of incumbent unions.  
Similarly, other cases involved employer misconduct during bargaining 
negotiations and the creation of alter ego entities to avoid a bargaining 
obligation.  Finally, one case involved the discharge of a union activist 
during an organizing campaign, and another case involved the discharge 
of 20 employees who engaged in protected, concerted activity.  
One case decided during the fiscal year involved a single 
employer/alter ego’s efforts to remove a longstanding union from the 
shop.  In Overstreet v. Advanced Architectural Metals,2 the employer 
refused to recognize and bargain with the incumbent union, made 
unilateral changes, refused to apply the collective-bargaining agreement, 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Ahearn v. Jackson Hospital Corp., 351 F.3d 226 (6th Cir. 2003), which was discussed in 
the fiscal 2004 Annual Report; Bloedorn v. Francisco Foods, Inc., 276 F.3d 270 (7th Cir. 2001).  
2 Civil No. S-07-00781-PMP-LRL (D.Nev.). 
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repeatedly threatened picketers with physical harm, discharged 17 
strikers, and granted recognition to a union representing only a minority 
of the employees. The district court concluded that there was a likelihood 
of success in proving that the companies constituted alter egos of the 
original employer and a single employer and that the employer’s conduct 
was unlawful.  Given these serious unfair labor practices and their 
continuing impact on the unit employees, the court concluded that the 
balance of harms and the public interest warranted interim injunctive 
relief. 
Another district court granted an injunction to protect bargaining for a 
first collective-bargaining agreement. In Chester v. Whitesell 
Corporation3, the employer was seeking concessions in order to have the 
employees’ terms and conditions of employment similar to those of its 
nonunion facilities. At the first bargaining session, the employer 
announced that it intended to present its final proposal to the union in 
two weeks.  After those 2 weeks the employer declared impasse, despite 
unfilled union information requests and despite the union disagreeing 
that the parties were at impasse, and the employer implemented its last 
offer.  The court concluded that the employer’s conduct had a “clear and 
natural tendency to undermine the union’s strength and the Board’s 
remedial powers” and, without interim relief, would further erode 
employee support for the union and impede the union’s ability to 
represent employees because the employer “ha[d] subverted the 
bargaining process and ignored the most basic statutory rights” of 
employees. The court ordered the employer to bargain in good faith with 
the union; to rescind, upon the union’s request, any unilateral changes; 
and to provide the union with requested information relevant to 
bargaining.  
A similar case involved an employer’s unlawful withdrawal of 
recognition from an incumbent union.  In Calatrello v. Carriage Inn of 
Cadiz,4 during negotiations for a successor collective-bargaining 
agreement, the union made a wage proposal it stated was calculated on 
the wages of the 24 employees among the 82-employee unit who paid 
union dues through checkoff.  The employer told the union that, if it only 
represented 24 employees, it did not represent a majority of the 
bargaining unit, and withdrew recognition.  The union responded that it 
continued to represent all employees in the unit.  The Regional Director 
alleged, inter alia, that the employer unlawfully withdrew recognition 
when there was not an actual loss of majority employee support for the 
union.  The court found that there was reasonable cause to believe that 
                                                 
3  2007 WL 2780348 (S.D. Iowa March 16, 2007). 
4 180 LRRM 3236, 2006 WL 3230778 (S.D. Ohio, November 6, 2006).  
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the employer unlawfully withdrew recognition where, inter alia, the court 
did not characterize the union’s statement concerning the basis for the 
calculation of its wage proposal as an admission, and because an 
employee’s refusal to be a union member and/or authorize dues checkoff 
is not sufficient to show a lack of support for the union.  The court 
concluded that it was “just and proper” to require the employer to 
recognize and bargain with the union where there was evidence that a 
loss of employee support for the union “may have occurred and/or is 
occurring.” 
In another withdrawal of recognition case, Norelli v. SFO Good-Nite 
Inn,5  the successor employer assumed the parties’ collective-bargaining 
agreement covering about 22 employees.  While bargaining for a new 
agreement during a period that the contract was extended, the employer 
threatened employees, made promises of benefits, and discharged two 
employees in an effort to solicit employee support for antiunion 
petitions.  The employer then withdrew recognition from the union while 
the contract was still in effect, relying on an antiunion petition supported 
by a majority of employees.  The court found that the Board was likely to 
prevail on the withdrawal of recognition allegation because the contract, 
which had been extended during negotiations for a successor agreement, 
barred withdrawal of recognition, and because the employer’s unfair 
labor practices tainted the antiunion petition.  The court also found that 
the Board had established irreparable harm to employee rights.  The 
court ordered the employer to offer interim reinstatement to two 
employees who were discharged for refusing to sign an anti-union 
petition and to recognize and bargain with the union.  Since the parties 
had been engaged in lengthy good faith negotiations before the 
withdrawal of recognition, the court limited the employer’s obligation to 
bargain for a “reasonable period of time, not to exceed 90 days.”   
Finally, in Holiday Inn Express,6 a successor employer tried to avoid 
its bargaining obligation by discriminatorily refusing to hire 19 hotel 
housekeeping and maintenance employees who worked for the 
predecessor employer.  The court agreed with the Board’s argument that 
injunctive relief was necessary to prevent irreparable injury, and rejected 
the employer’s defense that the 10(j) petition was untimely filed.  The 
court concluded that there was no undue delay resulting from the Board’s 
decision to await completion of the administrative hearing and that it was 
possible to restore the status quo ante through interim injunctive relief.  
Furthermore, the court rejected the employer’s argument that the balance 
of harms weighed against interim relief due to the displacement of 
 
5 No. C06-07335 MJJ (N.D. Ca.). 
6 Civil No. 07-2530, 2007 WL 1994045 (D.Minn.).  
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employees it had hired in place of the discriminatees.  Finally, the court 
determined that the public interest favored issuance of an injunction 
because such relief will preserve the Board’s remedial power and 
safeguard the collective-bargaining process, while sending the important 
and public message that employers may not displace employees by 
refusing to hire them because of their union affiliation.  The court 
ordered the employer to, inter alia, offer jobs at the hotel to employees it 
had refused to hire; recognize and bargain with the union; and rescind all 
unilateral changes implemented by the employer when it took over 
operations at the hotel.   
B.  Injunction Litigation Under Section 10(l) 
Section 10(l) imposes a mandatory duty on the Board to petition for 
“appropriate injunctive relief” against a labor organization or its agent 
charged with a violation of Section 8(b)(4)(A), (B), or (C),7 or Section 
8(b)(7),8 and against an employer or union charged with a violation of 
Section 8(e),9 whenever the General Counsel’s investigation reveals 
“reasonable cause to believe that such charge is true and that a complaint 
should issue.”10  In cases arising under Section 8(b)(7), however, a 
district court injunction may not be sought if a charge under Section 
8(a)(2) of the Act has been filed alleging that the employer had 
dominated or interfered with the formation or administration of a labor 
organization and, after investigation, there is “reasonable cause to 
believe such charge is true and that a complaint should issue.”  Section 
10(l) also provides that its provisions shall be applicable, “where such 
relief is appropriate,” to threats or other coercive conduct in support of 
jurisdictional disputes under Section 8(b)(4)(D) of the Act.11  In addition, 
under Section 10(l) a temporary restraining order pending the hearing on 
the petition for an injunction may be obtained, without notice to the 
employer, upon a showing that “substantial and irreparable injury to the 
                                                 
7 Sec. 8(b)(4)(A), (B), and (C), as enacted by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 
prohibited certain types of secondary strikes and boycotts, strikes to compel employers or self-
employed persons to join labor or employer organizations, and strikes against Board certifications of 
bargaining representatives.  These provisions were enlarged by the 1959 amendments of the Act 
(Title VII of Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act) to prohibit not only strikes and the 
inducement of work stoppages for these objects but also to proscribe threats, coercion, and restraint 
addressed to employers for these objects, and to prohibit conduct of this nature where an object was 
to compel an employer to enter into a “hot cargo” agreement declared unlawful in another section of 
the Act, Sec. 8(e).  
8 Sec. 8(b)(7), incorporated in the Act by the 1959 amendments, makes organizational or 
recognitional picketing under certain circumstances an unfair labor practice.  
9 Sec. 8(e), also incorporated in the Act by the 1959 amendments, makes hot cargo agreements 
unlawful and unenforceable, with certain exceptions for the construction and garment industries.  
10 See generally Pye v. Teamsters Local 122, 61 F.3d 1013 (1st Cir. 1995); Kinney v. Operating 
Engineers Local 150, 994 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1993).  
11 Sec. 8(b)(4)(D) was enacted as part of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. 
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charging party will be unavoidable” unless immediate injunctive relief is 
granted.  Such ex parte relief, however, may not extend beyond 5 days. 
In this report period, the Board filed six petitions for injunctions 
under Section 10(l).  No petitions were pending court action at the 
beginning of the period.  One of the six petitions was settled prior to 
adjudication by the court.  During this period, five petitions went to final 
order, with the courts granting injunctions in five cases.  None were 
denied. Injunctions were issued in three cases involving secondary 
boycott action proscribed by Section 8(b)(4)(B), as well as in instances 
involving a violation of Section 8(b)(4)(A), which proscribes certain 
conduct to obtain hot cargo agreements barred by Section 8(e). 
Injunctions were also issued in two cases to proscribe alleged 
recognitional or organizational picketing in violations of Section 8(b)(7). 
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VIII 
Contempt Litigation and Compliance Branch 
During fiscal year 2007, the Contempt Litigation and Compliance 
Branch (CLCB) provided a range of services, including advice, training, 
and assistance to Regions as well as conducting Federal court litigation, 
including contempt proceedings, actions under the Federal Debt 
Collection Procedures Act of 1990 (FDCPA) and bankruptcy actions.  A 
total of 333 cases were referred to CLCB during the fiscal year for 
advice and/or assistance, or for consideration of contempt proceedings or 
other appropriate action to achieve compliance with the Act.  Of this 
total, 132 cases were formal submissions respecting contempt or other 
compliance actions; in 201 other cases, advice and/or assistance was 
solicited and provided to the Regions or other agency personnel and the 
cases returned for further administrative processing.  CLCB also 
conducted 161 asset/entity database investigations to assist Regions in 
their compliance efforts, a task over and above the 333 referrals to CLCB 
referenced above.  In addition, nearly 350 hours were devoted by CLCB 
staff to training Regional and other agency personnel and members of the 
private sector bar on contempt and compliance issues. 
Of the 132 contempt or other formal submissions, voluntary 
compliance was achieved in 27 cases during the fiscal year, without the 
necessity of filing a contempt petition or other initiating papers, and 18 
other cases settled after the filing of a formal pleading in court but before 
trial.  In 39 other cases, it was determined that contempt or other 
proceedings were not warranted. 
In cases deemed to have merit, 15 civil contempt or equivalent 
proceedings were instituted, including two in which body attachment was 
sought.  A number of ancillary compliance proceedings under FDCPA 
were also instituted by CLCB in FY 2007, including seven proceedings 
to obtain subpoena enforcement orders; five proceedings to obtain post-
judgment writs of garnishment; three proceedings to obtain prejudgment 
writs of garnishment; and three proceedings to obtain prejudgment 
protective restraining orders.  CLCB instituted two proceedings in 
bankruptcy courts, including a motion to take Section 2004 
examinations, and a motion to give Board’s claims administrative 
priority. 
Fourteen civil contempt or equivalent adjudications were awarded in 
favor of the Board in FY 2007, including four assessing fines and one 
issuing a writ of body attachment.  During FY 2007, CLCB also 
successfully obtained three protective restraining orders; nine post-
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judgment writs of garnishment; four pre-judgment writs of garnishment; 
five turnover orders for garnished funds; and nine subpoena enforcement 
orders from District Courts.  In bankruptcy courts, CLCB obtained two 
orders, one granting in part and denying in part the Board’s claim for 
administrative priority, and one denying individual debtors’ requests for 
discharge based on §727 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
During the fiscal year, CLCB collected $34,250 in fines and 
$17,945,292 in backpay or other compensatory damages, while 
recouping $320,481 in court costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in 
contempt litigation. 
There were a number of noteworthy cases decided in FY 2007.  In 
NLRB v. Electrical Workers Local 3, 471 F.3d 399 (2d Cir. 2006), the 
Second Circuit adopted a Special Master’s report adjudging Local 3 in 
further civil contempt for failing to distribute copies of the court’s prior 
orders to business representatives and engaging in unlawful secondary 
picketing and threats.  The court ordered that Local 3 pay compliance 
fines, the Board’s costs and attorneys’ fees (at the prevailing private 
practice market rate) and the costs and attorneys’ fees of the Special 
Master.  It also increased substantially prospective compliance fines 
against Local 3 for future violations. 
Several collection/bankruptcy cases were also favorably resolved this 
year.  In Kaiser Aluminum, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Delaware, in Case No. 02-10429 (JKF), had previously 
approved settlement of the Board’s backpay claims (which were 
calculated based on a statistical sampling).  That settlement resulted in a 
distribution of Kaiser stock to employees worth nearly $12 million.  In 
Korns Bakery, a protective restraining order and a contingent 
receivership order entered by the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York under the FDCPA (Misc. 06-50 (FJD)) led 
to a backpay settlement in excess of $2 million.  In M&M Backhoe, the 
CLCB, pursuant to Section 10(e) of the Act, obtained an emergency 
order from the D.C. Circuit (Case No. 05-1378) freezing the proceeds of 
an auction sale which threatened to undermine Respondent’s ability to 
pay backpay.  The order ultimately led to a settlement of $250,000 
payment for backpay.  Finally, in HH3 (William Hudson and Gretchen 
Hudson), the CLCB, for the first time, obtained an order from the 
bankruptcy court rejecting individual debtors’ request for a Chapter 7 
discharge due to fraudulent conduct, under Section 727 of the 
Bankruptcy Code (N.D. Ill, Bankruptcy Case No. 05-73899). 
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IX 
Special Litigation 
The Board participates in a number of cases that fall outside the 
normal process of statutory enforcement and review.  The following 
represent the most significant cases decided this year. 
A.  Litigation Concerning Board and Court Jurisdiction 
In Service Employees Local 790  v. Norelli et al.,1 the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California denied SEIU’s 
motion to enjoin a union-security deauthorization election and granted 
the Board’s motion to dismiss the complaint, based on lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.2  In the Board’s underlying Covenant Aviation 
Security, LLC decision,3 the panel majority (Chairman Battista and 
Member Kirsanow; Member Walsh dissenting) had found that Section 
9(e)(1) of the Act permits the gathering of signatures for the statutorily-
required showing of interest to occur prior to the signing of a collective-
bargaining agreement.  In district court SEIU argued that the Board’s 
decision violated a “clear and mandatory” provision of the Act, thus 
satisfying the narrow Leedom v. Kyne4 exception to the rule precluding 
district court jurisdiction.  The district court rejected this argument, and 
found that, “[g]iven, therefore, that the language of section 9(e)(1) does 
not facially address the question of timing regarding the signatures 
necessary to support a petition filed pursuant to that provision, and that 
legislative history also fails to provide a clear answer to the question, the 
court concludes that the statute fails to set forth a ‘clear and mandatory’ 
provision that the Board has violated in allowing the instant petition to 
go forward.”5 
B.  Preemption Litigation 
In NLRB v. State of North Dakota,6 the Board obtained a declaratory 
judgment that North Dakota Century Code § 34-01-14.1, a statutory 
provision requiring nonunion members to pay the union for the costs of 
processing their grievances, is preempted by the Act.  The district court 
concluded that § 34-01-14.1 is in actual conflict with the Act and thus 
preempted by the Supremacy Clause as a matter of law.  The Board 
                                                 
1 No. C 07-2766 PJH, 2007 WL 1880373 (N.D. Cal.). 
2 Id. at *5–7. 
3 349 NLRB 699. 
4 358 U.S. 184, 188 (1958). 
5 2007 WL 1880373. 
6 504 F.Supp. 2d 750 (D.N.D.). 
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argued, among other things, that Section 34-01-14.1 of the North Dakota 
Century Code alters the considerations underlying an employee’s choice 
of whether to join or refrain from joining a union by requiring 
nonmembers—those employees who choose not to join a union that 
represents them—to pay the union for any expenses incurred 
representing them under the contractual grievance and arbitration 
procedures.  The court agreed with the Board that charging nonunion 
members the cost of providing a service that union members get free 
(even though they pay dues) has a coercive effect on non-members in the 
exercise of their Section 7 right to join or refrain from joining a union.  
Emphasizing that the purpose of the Act was to obtain a uniform 
application of its substantive rules and avoid conflicts likely to result 
from a variety of local procedures and attitudes towards labor disputes, 
the court found that Section 34-01-14.1 stands as an obstacle to these 
congressional objectives.  Thus, the court concluded that the statutory 
provision is in actual conflict with Sections 7 and 8 of the Act because 
North Dakota law requires unions in that State to engage in conduct that 
is prohibited by Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.   
In Healthcare Assn. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Pataki,7 the Second Circuit 
reversed a district court decision that had determined a New York 
neutrality statute was preempted under the Machinists doctrine.8   The 
State statute at issue prohibited the use of State funds, including 
Medicaid, for encouraging or discouraging union organization. A 
majority of the Second Circuit concluded that Section 8(c) of the Act not 
only protects the constitutional free-speech rights of employers but also 
embodies a congressional policy designed to preserve employers’ ability 
to participate in union organizing campaigns.9  The majority 
acknowledged that Garmon preemption10 potentially applies to the State 
statute at issue.11  However, the court found the record to contain an 
insufficient factual basis upon which it could determine whether the State 
was either impermissibly restricting the plaintiffs’ exercise of their 
NLRA free speech rights or merely refusing to subsidize that exercise 
with State monies.12  Moreover, the court concluded that resolution of 
these factual issues would also determine the applicability of the Garmon 
factor of interests “deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility” and 
the general proprietary interest exception to NLRA preemption.13  
                                                 
7 471 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2006). 
8 Machinists Local 76 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).   
9 471 F.3d at 100. 
10 San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). 
11 471 F.3d at 100.  
12 Id. at 105. 
13 Id. at 106–107. 
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ting.”  
                                                
Further, all three judges agreed that Machinists preemption could apply 
to the extent that the New York statute interferes with employers’ use of 
free speech as a lawful “weapon” to respond to union organizing 
campaigns, but concluded that the answer to the Machinists question also 
turned on the factors identified as determinative in deciding Garmon 
preemption: whether the statute burdens monies that cannot properly be 
said to belong to the State and whether the State can accomplish its goal 
of saving money by limiting certain reimbursement costs.14 Accordingly, 
the court remanded the case for resolution of disputed factual issues. 
C.  Bankruptcy Litigation 
In In re Pan American Hospital Corp.,15 the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida held that the Board 
violated the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code16 by filing 
with the court and serving on potential purchasers of the debtor a Golden 
State Bottling17 notice of pending unfair labor practice charges after the 
court had issued an order authorizing the debtor to sell its assets free and 
clear of all liens, claims, and encumbrances.18  The court found that the 
Board filed and served the notice on potential purchasers for the 
improper purpose of “attempting to enforce its pecuniary interest in 
property of the Debtor by asserting successor liability onto the 
purchaser.”19  The court specifically found that the notice “was not only 
intended to chill the bidding process, but it inferred [sic] that potential 
successor liability existed and should be considered when bidding.”20  
Accordingly, the court held that it was improper for the Board to attempt 
to collect its claim against the debtor from a free and clear sale purchaser 
of the debtor’s assets in a manner which was unavailable to other 
similarly situated creditors and which may have “thrown ice water on a 
pending sale to the detriment of all creditors[,] including the specific 
creditor community [the Board] is represen 21
In In re Wallace Packaging Corp.,22 the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the Eastern District of New York denied the trustee’s motion to 
disallow and expunge the Board’s claim.  The Board had filed its claim 
to protect its ability to collect potential backpay liability arising in a 
pending Board case as a result of the debtor’s alleged failure to bargain 
 
14 Id. at 107–108. 
15 364 B.R. 832 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.). 
16 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). 
17 Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973). 
18 11 U.S.C. § 363(f).   
19 364 B.R. at 837. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 838. 
22 No. 04-86203 (E.D. Bankr.).  
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over the effects of the debtor’s plant closing.  The bankruptcy court 
rejected the trustee’s argument that the claim should be expunged on 
grounds that the debtor did not engage in unlawful conduct under the 
Act.  In agreement with the Board’s position, the bankruptcy court ruled 
that the Board has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether there has 
been an NLRA violation. 
D.  Mandamus Petitions Seeking to Compel the Board to  
Issue Decisions 
In two separate actions filed in the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit, petitioners sought writs of mandamus to 
compel the Board to issue decisions in pending unfair labor practice 
cases.  The petitioners in both mandamus actions claimed that the 
Board’s adjudication of the cases to which they were parties had been 
unreasonably delayed.  The D.C. Circuit issued the writ in one case, but 
denied mandamus relief in the other.   
In re Pirlott23 was brought in June 2006 by the charging parties to 
Teamsters Local 75 (Schreiber Foods),24 a case raising many issues, 
including the chargeability of extra-unit organizing expenses to Beck 
objectors.  Schreiber Foods originated with the filing of an unfair labor 
practice charge in November 1989 and had been pending before the 
Board on postremand exceptions since March 2002.  The Board filed a 
substantive opposition to the mandamus petition and communicated its 
intention to issue a decision by November 30, 2006.  When it became 
apparent that the Board would not be able to meet its self-imposed 
deadline, the Board sought a 2-month extension.  In a short, per curiam 
order denying the Board’s request and granting the mandamus petition, 
the court stated that “the delay in this case and the important interests at 
stake warrant issuance of the writ.”25  
In the other mandamus case, In re Gally, the D.C. Circuit denied the 
mandamus petition.26  As in In re Pirlott, the petitioner in In re Gally 
was the charging party in a Board case dealing with the rights and 
obligations of Beck objectors, but the underlying Board case (Auto 
Workers Local 376 (Colt’s Mfg. Co.)),27 had been pending before the 
Board for a little over 2 years.  The D.C. Circuit found that the delay in 
Colt’s Mfg. was neither so “egregious” nor so “unreasonable as to 
warrant the extraordinary remedy of mandamus.”28  Shortly thereafter, 
                                                 
23 No. 06-1188 (D.C. Cir.). 
24 329 NLRB 28 (1999), modified 349 NLRB 77. 
25 No. 06-1188, slip op. at 1. 
26 No. 07-1023 (D.C. Cir.). 
27 34–CB–2631 (NLRB) (unpublished). 
28 No. 07-1023, slip op. at 1. 
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the Board issued an order remanding Colt’s Mfg. with instructions to 
schedule a hearing to be conducted “expeditiously” before an 
administrative law judge.29 
 
29 34–CB–2631, slip op. at 6 fn. 3. 
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APPENDIX 
 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN STATISTICAL TABLES 
 
The definitions of terms contained in this glossary are not intended for general 
application but are specifically directed toward increasing comprehension of the 
statistical tables that follow. Thus the definitions are keyed directly to the terms used in 
such tables. 
Adjusted Cases 
Cases are closed as “adjusted” when an informal settlement agreement is executed 
and compliance with its terms is secured. (See “Informal Agreement,” this glossary.) 
In some instances, a written agreement is not secured but appropriate remedial action 
is taken so as to render further proceeding unnecessary. A central element in an 
“adjusted” case is the agreement of the parties to settle differences without recourse 
to litigation. 
Advisory Opinion Cases 
See “Other Cases—AO” under “Types of Cases.” 
Agreement of Parties 
See “Informal Agreement” and “Formal Agreement,” this glossary. The term 
“agreement” includes both types. 
Amendment of Certification Cases 
See “Other Cases—AC” under “Types of Cases.” 
Backpay 
Amounts of money paid or to be paid employees as reimbursement for wages lost 
because they were discriminatorily discharged or unlawfully denied employment, 
plus interest on such money. Also included is payment for bonuses, vacations, other 
fringe benefits, etc., lost because of the discriminatory acts, as well as interest 
thereon. All moneys noted in table 4 have been reported as paid or owing in cases 
closed during the fiscal year. (Installment payments may protract some payments 
beyond this year and some payments may have actually been made at times 
considerably in advance of the date a case was closed; i.e., in a prior fiscal year.) 
Backpay Hearing 
A supplementary hearing to receive evidence and testimony as to the amount of 
backpay due discriminatees under a prior Board or court decree. 
Backpay Specification 
The formal document, a “pleading,” which is served on the parties when the Regional 
Director and the respondent are unable to agree as to the amounts of backpay due 
discriminatees pursuant to a Board order or court decree requiring payment of such 
backpay. It sets forth in detail the amount held by the Regional Director to be owing 
each discriminatee and the method of computation employed. The specification is 
accompanied by a notice of hearing setting a date for a backpay hearing. 
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Case 
A “case” is the general term used in referring to a charge or petition filed with the 
Board. Each case is numbered and carries a letter designation indicating the type of 
case. See “Types of Cases.” 
Certification 
A certification of the results of an election is issued by the Regional Director or the 
Board. If a union has been designated as the exclusive bargaining representative by a 
majority of the employees, a certification of representative is issued. If no union has 
received a majority vote, a certification of results of election is issued. 
Challenges 
The parties to an NLRB election are entitled to challenge any voter. At the election 
site, the challenged ballots are segregated and not counted when other ballots are 
tallied. Most frequently, the tally of unchallenged ballots determines the election and 
the challenged ballots are insufficient in number to affect the results of the election. 
The challenges in such a case are never resolved, and the certification is based on the 
tally of (unchallenged) ballots. 
 
When challenged ballots are determinative of the result, a determination as to whether 
or not they are to be counted rests with the Regional Director in the first instance, 
subject to possible appeal to the Board. Often, however, the “determinative” challenges 
are resolved informally by the parties by mutual agreement. No record is kept of 
nondeterminative challenges or determinative challenges which are resolved by 
agreement prior to issuance of the first tally of ballots. 
Charge 
A document filed by an employee, an employer, a union, or an individual alleging 
that an unfair labor practice has been committed. See “C Case” under “Types of 
Cases.” 
Complaint 
The document which initiates “formal” proceedings in an unfair labor practice case. 
It is issued by the Regional Director when he or she concludes on the basis of a 
completed investigation that any of the allegations contained in the charge have merit 
and adjustment or settlement has not been achieved by the parties. The complaint sets 
forth all allegations and information necessary to bring a case to hearing before an 
administrative law judge pursuant to due process of law. The complaint contains a 
notice of hearing, specifying the time and place of hearing. 
Election, Runoff 
An election conducted by the Regional Director after an initial election, having three 
or more choices on the ballot, has turned out to be inconclusive (none of the choices 
receiving a majority of the valid votes cast). The Regional Director conducts the 
runoff election between the choices on the original ballot which received the highest 
and the next highest number of votes. 
Election, Stipulated 
An election held by the Regional Director pursuant to an agreement signed by all the 
parties concerned. The agreement provides for the waiving of hearing and the 
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establishment of the appropriate unit by mutual consent. Postelection rulings are 
made by the Board. 
Eligible Voters 
Employees within an appropriate bargaining unit who were employed as of a fixed 
date prior to an election, or are otherwise qualified to vote under the Board’s 
eligibility rules. 
Fees, Dues, and Fines 
The collection by a union or an employer of dues, fines, and referral fees from 
employees may be found to be an unfair labor practice under Section 8(b)(1)(A) or 
(2) or 8(a)(1) and (2) or (3), where, for instance such moneys were collected pursuant 
to an illegal hiring hall arrangement, or an invalid or unlawfully applied union-
security agreement; where dues were deducted from employees’ pay without their 
authorization; or, in the cases of fines, where such fines restrained or coerced 
employees in the exercise of their rights. The remedy for such unfair labor practices 
usually requires the reimbursement of such moneys to the employees. 
Fines 
See “Fees, Dues, and Fines.” 
Formal Action 
Formal actions may be documents issued or proceedings conducted when the 
voluntary agreement of all parties regarding the disposition of all issues in a case 
cannot be obtained, and where dismissal of the charge or petition is not warranted. 
Formal actions, are, further, those in which the decision-making authority of the 
Board (the Regional Director in representation cases), as provided in Sections 9 and 
10 of the Act, must be exercised in order to achieve the disposition of a case or the 
resolution of any issue raised in a case. Thus, formal action takes place when a Board 
decision and consent order is issued pursuant to a stipulation, even though the 
stipulation constitutes a voluntary agreement. 
Formal Agreement (in unfair labor practice cases) 
A written agreement between the Board and the other parties to a case in which 
hearing is waived and the specific terms of a Board order agreed upon. The 
agreement may also provide for the entry of a consent court decree enforcing the 
Board order. 
Compliance 
The carrying out of remedial action as agreed upon by the parties in writing (see 
“Formal Agreement,” “Informal Agreement”); as recommended by the administrative 
law judge in the decision; as ordered by the Board in its decision and order; or 
decreed by the court. 
Dismissed Cases 
Cases may be dismissed at any stage. They are dismissed informally when, following 
investigation, the Regional Director concludes that there has been no violation of the 
law, that there is insufficient evidence to support further action, or for a variety of 
other reasons. Before the charge is dismissed, however, the charging party is given 
the opportunity to withdraw the charge by the administrative law judge, by the Board, 
or by the courts through their refusal to enforce orders of the Board. 
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Dues 
See “Fees, Dues, and Fines.” 
Election, Consent 
An election conducted by the Regional Director pursuant to an agreement signed by 
all parties concerned. The agreement provides for the waiving of a hearing, the 
establishment of the appropriate unit by mutual consent, and the final determination 
of all postelection issues by the Regional Director. 
Election, Directed 
Board-Directed 
An election conducted by the Regional Director pursuant to a decision and direction 
of election by the Board. Postelection rulings are made by the Regional Director or 
by the Board. 
Regional Director-Directed 
An election conducted by the Regional Director pursuant to a decision and direction 
of election issued by the Regional Director after a hearing. Postelection rulings are 
made by the Regional Director or by the Board. 
Election, Expedited 
An election conducted by the Regional Director pursuant to a petition filed within 30 
days of the commencement of picketing in a situation in which a meritorious 
8(b)(7)(C) charge has been filed. The election is conducted under priority conditions 
and without a hearing unless the Regional Director believes the proceeding raises 
questions which cannot be decided without a hearing. 
 
Postelection rulings on objections and/or challenges are made by the Regional 
Director and are final and binding unless the Board grants an appeal on application 
by one of the parties. 
Election, Rerun 
An election held after an initial election has been set aside either by the Regional 
Director or by the Board. 
Informal Agreement (in unfair labor practice cases) 
A written agreement entered into between the party charged with committing an 
unfair labor practice, the Regional Director, and (in most cases) the charging party 
requiring the charged party to take certain specific remedial action as a basis for the 
closing of the case. Cases closed in this manner are included in “adjusted” cases. 
Injunction Petitions 
Petitions filed by the Board with respective U.S. district courts for injunctive relief 
under Section 10(j) or Section 10(e) of the Act pending hearing and adjudication of 
unfair labor practice charges before the Board. Also, petitions filed with the U.S. 
court of appeals under Section 10(e) of the Act. 
Jurisdictional Disputes 
Controversies between unions or groupings of employees as to which employees will 
perform specific work. Cases involving jurisdictional disputes are received by the 
Board through the filing of charges alleging a violation of Section 8(b)(4)(D). They are 
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initially processed under Section 10(k) of the Act which is concerned with the 
determination of the jurisdictional dispute itself rather than with a finding as to whether 
an unfair labor practice has been committed. Therefore, the failure of a party to comply 
with the Board’s determination of dispute is the basis for the issuance of an unfair labor 
practice complaint and the processing of the case through usual unfair labor practice 
procedures. 
Objections 
Any party to an election may file objections alleging that either the conduct of the 
election or the conduct of a party to the election failed to meet the Board’s standards. 
An election will be set aside if eligible employee-voters have not been given an 
adequate opportunity to cast their ballots, in secrecy and without hindrance from fear 
or other interference with the expression of their free choice. 
Petition 
See “Representation Cases.” Also see “Other Cases—AC, UC, and UD” under 
“Types of Cases.” 
Proceeding 
One or more cases included in a single litigated action. A “proceeding” may be a 
combination of C and R cases consolidated for the purpose of hearing. 
Representation Cases 
This term applies to cases bearing the alphabetical designations RC, RM, or RD. (See 
“R Cases” under “Types of Cases,” this glossary, for specific definitions of these 
terms.) All three types of cases are included in the term “representation” which deals 
generally with the problem of which union, if any, shall represent employees in 
negotiations with their employer. The cases are initiated by the filing of a petition by 
a union, an employer, or a group of employees. 
Representation Election 
An election by secret ballot conducted by the Board among the employees in an 
appropriate collective-bargaining unit to determine whether the employees wish to be 
represented by a particular labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining. 
The tables herein reflect only final elections which result in the issuance of a 
certification of representative if a union is chosen, or a certification of results if the 
majority has voted for “no union.” 
Situation 
One or more unfair labor practice cases involving the same factual situation. These 
cases are processed as a single unit of work. A situation may include one or more CA 
cases, a combination of CA and CB cases, or combination of other types of C cases. 
It does not include representation cases. 
Types of Cases 
General: 
Letter designations are given to all cases depending upon the subsection of 
the Act allegedly violated or otherwise describing the general nature of each 
case. Each of the letter designations appearing below is descriptive of the 
case it is associated with. 
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C Cases (unfair labor practice cases) 
A case number which contains the first letter designation C, in combination 
with another letter, i.e., CA, CB, etc., indicates that it involves a charge that 
an unfair labor practice has been committed in violation of one or more 
subsections of Section 8. 
CA: 
A charge that an employer has committed unfair labor practices in violation 
of Section 8(a)(1), (2), (3), (4), or (5), or any combination thereof. 
CB: 
A charge that a labor organization has committed unfair labor practices in 
violation of Section 8(b)(1), (2), (3), (5), or (6), or any combination thereof. 
CC: 
A charge that a labor organization has committed unfair labor practices in 
violation of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and/or (A), (B), or (C), or any combination 
thereof. 
CD: 
A charge that a labor organization has committed an unfair labor practice in 
violation of Section 8(b)(4)(i) or (ii)(D). Preliminary actions under Section 
10(k) for the determination of jurisdictional disputes are processed as CD 
cases. (See “Jurisdictional Disputes” in this glossary.) 
CE: 
A charge that either a labor organization or an employer, or both jointly, 
have committed an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(e). 
CG:  
A charge that a labor organization has committed unfair labor practices in 
violation of Section 8(g). 
CP: 
A charge that a labor organization has committed unfair labor practices in 
violation of Section 8(b)(7)(A), (B), or (C), or any combination thereof. 
R Cases (representation cases) 
A case number which contains the first letter designation R, in combination 
with another letter, i.e., RC, RD, RM, indicates that it is a petition for 
investigation and determination of a question concerning representation of 
employees, filed under Section 9(c) of the Act. 
RC: 
A petition filed by a labor organization or an employee alleging that a 
question concerning representation has arisen and seeking an election for 
determination of a collective-bargaining representative. 
RD: 
A petition filed by employees alleging that the union previously certified or 
currently recognized by the employer as their collective-bargaining 
representative no longer represents a majority of the employees in the 
appropriate unit and seeking an election to determine this. 
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RM: 
A petition filed by an employer alleging that a question concerning 
representation has arisen and seeking an election for the determination of a 
collective-bargaining representative. 
Other Cases 
AC: 
(Amendment of Certification cases): A petition filed by a labor organization 
or an employer for amendment of an existing certification to reflect changed 
circumstances, such as changes in the name or affiliation of the labor 
organization involved or in the name or location of the employer involved. 
AO: 
(Advisory Opinion cases): As distinguished from the other types of cases 
described above, which are filed in and processed by Regional Offices of the 
Board, AO or “advisory opinion” cases are filed directly with the Board in 
Washington and seek a determination as to whether the Board would or 
would not assert jurisdiction, in any given situation on the basis of its current 
standards over the party or parties to a proceeding pending before a state or 
territorial agency or a court. (See subpart H of the Board’s Rules and 
Regulations, Series 8, as amended.) 
UC: 
(Unit Clarification cases): A petition filed by a labor organization or an 
employer seeking a determination as to whether certain classification of 
employees should or should not be included within a presently existing 
bargaining unit. 
UD: 
(Union Deauthorization case): A petition filed by employees pursuant to 
Section 9(e)(1) requesting that the Board conduct a referendum to determine 
whether a union’s authority to enter into a union-shop contract should be 
rescinded. 
UD Cases 
See “Other Cases—UD” under “Types of Cases.” 
Unfair Labor Practice Cases 
See “C Cases” under “Types of Cases.” 
Union Deauthorization Cases 
See “Other Cases—UD” under “Types of Cases.” 
Union-Shop Agreement 
An agreement between an employer and a labor organization which requires 
membership in the union as a condition of employment on or after the 30th day 
following (1) the beginning of such employment or (2) the effective date of the 
agreement, whichever is the later. 
Unit, Appropriate Bargaining 
A grouping of employees in a plant, firm, or industry recognized by the employer, 
agreed upon by the parties to a case, or designated by the Board or its Regional 
Director, as appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining. 
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Valid Vote 
A secret ballot on which the choice of the voter is clearly shown. 
Withdrawn Cases 
Cases are closed as “withdrawn” when the charging party or petitioner, for whatever 
reasons, requests withdrawal or the charge of the petition and such request is 
approved. 
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 Table 1.—Total Cases Received, Closed, and Pending, Fiscal Year 20071 
Identification of filing party   
 
 
 
Total  
AFL-CIO 
Unions 
Other 
National 
Unions 
Other  
local  
Unions 
 
Individuals 
 
Employers 
 All Cases 
Pending October 1, 2006.................... 14,398 5,001 4,036 500 4,257 604 
Received fiscal 2007.......................... 25,649 6,950 6,683 851 9,983 1,182 
On docket fiscal 2007........................ 40,047 11,951 10,719 1,351 14,240 1,786 
Closed fiscal 2007.............................. 26,727 7,387 7,228 905 10,089 1,118 
Pending September 30, 2007.............. 13,320 4,564 3,491 446 4,151 668 
 Unfair labor practice cases2 
Pending October 1, 2006.................... 13,123 4,668 3,534 416 3,969 536 
Received fiscal 2007.......................... 22,331 5,914 5,479 680 9,226 1,032 
On docket fiscal 2007........................ 35,454 10,582 9,013 1,096 13,195 1,568 
Closed fiscal 2007.............................. 23,130 6,298 5,848 707 9,295 982 
Pending September 30, 2007.............. 12,324 4,284 3,165 389 3,900 586 
 Representation cases3 
Pending October 1, 2006.................... 1,157 310 484 73 248 42 
Received fiscal 2007.......................... 3,056 991 1,156 158 659 92 
On docket fiscal 2007........................ 4,213 1,301 1,640 231 907 134 
Closed fiscal 2007.............................. 3,332 1,047 1,333 180 685 87 
Pending September 30, 2007.............. 881 254 307 51 222 47 
 Union-shop deauthorization cases 
Pending October 1, 2006.................... 38 -- -- -- 38 -- 
Received fiscal 2007.......................... 94 -- -- -- 94 -- 
On docket fiscal 2007........................ 132 -- -- -- 132 -- 
Closed fiscal 2007.............................. 103 -- -- -- 103 -- 
Pending September 30, 2007.............. 29 -- -- -- 29 -- 
 Amendment of certification cases 
Pending October 1, 2006.................... 5 0 3 0 0 2 
Received fiscal 2007.......................... 6 0 3 3 0 0 
On docket fiscal 2007........................ 11 0 6 3 0 2 
Closed fiscal 2007.............................. 7 0 2 3 0 2 
Pending September 30, 2007.............. 4 0 4 0 0 0 
 Unit clarification cases 
Pending October 1, 2006.................... 75 23 15 11 2 24 
Received fiscal 2007.......................... 162 45 45 10 4 58 
On docket fiscal 2007........................ 237 68 60 21 6 82 
Closed fiscal 2007.............................. 155 42 45 15 6 47 
Pending September 30, 2007.............. 82 26 15 6 0 35 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions.  Advisory Opinion (AO) cases not included.  See Table 22. 
2 See Table 1Afor totals by types of cases. 
3 See Table 1B for totals by types of cases. 
* Totals for cases pending Oct. 1, 2007, differ from last year’s annual report.  Revised totals result from postreport adjustments to last year’s “on 
docket” and/or “closed figures.” 
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Table 1A.—Unfair Labor Practice Cases Received, Closed, and Pending, Fiscal Year 20071 
Identification of filing party   
 
 
Total  
AFL-CIO 
Unions 
Other 
National 
Unions 
Other  
local  
Unions 
 
Individuals 
 
Employers 
 CA cases 
Pending October 1, 2006.................... *10,804 4,653 3,501 408 2,215 27 
Received fiscal 2007.......................... 16,291 5,887 5,441 650 4,263 50 
On docket fiscal 2007........................ 27,095 10,540 8,942 1,058 6,478 77 
Closed fiscal 2007.............................. 17,058 6,269 5,806 680 4,254 49 
Pending September 30, 2007.............. 10,037 4,271 3,136 378 2,224 28 
 CB Cases 
Pending October 1, 2006.................... 2,006 10 26 8 1,739 223 
Received fiscal 2007.......................... 5,523 18 27 26 4,932 520 
On docket fiscal 2007........................ 7,529 28 53 34 6,671 743 
Closed fiscal 2007.............................. 5,624 18 32 25 5,014 535 
Pending September 30, 2007.............. 1,905 10 21 9 1,657 208 
 CC Cases 
Pending October 1, 2006.................... 226 1 5 0 9 211 
Received fiscal 2007.......................... 306 2 5 0 18 281 
On docket fiscal 2007........................ 532 3 10 0 27 492 
Closed fiscal 2007.............................. 246 3 3 0 15 225 
Pending September 30, 2007.............. 286 0 7 0 12 267 
 CD Cases 
Pending October 1, 2006.................... 43 3 0 0 3 37 
Received fiscal 2007.......................... 88 4 4 1 5 74 
On docket fiscal 2007........................ 131 7 4 1 8 111 
Closed fiscal 2007.............................. 101 4 4 1 4 88 
Pending September 30, 2007.............. 30 3 0 0 4 23 
 CE Cases 
Pending October 1, 2006.................... 11 1 1 0 1 8 
Received fiscal 2007.......................... 48 2 1 2 4 39 
On docket fiscal 2007........................ 59 3 2 2 5 47 
Closed fiscal 2007.............................. 30 3 1 0 5 21 
Pending September 30, 2007.............. 29 0 1 2 0 26 
 CG Cases 
Pending October 1, 2006.................... 9 0 0 0 1 8 
Received fiscal 2007.......................... 13 0 0 0 0 13 
On docket fiscal 2007........................ 22 0 0 0 1 21 
Closed fiscal 2007.............................. 12 0 0 0 0 12 
Pending September 30, 2007.............. 10 0 0 0 1 9 
 CP Cases 
Pending October 1, 2006.................... 24 0 1 0 1 22 
Received fiscal 2007.......................... 62 1 1 1 4 55 
On docket fiscal 2007........................ 86 1 2 1 5 77 
Closed fiscal 2007.............................. 59 1 2 1 3 52 
Pending September 30, 2007.............. 27 0 0 0 2 25 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
* Totals for cases pending Oct. 1, 2007, differ from last year’s annual report.  Revised totals result from postreport adjustments to last year’s “on 
docket” and/or “closed figures.” 
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Table 1B.—Representation Cases Received, Closed, and Pending, Fiscal Year 20071 
Identification of filing party   
 
 
Total  
AFL-CIO 
Unions 
Other 
National 
Unions 
Other  
local  
Unions 
 
Individuals 
 
Employers 
 RC Cases 
Pending October 1, 2006.................... *868 309 484 73 2 -- 
Received fiscal 2007.......................... 2,302 990 1,153 156 3 -- 
On docket fiscal 2007........................ 3,170 1,299 1,637 229 5 -- 
Closed fiscal 2007.............................. 2,560 1,046 1,331 179 4 -- 
Pending September 30, 2007.............. 610 253 306 50 1 -- 
 RM Cases 
Pending October 1, 2006.................... 42 -- -- -- -- 42 
Received fiscal 2007.......................... 92 -- -- -- -- 92 
On docket fiscal 2007........................ 134 -- -- -- -- 134 
Closed fiscal 2007.............................. 87 -- -- -- -- 87 
Pending September 30, 2007.............. 47 -- -- -- -- 47 
 RD Cases 
Pending October 1, 2006.................... 247 1 0 0 246 -- 
Received fiscal 2007.......................... 662 1 3 2 656 -- 
On docket fiscal 2007........................ 909 2 3 2 902 -- 
Closed fiscal 2007.............................. 685 1 2 1 681 -- 
Pending September 30, 2007.............. 224 1 1 1 221 -- 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
* Totals for cases pending Oct. 1, 2007, differ from last year’s annual report.  Revised totals result from postreport adjustments to last  
year’s “on docket” and/or “closed figures.” 
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      Table 2.–Types of Unfair Labor Practices Alleged, Fiscal Year 2007 
 Number of cases show-
ing specific allegations 
 
Percent of total cases 
 
Subsections of Sec. 8(a): Total cases.................... 16,291 100.0 
8(a)(1).................................................................... 2,468 15.1 
8(a)(1)(2).............................................................. 167 1.0 
8(a)(1)(3).............................................................. 4,899 30.1 
8(a)(1)(4).............................................................. 113 0.7 
8(a)(1)(5).............................................................. 6,586 40.4 
8(a)(1)(2)(3).......................................................... 87 0.5 
8(a)(1)(2)(4).......................................................... 2 0 
8(a)(1)(2)(5).......................................................... 77 0.5 
8(a)(1)(3)(4).......................................................... 362 2.2 
8(a)(1)(3)(5).......................................................... 1,320 8.1 
8(a)(1)(4)(5).......................................................... 24 0.1 
8(a)(1)(2)(3)(4)...................................................... 15 0.1 
8(a)(1)(2)(3)(5)...................................................... 64 0.4 
8(a)(1)(2)(4)(5)...................................................... 1 0 
8(a)(1)(3)(4)(5)...................................................... 99 0.6 
8(a)(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)................................................ 7 0 
Recapitulation1 
8(a)(1).................................................................... 16,291 100.0 
8(a)(2).................................................................... 420 2.6 
8(a)(3).................................................................... 6,853 42.1 
8(a)(4).................................................................... 623 3.8 
8(a)(5).................................................................... 8,178 50.2 
B. Charges filed against unions under Sec. 8(b)1 
Subsections of Sec. 8(b): Total cases.................... 5,979 100.0 
8(b)(1).................................................................. 4,672 78.1 
8(b)(2).................................................................. 32 0.5 
8(b)(3).................................................................. 290 4.9 
8(b)(4).................................................................. 394 6.6 
8(b)(5).................................................................. 4 0.1 
8(b)(6).................................................................. 3 0.1 
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Table 2.–Types of Unfair Labor Practices Alleged, Fiscal Year 2007—Continued 
 Number of cases show-
ing specific allegations 
 
Percent of total cases 
 
8(b)(7).................................................................. 62 1.0 
8(b)(1)(2).............................................................. 417 7.0 
8(b)(1)(3).............................................................. 72 1.2 
8(b)(1)(5).............................................................. 3 0.1 
8(b)(1)(6).............................................................. 3 0.1 
8(b)(2)(3).............................................................. 6 0.1 
8(b)(1)(2)(3).......................................................... 18 0.3 
8(b)(1)(2)(5).......................................................... 2 0 
8(b)(1)(2)(3)(5)(6)................................................ 1 0 
Recapitulation1 
8(b)(1).................................................................. 5,188 86.8 
8(b)(2).................................................................. 476 8.0 
8(b)(3).................................................................. 387 6.5 
8(b)(4).................................................................. 422 7.1 
8(b)(5).................................................................. 10 0.2 
8(b)(6).................................................................. 7 0.1 
8(b)(7).................................................................. 63 1.1 
B1. Analysis of 8(b)(4) 
Total cases 8(b)(4)................................................ 394 100.0 
8(b)(4)(A).............................................................. 25 6.3 
8(b)(4)(B).............................................................. 249 63.2 
8(b)(4)(C).............................................................. 7 1.8 
8(b)(4)(D).............................................................. 88 22.3 
8(b)(4)(A)(B)........................................................ 20 5.1 
8(b)(4)(B)(C)........................................................ 2 0.5 
8(b)(4)(A)(B)(C).................................................. 3 0.8 
Recapitulation 
8(b)(4)(A).............................................................. 48 12.2 
8(b)(4)(B).............................................................. 274 69.5 
8(b)(4)(C).............................................................. 12 3.0 
8(b)(4)(D).............................................................. 88 22.3 
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Table 2.–Types of Unfair Labor Practices Alleged, Fiscal Year 2007—Continued 
 Number of cases show-
ing specific allegations 
 
Percent of total cases 
 
B2. Analysis of 8(b)(7) 
Total cases 8(b)(7)................................................ 62 100.0 
8(b)(7)(A).............................................................. 13 21.0 
8(b)(7)(B).............................................................. 2 3.2 
8(b)(7)(C).............................................................. 46 74.2 
8(b)(7)(A)(C)........................................................ 1 1.6 
Recapitulation1 
8(b)(7)(A).............................................................. 14 22.6 
8(b)(7)(B).............................................................. 2 3.2 
8(b)(7)(C).............................................................. 47 75.8 
C. Charges filed under Sec. 8(e) 
Total cases 8(e).................................................... 48 100.0 
Against unions alone............................................ 40 83.3 
Against employers alone...................................... 7 14.6 
Against both.......................................................... 1 2.1 
D. Charges filed Sec. 8(g) 
Total cases 8(g).................................................... 13 100.0 
 
1 A single case may include allegations of violations of more than one subsection of the Act.  Therefore, the total of the 
various allegations is greater than the total number of cases. 
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Table 3B.—Formal Actions Taken in Representation and Union Deauthorization Cases,  
Fiscal Year 20071  
 Formal actions taken by type of case 
 
 
 
Types of formal actions taken 
Cases in 
which 
formal 
actions 
taken2 
Total 
formal 
actions 
taken3 
 
 
RC 
 
 
RM 
 
 
RD 
 
 
UD 
Hearings completed, total...................................................... 357 343 281 3 59 3 
Initial hearing...................................................................... 262 255 214 3 38 2 
Hearing on objections and/or challenges............................ 95 88 67 0 21 1 
Decisions issued, total............................................................        
By Regional Director.......................................................... 242 237 194 4 39 8 
Elections directed.......................................................... 211 200 166 2 32 7 
Dismissals on record.................................................... 31 37 28 2 7 1 
By Board............................................................................ 35 30 14 4 12 2 
Transferred by Regional Directors for initial decision. 2 2 2 0 0 0 
Elections directed................................................... 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Dismissals on record.............................................. 1 1 1 0 0 0 
      Other..................................................................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Review of Regional Directors' decisions:        
Requests for review received.................................. 121 103 75 8 20 0 
Withdrawn before request ruled upon.................... 11 10 9 0 1 0 
Board action on request ruled upon, total.............. 96 80 59 5 16 0 
Granted.............................................................. 13 12 9 1 2 0 
Denied.............................................................. 78 63 46 4 13 0 
Remanded........................................................ 5 5 4 0 1 0 
Withdrawn after request granted, before Board 
review...................................................................... 5 5 2 3 0 0 
Board decision after review, total.......................... 33 28 12 4 12 2 
Regional Directors' decisions:        
Affirmed...................................................... 14 12 3 3 6 1 
Modified...................................................... 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Reversed...................................................... 18 15 8 1 6 1 
Outcome:        
Election directed........................................ 25 21 12 1 8 2 
Dismissals on record................................... 7 6 0 2 4 0 
Other.......................................................... 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Decisions on Objections and/or Challenges, total..................        
By Regional Directors........................................................ 175 160 134 1 25 6 
By Administrative Law Judges......................................... 24 22 21 0 1 0 
By Board............................................................................ 178 169 142 0 27 6 
In stipulated elections.................................................. 143 140 115 0 25 3 
No Exceptions to Regional Directors’ reports...... 87 87 67 0 20 2 
Exceptions to Regional Directors’ reports.............. 56 53 48 0 5 1 
In directed  elections ( after transfer by Regional 
Director)........................................................................ 24 20 18 0 2 3 
No exceptions to RDs/HOs Reports 18 15 14 0 1 2 
Exceptions to RDs/HOs Reports 6 5 4 0 1 1 
Review of Regional Directors' supplemental decisions:        
Request for review received.................................. 28 24 21 0 3 0 
Withdrawn before request ruled upon.................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Board action on request ruled upon, total.............. 24 20 18 1 1 0 
Granted.............................................................. 5 5 4 1 0 0 
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Table 3B.—Formal Actions Taken in Representation and Union Deauthorization Cases,  
Fiscal Year 20071 —Continued 
 Formal actions taken by type of case 
 
 
 
Types of formal actions taken 
Cases in 
which 
formal 
actions 
taken2 
Total 
formal 
actions 
taken3 
 
 
RC 
 
 
RM 
 
 
RD 
 
 
UD 
Denied.............................................................. 17 13 12 0 1 0 
Remanded........................................................ 2 2 2 0 0 0 
Withdrawn after request granted, before Board 
review...................................................................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Board decision after review, total.......................... 11 9 9 0 0 0 
Regional Directors' decisions:        
Affirmed...................................................... 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Modified...................................................... 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Reversed...................................................... 9 7 7 0 0 0 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
2 Total includes petitions consolidated into one decision. 
3 Case counts for UD not included. 
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Table 3C.—Formal Actions Taken in Amendment of Certification and  
Unit Clarification Cases, Fiscal Year 20071 
Formal actions taken by type of 
case2 Types of formal actions taken 
Cases in 
which formal 
actions taken 
AC UC 
Hearings completed........................................................................... 39 1 37 
Decisions issued after hearing...........................................................    
By Regional Directors.................................................................. 58 4 51 
By Board...................................................................................... 4 0 4 
Transferred by Regional Directors for initial decision............ 0 0 0 
Review of Regional Directors’ decisions:...............................    
Requests for review received.............................................. 39 2 21 
Withdrawn before request ruled upon................................ 1 1 0 
Board action on requests ruled upon, total.......................... 20 1 19 
Granted   ........................................................................ 7 0 7 
Denied............................................................................ 13 1 12 
Remanded....................................................................... 0 0 0 
Withdrawn after request granted, before Board review...... 1 0 1 
Board decision after review, total....................................... 4 0 4 
Regional Directors’ decisions:.......................................    
Affirmed.................................................................... 10 0 1 
Modified.................................................................... 0 0 0 
Reversed.................................................................... 3 0 3 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
2 While columns at left counts “cases,” these two columns reflect “situations,” i.e., one or more unfair labor practice cases involving 
the same factual situation. 
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 Table 7A.-Analysis of Methods of Disposition of Jurisdictional Dispute Cases 
 Closed Prior to Unfair Labor Practice Proceedings, Fiscal Year 20071 
Method and stage of disposition Number of cases 
Percent of 
total closed 
Total number of cases closed before issuance of complaint........................................... 47 100.0 
Agreement of the parties-informal settlement.......................................................................... 26 55.3 
Before 10(k) notice.............................................................................................................. 15 31.9 
After 10(k) notice, before opening of 10(k) hearing........................................................... 6 12.8 
After opening of 10(k) hearing, before issuance of Board decision and determination of 
dispute.................................................................................................................................. 4 8.5 
     After Board decision and determination of dispute............................................................ 1 2.1 
Compliance with Board decision and determination of dispute.............................................. 2 4.3 
Withdrawal.............................................................................................................................. 13 27.7 
Before 10(k) notice.............................................................................................................. 11 23.4 
After 10(k) notice, before opening of 10(k) hearing........................................................... 2 4.3 
After opening of 10(k) hearing, before issuance of Board decision and determination of 
dispute.................................................................................................................................. 0 0.0 
After Board decision and determination of dispute............................................................. 0 0.0 
Dismissal.................................................................................................................................. 6 12.8 
Before 10(k) notice.............................................................................................................. 6 12.8 
After 10(k) notice, before opening of 10(k) hearing........................................................... 0 0.0 
After opening of 10(k) hearing, before issuance of Board decision and determination of 
dispute.................................................................................................................................. 0 0.0 
By Board decision and determination of dispute................................................................ 0 0.0 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
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Table 10A.—Analysis of Methods of Disposition of Amendment of Certification 
                      And Unit Clarification Cases Closed, Fiscal Year 20071 
 AC UC 
Total, all.......................................................................................................................... 7 155 
Certification amended or unit clarified.................................................................................... 2 19 
Before hearing................................................................................................................ 1 2 
By Regional Director’s decision.......................................................................... 1 2 
By Board decision................................................................................................ 0 0 
After hearing.................................................................................................................. 1 17 
By Regional Director’s decision.......................................................................... 1 13 
By Board decision................................................................................................ 0 4 
Dismissed................................................................................................................................ 1 35 
Before hearing................................................................................................................ 1 12 
By Regional Director’s decision.......................................................................... 1 11 
By Board decision................................................................................................ 0 1 
After hearing.................................................................................................................. 0 23 
By Regional Director’s decision.......................................................................... 0 19 
By Board decision................................................................................................ 0 4 
Withdrawn................................................................................................................................ 4 101 
Before hearing................................................................................................................ 4 95 
After hearing.................................................................................................................. 0 6 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
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       Table 11.—Types of Elections Resulting in Certification in Cases Closed, 
          Fiscal Year 20071 
Type of election  
 
Type of case 
Total Consent Stipulated 
Board-
directed 
Regional 
Director-
directed2 
Expedited 
elections 
under 
8(b)(7)(C) 
All types, total:       
Elections................................. 31,938 92 1,588 0 256 2 
Eligible voters........................ 135,519 8,825 100,585 0 26,036 73 
Valid votes............................. 105,977 6,436 82,043 0 17,426 72 
RC cases:       
Elections................................. 1,500 74 1,233 0 192 1 
Eligible voters........................ 101,934 8,035 72,709 0 21,120 70 
Valid votes............................. 80,071 5,850 60,386 0 13,766 69 
RM cases:       
Elections................................ 23 0 15 0 7 1 
Eligible voters........................ 1,004 0 830 0 171 3 
Valid votes............................. 831 0 715 0 113 3 
RD cases:       
Elections................................. 358 16 299 0 43 0 
Eligible voters........................ 25,611 617 21,347 0 3,647 0 
Valid votes............................. 21,012 489 17,809 0 2,714 0 
UD cases:       
Elections................................. 57 2 41 0 14 -- 
Eligible voters........................ 6,970 173 5,699 0 1,098 -- 
Valid votes............................. 4,063 97 3,133 0 833 -- 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
2 Cases where election is held pursuant to a decision and direction by the Board. 
3 Due to technical difficulties, data discrepancies exceed 1 percent but are less than 3 percent in case totals for Tables 11, 15B, 15C, and 16. 
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 Table 11C.—Objections Filed in Representation Cases Closed, by Party Filing 
                                                              Fiscal Year 20071 
Total By employer By union By both parties2 Type of election/case 
Number 
Percent 
by type Number 
Percent 
by type Number 
Percent 
by type Number 
Percent 
by type 
All representation elections............................ 163 100.0 50 30.7 109 66.9 4 2.5 
By type of case:         
RC cases............................................... 133 100.0 46 34.6 84 63.2 3 2.3 
RM cases.............................................. 1 100.0 0 0.0 1 100.0 0 0.0 
RD cases............................................... 29 100.0 4 13.8 24 82.8 1 3.4 
By type of election:         
Consent elections.................................. 3 100.0 1 33.3 2 66.7 0 0.0 
Stipulated elections.............................. 92 100.0 27 29.3 63 68.5 2 2.2 
Expedited elections.............................. 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Regional Director-directed elections.... 68 100.0 22 32.4 44 64.7 2 2.9 
Board-directed elections....................... 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
2 Objections filed by more than one party in the same cases are counted as one. 
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 Table 11D.—Disposition of Objections in Representation Cases Closed, 
 Fiscal Year 20071   
Overruled Sustained Type of election/case 
Objec-
tions 
filed 
Objec-
tions 
with-
drawn 
Objec-
tions 
ruled 
upon Number 
Percent 
of total 
ruled 
upon 
Number 
Percent 
of total 
ruled 
upon 
All representation elections............................................. 163 55 108 97 89.8 11 10.2 
By type of case:        
RC cases................................................................ 133 49 84 74 88.1 10 11.9 
RM cases................................................................ 1 0 1 1 100.0 0 0.0 
RD cases................................................................ 29 6 23 22 95.7 1 4.3 
By type of election:        
Consent elections.................................................... 3 0 3 3 100.0 0 0.0 
Stipulated elections................................................ 92 50 42 35 83.3 7 16.7 
Expedited elections................................................ 0 0 0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Regional Director-directed elections...................... 68 5 63 59 93.7 4 6.3 
Board-directed elections........................................ 0 0 0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
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 Table 11E.—Results of Rerun Elections Held in Representation Cases Closed 
                                                                Fiscal Year 20071 
 
Total rerun 
elections 
 
Union certified 
 
No Union chosen 
Outcome of 
original election 
reversed 
Type of election/case 
 
Number 
Percent 
by type 
 
Number 
Percent 
by type 
 
Number 
Percent 
by type 
 
Number 
Percent 
by type 
All representation elections............................ 25 100.0 11 44.0 14 56.0 5 20.0 
By type of case:         
RC cases.............................................. 22 100.0 11 50.0 11 50.0 5 22.7 
RM cases.............................................. 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
RD cases.............................................. 3 100.0 0 0.0 3 100.0 0 0.0 
By type of election:         
Consent elections.................................. 2 100.0 0 0.0 2 100.0 0 0.0 
Stipulated elections.............................. 14 100.0 8 57.1 6 42.9 5 35.7 
Expedited elections.............................. 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Regional Director-directed elections.... 9 100.0 3 33.3 6 66.7 0 0.0 
Board-directed elections...................... 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
1 Includes only final rerun elections, i.e., those resulting in certification.  See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
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Table 22.—Advisory Opinion Cases Received, Closed, and Pending, 
Fiscal Year 20071 
 
Number of cases 
Identification of petitioner 
 
 
 
 
Total 
Employer Union Courts 
State 
board 
Pending October 1, 2006 ……………….………… 0 0 0 0 0 
Received fiscal 2007 ……………………...……….. 0 0 0 0 0 
On docket fiscal 2007 ……...……………………… 0 0 0 0 0 
Closed fiscal 2007 …………………….…………… 0 0 0 0 0 
Pending September 30, 2007……………………... 0 0 0 0 0 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 22A.—Disposition of Advisory Opinion Cases, Fiscal Year 20071 
 
 
Action taken Total cases 
closed 
Total Cases …………………………….…………………………………………………………………………. 0 
Board would assert jurisdiction ………………………………………………………………………………….. 0 
Board would not assert jurisdiction ……………………………………………………………………………… 0 
Unresolved because of insufficient evidence submitted …………………………………………………………. 0 
Dismissed ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 0 
Withdrawn …………………………….………………………………………………………………………….. 0 
Denied ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 0 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
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Table 23.—Time Elapsed for Major Case Processing Stages Completed, Fiscal Year 2007;  
                          and Age of Cases Pending Decision, September 30, 2007 
Stage Median 
days 
I. Unfair labor practice cases:  
 A. Major stages completed -  
 1. Filing of charge to issuance of complaint.............................................................................................. 96 
 2. Complaint to close of hearing................................................................................................................ 104 
 3. Close of hearing to administrative law judge’s decision........................................................................ 69 
 4. Receipt of briefs or submissions to issuance of administrative law judge’s decision............................ 29 
 5. Administrative law judge’s decision to issuance of Board decision...................................................... 840 
 6. Originating document to Board decision................................................................................................ 610 
 7. Assignment to Board decision................................................................................................................ 517 
 8. Filing of charge to issuance of Board decision...................................................................................... 1173 
 B. Age of cases pending administrative law judge's decision, September 30, 2007  
 1. From filing of charge.............................................................................................................................. 296 
 2. From close of hearing............................................................................................................................ 52 
 C. Age of cases pending Board decision, September 30, 2007  
 1. From filing of charge.............................................................................................................................. 829 
 2. From originating document.................................................................................................................... 282 
 3. From assignment.................................................................................................................................... 213 
II. Representation cases:  
 A. Major stages completed -  
 1. Filing of petition to notice of hearing issued.......................................................................................... 1 
 2. Notice of hearing to close of hearing...................................................................................................... 14 
 3. Close of hearing to Regional Director’s decision issued........................................................................ 22 
 4. Close of pre-election hearing to Board’s decision issued1...................................................................... 695 
 5. Close of post-election hearing to Board’s decision issued.................................................................... 102 
 6. Filing of petition to-  
 a. Board decision issued........................................................................................................................ 365 
 b. Regional Director’s decision issued.................................................................................................. 39 
 7. Originating document to Board decision................................................................................................ 186 
 8. Assignment to Board’s decision............................................................................................................ 131 
 B. Age of cases pending Board decision, September 30, 2007  
 1. From filing of petition............................................................................................................................ 318 
 2. From originating document.................................................................................................................... 159 
 3. From assignment.................................................................................................................................... 97 
 C. Age of cases pending Regional Director’s decision, September 30, 2007................................................ 91 
1 This median does not include cases in which the Board denied requests for review. 
Appendix 185 
         Table 24.—NLRB Activity Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, FY 2007 
Action taken Cases/ Amount 
I. Applications for fees and expenses filed with the Board under 5 U.S.C. § 504 during this fiscal year: 
 A. Number of applications filed:.................................................................................................................. 2
 B. Decisions in EAJA cases ruled on by the Board during this fiscal year (includes ALJ awards 
adopted by the Board, and settlements): 
 Granting fees:……………………………………………………………………………………… 0
 Denying fees:………………………………………………………………………………………                2
 C. Amount of fees and expenses in cases listed in B, above: 
 Claimed:…………………………………………………………………………………………… $227,643
 Recovered:………………………………………………………………………………………… 0
II. Petitions for Review of Board Orders denying fees under 5 U.S.C. § 504: 
 A. Awards granting fees (includes settlements):…………………………………………………………                  0
 B. Awards denying fees:………………………………………………………………………………….                  0
 C. Amount of fees and expenses recovered pursuant to court award or settlement (includes fees 
recovered in cases in which court finds merit to claim but remands to Board for determination 
of fee amount):…………………………………………………………………………………………..                0
III. Applications for fees and expenses before Circuit Courts of Appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 2412: 
 A. Awards granting fees (includes settlements):…………………………………………………………                0
 B. Awards denying fees:………………………………………………………………………………….                  0
 C. Amount of fees and expenses recovered:…………………………………………………………….. $10,000,00
IV. Applications for fees and expenses before District Courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2412: 
 A. Awards granting fees (includes settlements):…………………………………………………………                0
 B. Awards denying fees:………………………………………………………………………………….                  0
 C. Amount of fees and expenses recovered:………………………………………………….………… 0  
 
 
 
 
 
